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ARTICLES

AUTOPOIESIS AND THE "RELATIVE
AUTONOMY" OF LAW
Hugh Baxter*

ABSTRACT
Recent accounts of the relation between law and other social
spheres have emphasized law's "relative autonomy." The intuition behind the "relative autonomy" formula is that law is neither
wholly independent of, nor entirely reducible to, political, economic and other social processes. Sensible as this intuition is,
however, the idea of "relative autonomy" by itself remainspurely
negative. It excludes two unpalatableextremes-pure formalism
and pure instrumentalism-butit does not by itself characterize,
in positive theoretical terms, the relation between law and other
social discourses or practices.
This Article examines an attempt in recent German social
thought to specify theoretically the relation between law and
other social spheres. The theory examined-Niklas Luhmann's
theory of "autopoiesis"-is,though familiar to Continentalreaders, not yet well-known to American legal academics. This Article presents autopoietic theory to the American legal audience,
with particularattention to the way in which Luhmann reformulates the "relative autonomy" problematic. Throughout, the Article focuses on the connections between autopoietic theory and
issues in American law and contemporary American legal theory.
The Article's strategy is to criticize those aspects of autopoietic
theory that deserve criticism, but at the same time, to show how
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF "RELATIVE AUTONOMY"

Robert Post has suggested what he calls "a new and stimulating" strategy for the interdisciplinary study of law: to "conceive the
law as a relatively autonomous form of discourse."1 By "relatively
autonomous," Post means that while law "establish[es] its own
particular kind of cultural discourse," it does so by drawing, in
part, on the cultural resources of other social spheres.2 Law, for
Post, is thus not "something apart" from the rest of society, but
neither is it the mere "reflection or reproduction" of other, nonlegal spheres.3
Post acknowledges that understanding law in this way, as a
relatively autonomous discourse, raises difficult questions that require explicit theorizing.4 Among the questions he identifies are
the "boundary question" of the mechanisms by which law simultaneously distinguishes itself from and relates itself to other cultural
spheres, the "legitimacy question" of how law, among other social
discourses, maintains its "characteristic prestige and power," and
the "political question" of how to conceive responsible political action in a world where "meaning has been dissolved into faceless
and impersonal systems of discourse." 5 These questions, and the
associated problematic of law's "relative autonomy," are, according to Post, "driving some of the best and most innovative contemporary legal scholarship." 6
In one sense, Post's proposal seems not so novel. As Post acknowledges, the question of law's boundaries-the boundaries
separating, for example, law and morality, law and politics, or law
and economics-"evokes longstanding work in the theory of legal
interpretation."7 And despite its origins in Marxist debates over
the relation between "base" and "superstructure,"' and its conventional association with the critical legal studies movement,9 the
I Robert Post, The Relatively Autonomous Discourse of Law, in LAW AND THE
ORDER OF CULTURE at viii (Robert Post ed., 1991).
2 Id.
3 Id. at vii.
4 See id. at viii.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at ix.
8 See, e.g., Louis ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY 135-36 (Ben Brewster trans.,
1971); LOUIS ALTHUSSER & tTIENNE BALIBAR, READING CAPITAL 99-100 (Ben Brewster trans., 1970).
9 See, e.g., John Stick, Chartingthe Development of CriticalLegal Studies, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 407, 418 (1988) (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL

STUDIES (1987)); Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Criti-
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formula of "relative autonomy" has entered mainstream scholarship as a convenient way to characterize law's relation to the various other social fields. 10 Even those unfamiliar with the term
"relative autonomy" will recognize the story line it marks out.
Law, the story goes, is at least partially autonomous, in that its
structure, content, and dynamics are not wholly determined by
other social spheres." But law is only "relatively" rather than
completely autonomous: other social spheres (especially politics
and the economy) have influenced, and have in turn been influenced by, the development of the law. The "relative autonomy"
formula thus acknowledges the obvious influences running, in both
directions, between law and other social spheres. At the same
time it recognizes that law must first be understood in its own
terms, not the terms of some other field or discipline (such as politics or economics). Seen in this way, the "relative autonomy" formula seems to offer legal theory a way to negotiate between doctrinal formalism, on one side, and reductionist instrumentalism, on
12
the other.
Still, Post's proposal is unusual and exemplary in at least one
respect: its recognition that "relative autonomy" must be theorized, not simply invoked as a self-interpreting formula. As Post
realizes, the phrase "relative autonomy," left unelaborated, remains purely negative. It suggests that law is neither wholly determined by some other sphere, such as politics or the economy,
nor wholly self-determining and immune from "outside" influences. 3 But in excluding only the extremes of formalism and incal Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV.
199,222 n.97 (1984).
10 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse,and
the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1424-26 (1996) (describing a
"new synthesis" of "post-Chicago School law and economics" and "post-critical legal
studies," one of whose premises is "the relative autonomy of the law"); Pierre Schlag,
Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 839 n.106 (1991) (referring
to "the dominant belief among legal thinkers that the law is (at least relatively) autonomous").
11 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 101
(1984) ("[Rlelative autonomy means that [legal structures] can't be explained completely
by reference to external political/social/economic factors."); Richard A. Posner, Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline?, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 333, 333
(1988) ("[O]ne cannot fairly describe law as completely parasitic on other fields or disciplines.").
12 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the JuridicalField, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 805,814-15 (1987); Post, supra note 1, at xvi n.7.
13 See Robert W. Gordon, Autopoiesis-Questions of a Fascinated Skeptic 2 (1985)
(unpublished conference paper, on file with author) (stating that"relative autonomy" formula "only describe[s] what [law] [i]sn't, rather than what it [ius").
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strumentalism, the phrase "relative autonomy," characterizes neither the extent to which law is "relatively autonomous" nor the
ways in which law maintains its (relative) autonomy.14 As Alan
Hunt has put it: "relative autonomy is a concept in search of a the5

ory."1

A theory that could give "relative autonomy" positive content
needs to address a number of issues. First, as Post suggests, the
theory must account for the "boundary" between law and not-law.
What is it that makes a particular action or communication "legal"
and another "nonlegal"? What are the "internal mechanisms" (in
Post's phrase)" that maintain or relocate this boundary and that
reproduce or transform the legal system? What is the nature of
the boundaries between law and other social spheres? Are they
"porous" or "impervious"? 17 How, in other words, should we understand the relations across boundaries and between different social spheres (between law and the economy, for example, or law
and politics)?
Further, a theory that describes the field of law as "relatively
autonomous" should investigate whether the various particular
spheres of legal activity are equally so. Most claims for law's
autonomy or relative autonomy have centered around the activity
of judging and the development of legal doctrine." But what
about other spheres of legal activity-for example, legislation,
lawyerly practice and argument, legal education, legal scholarship,
and everyday action raising claims to legal validity? A comprehensive account of law's relative autonomy must attend to the difl4 See Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 9, at 222 n.97:
The notion of relative autonomy is so vague as to be of no real significance. Except for those rare few who adopt one of the extreme, almost nonsensical,
views-that law is either completely autonomous from ...or completely determined by material and social life-the notion of relative autonomy can accommodate all political and legal theorists ....
15 ALAN HuNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY 166 (1993); see also id. (stating
that the notion of relative autonomy "is, at least in the formulations currently available to
us, seriously flawed"); id. at 167 (asserting that without theoretical elaboration "the concept of relative autonomy cannot be taken as achieving more than pointing toward a desired type of analysis"); E.P. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 97 (1978) ("'[R]elative autonomy' is a helpful talisman against reductionism,..
but, without substantial addition, and substantive analysis, it remains as nothing more than
a warning-notice.").
16 See Post, supra note 1, at viii.
17 These terms come from Lawrence B. Solum, The Boundaries of Legal Discourse and
the Debate over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 311, 315-16
(1993).
18 See NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 63 (1993) [hereinafter
RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT].
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ferences and interrelations among the legal system's particular

spheres, not take one part of the system-judging and doctrinal
development-for the whole.

Finally, and most fundamentally, the theory must specify what
it means by "autonomy." The most common rendition of autonomy views it as a substantive concept, signifying a (relative) im-

munity from causal influence. On this view, law is autonomous to
the extent it resists determination by other social spheres. 9 But
perhaps "autonomy" can be understood otherwise-as, for example, a methodological directive, instructing the theorist to proceed
immanently, to trace legal phenomena in the first instance to structures, concepts, standards, and dynamics "internal" to the legal
system rather than some other social sphere. On this latter view,
law's autonomy would be fully consistent with the interdependencies among law and other social spheres.
In this Article, I examine a theoretical project that addresses
these issues and rigorously theorizes the space toward which "rela-

tive autonomy" gestures. Although this project-the theory of
"autopoietic" systems-has been highly influential in Europe for
some time,20 only recently has it begun to draw attention in Ameri-

can legal-theoretical circles.' The central notion of "autopoiesis" -a neologism that translates literally as "self-making," "selfcreation," or "self-production"-originated during the 1970s in
biological theory.22 Since the early 1980s, however, the German
19 See, e.g., Richard Lempert, The Autonomy of Law: Two Visions Compared, in
AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 152,173 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988) (defining the "Anglo-American" conception of legal autonomy "in terms of
the (material) independence of applied law from other sources of power and authority in
social life") [hereinafter AUTOPOIETIC LAW].
20 See William Rehg, Translator's Introduction to JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACTS

AND

NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS

TO A DISCOURSE THEORY

OF LAW AND

DEMOCRACY at ix, xx (William Rehg trans., 1996) (noting that Niklas Luhmann, the bestknown exponent of autopoietic theory, "is one of the most influential social theorists in
Germany today"); Eva M. Knodt, Foreword to NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS at
ix, x (John Bednarz, Jr. & Dirk Baecker trans., 1995) [hereinafter LUHMANN, SOCIAL
SYSTEMS] ("Niklas Luhmann. . . in recent years has emerged as Germany's most prominent and controversial social theorist.").
21 See, e.g., Arthur J. Jacobson, The Other Path of the Law, 103 YALE L.J. 2213 (1994);
Arthur J. Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1647 (1989); Rubin, supra note 10, at 1417-19, 1427-29; Symposium, Closed Systems
and Open Justice: The Legal Sociology of Niklas Luhmann, 13 CARDOzO L. REV. 1419
(1992).
22 See HUMBERTO R. MATURANA & FRANCISCO J. VARELA, AUTOPOIESIS AND
COGNITION (Robert S. Cohen & Marx W. Wartofsky eds., 1980); FRANCISCO J. VARELA,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGICAL AUTONOMY (1979); MILAN ZELENY, AUTOPOIESIS: A
THEORY OF LIVING ORGANIZATIONS (1981).

19981

"RELATIVE AUTONOMY" OFLAW

1993

sociologist and lawyer Niklas Luhmann has led a movement to incorporate the idea into sociological thought, and Luhmann, together with another German sociologist and lawyer, Gunther
Teubner, has been particularly interested in the connections between autopoietic theory and the law. From the point of view of
legal theory, this movement has culminated in the recent publication of Luhmann's first book-length application of autopoietic
theory to law, Das Recht der Gesellschaf.23 In this Article, I survey
and criticize Luhmann's theory of legal autopoiesis, focusing on
whether Luhmann's autopoietic theory of law successfully reformulates the "relative autonomy" problematic of legal theory."
In Luhmann's analysis, modern societies are systems of communication that have become differentiated, through a process of
social evolution, into various functional subsystems. Luhmann's
usual examples of these functional subsystems are politics, religion, science, education, economy, and art, as well as the legal system. The boundaries of these communicative systems are established by a "code," or, system-defining distinction-for example,
the legal system's distinction between legal and illegal. Communication invoking the legal/illegal code belongs to the legal system;
all other communication belongs to the legal system's environment. Whereas conventional social systems theory sees these
functional subsystems as "open," engaging in exchanges of input
and output with their environments across porous system boundaries, Luhmann's autopoietic theory describes them as "operatively
23 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18. This book-still untranslated, and
thus practically unavailable to most American legal scholars-amends, clarifies, and deepens Luhmann's earlier discussions of law, and in my view it is essential to an understanding
of Luhmann's views. Accordingly, I rely on it extensively (though with parallel citations to
Luhmann's translated works, where possible). Translations from this work are my own,
with the assistance of Barbara Bosch.
Because autopoietic theory in general, and Recht der Gesellschaft in particular, are
not well-known in the American legal academy, my exposition of Luhmann's views is
lengthier than it otherwise would be. Most of the exposition, however, will be new even to
those who have read English translations of Luhmann's previous article- and chapterlength discussions of law.
For one of the few English-language discussions of autopoietic theory that addresses
Recht der Gesellschaft, see JAMES E. HERGET, CONTEMPORARY GERMAN LEGAL

PHILOSOPHY 73-92 (1996).
24 My exposition of autopoietic theory focuses on Luhmann, rather than both Luhmann and Teubner, for two related reasons. First, Teubner's thinking has incorporated
insights from other theoretical 'approaches, particularly the projects of Jtirgen Habermas
and Michel Foucault. While Teubner's openness to other influences enriches his work, at
the same time it makes him more difficult to describe, simply, as an autopoietic theorist.
Second, Luhmann and Teubner disagree in some important respects, and to account for
both would make the exposition even longer than it is already.
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closed." Autopoietic systems, including the legal system, operate
recursively, producing their own elements self-referentially. For
Luhmann, the legal system, as an autopoietic system of communication, is a recursive, self-referential, self-producing, selfreproducing, self-observing, and self-describing system-in senses
of these terms that will be explained below.
While Luhmann expressly refuses the term "relative autonomy, '" 5 his work can nonetheless be understood as an attempt to
capture theoretically the intuition behind that enigmatic phrase.
Despite his emphasis on "operative closure," Luhmann readily acknowledges that social subsystems, among them the legal system,
are at the same time "cognitively open" and able to "observe" one
another.2 He insists, further, that the legal system is connected"structurally coupled"-to other social subsystems, particularly the
economic and political systems. 27 Luhmann's account of the law's
simultaneous openness and closure, and its simultaneous distinction from and "coupling" to other systems, corresponds to the opposing impulses that the phrase "relative autonomy" expresses.
My account of Luhmann's autopoietic theory of law takes the
following form. Part I outlines the more familiar notions of "open
systems theory" to which Luhmann's autopoietic theory responds.
Part II is an introduction to the basic concepts of general autopoietic theory. In Part III, I describe Luhmann's more particularized
account of the legal system as an autopoietic system, with special
attention to the convergences with, and divergences from, more
familiar American theories of law. I then turn, in Part IV, to the
notion of "structural coupling" Luhmann uses to analyze the interdependencies between law and other social systems-interdependencies that, for other theorists, count as the "relative" part of
"relative autonomy." Part V is a critique and suggested transformation of the theory. In the conclusion, Part VI, I suggest connections between autopoietic theory and contemporary American legal scholarship.
As the reader has probably already discerned, Luhmann's
work is extraordinarily complex and difficult, drawing upon developments in a number of specialized fields, such as cognitive biol25 See, e.g., RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 64-66, 452 n.29, 494, 554
n.12 ("[Tihe common solution with the assistance of the 'relative autonomy' concept can
be neither theoretically nor empirically satisfying, because it does not discriminate in any
way."); Niklas Luhmann, Closure and Openness: On Reality in the World of Law [hereinafter Closure and Openness], in AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note 19, at 335,345.
26 See infra Part II.B.
27 See infra Part IV.
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ogy, cybernetics, and information theory. Further, Luhmann acknowledges that his autopoietic theory belongs to the discipline of
sociology, not legal theory, 21 and thus it does not seem, at first, to
speak directly to the concerns of most American legal theorists.
I try throughout this Article, however, to make Luhmann's
thought more accessible, by noting various points of connection to
positions or debates in American law and legal theory. Some of
these points of connection are relatively specific. In Part III, for
example, I compare Luhmann's notion that courts are "central" to
the legal system with Dworkin's apparently similar claims for
courts' centrality in "law's empire." In Part IV; I discuss ways in
which autopoietic theory might illuminate the structure of regulatory-takings law. And in the concluding Part of this Article, I discuss convergences and divergences between autopoietic theory
and two other contemporary approaches to legal theory-the "law
and social norms" project and legal "postmodernism."
More generally, I suggest that autopoietic theory addresses a
central aspiration of postrealist law and legal theory: to increase
law's "openness" and responsiveness to the social world and to
other, nonlegal discourses. Notwithstanding his insistence on legal
"closure," I argue, Luhmann emphasizes at the same time the possibilities and conditions of law's "openness." The notion of "structural coupling" is Luhmann's way of analyzing the specific links
between legal communication and other social spheres. To date,
Luhmann has identified and discussed three such "structural couplings": notions of "property" and "contract," he says, link legal
and economic communication, and the idea of the "constitution"
links legal and political communication. Each of these couplings,
on Luhmann's account, has a double meaning: both a legal meaning and a distinct, but related, meaning in some other system of
communication. In this way, legal communication may draw systematically upon insights in some other discourse while, at the
same time, law retains its separate identity-that is, its "relative
autonomy."
This idea of structural coupling, I argue in Part V, suggests
any number of analogous connections between law and other social spheres. "Negligence," for example, has both legal and economic significance. Standard jury instructions define negligence as
the failure to meet the legal standard of ordinary care set by that
creature of the law, the "reasonably prudent person." From an
28

See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 31-33.
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economic point of view, "negligence" means the failure to adopt
cost-justified precautions. Increasingly, the economic meaning of
negligence has informed legal interpretations, but notwithstanding
the claims of some law and economics scholars, the two senses of
"negligence" do not entirely coincide. Similarly, the meaning of
"insanity" in criminal law discourse is informed by the meaning of
"insanity" in medical or psychiatric discourse. Nonetheless, as the
Supreme Court has recently stated, the legal meaning of "insanity"
does not track in every respect the medical sense of that term.30 To
take one final example, the idea of "scientific validity" both guides
scientific communication and, within the legal system, helps establish the federal standard for admissibility of expert scientific testimony.31 Even in prescribing this legal link to scientific communication, however, the Supreme Court has noted the differences
between science and law-differences that must qualify the way in
which courts observe, and draw insight from, scientific communi32
cation.
See infra text accompanying notes 492-95.
In the Court's words:
[W]e have traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a medical
nature that have legal significance. As a consequence, the States have, over the
years, developed numerous specialized terms to define mental health concepts.
Often, those definitions do not fit precisely with the definitions employed by the
medical community. The legal definitions of "insanity" and "competency," for
example, vary substantially from their psychiatric counterparts. Legal definitions,... which must "take into account such issues as individual responsibility
... and competency," need not mirror those advanced by the medical profession.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (1997) (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS at xxiii, xxvii (4th ed. 1994)) (citations omitted).
31 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993), the
Court explained:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony,... the trial judge must
determine at the outset ... whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a
fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.
32 The Court stated:
It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and scientific analyses. Yet there are important differences between the quest for truth in the
courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are
subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging
consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are
probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment-often of great consequence-about a particular set of events in the past. We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role
for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury
29
30
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Each of these "couplings" helps to establish law's openness to
the social world by linking legal communication to another social
discourse. But these linkages do not fuse the two systems, nor do
they result in the simple incorporation of one discourse into another. Legal "observation" of other communicative systems is always selective, Luhmann insists, and it remains subject to the conditions, procedures, standards, and criteria of the observing
system.
One contribution of Luhmann's autopoietic theory, I think, is
that it focuses our attention on the possibilities-but also the obstacles and difficulties-of increasing law's openness. The notion
of "coupling" suggests an inquiry into the specific mechanisms,
procedures, and practices that could link legal communication to
other social discourses and to other social spheres. It suggests,
also, attention to the incommensurability of social discourses, and
it counsels some skepticism about what can be attained through
realist and postrealist strategies of increasing law's openness and
responsiveness to its environment.
I note in Part V, however, that Luhmann has not gone far in
moving from general reflection on basic autopoietic concepts to
the sort of specific inquiry that would most interest legal scholars.
I suggest, also, that some of the central theses of autopoietic theory should be qualified or abandoned, and that the theory needs to
be supplemented with insights drawn from other approaches. Legal scholars' "observation" of Luhmann's sociological theory cannot-on Luhmann's own premises-be a simple incorporation of
autopoietic concepts directly into legal theory.
My strategy of interpretation is thus to criticize what deserves
criticism, but to focus also on those aspects of Luhmann's work
that can be useful. In my view, whether or not one decides to
adopt Luhmann's categories and terminology in one's own work,
Luhmann's autopoietic theory still can operate as a productive
stimulus for legal theory.
I. BACKGROUND: "OPEN SYSTEMS" THEORY
Luhmann locates his account of the legal system in a more
comprehensive social-theoretical framework, that of "social sysfrom learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the
balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive
search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal
disputes.
Id. at 596-97.
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tems theory." The basic distinction for any of the many varieties
of social systems theory, including Luhmann's autopoietic theory,
is the distinction between a system and its environment.33 This
fundamental distinction raises a number of fundamental questions.
For example: How should we describe the system's internal structure? What unifies the system as a system, differentiated from its
environment? What is the nature of the boundary between a system and its environment? And how do we account for a system's
relations to its environment? Luhmann typically introduces his
version of social systems theory by distinguishing its answers to
these questions from those offered by earlier versions of systems
theory.
The version of social systems theory probably best known to
legal theorists-and Luhmann's usual foil-is the "open systems"
approach 4 developed during the 1960s under the influence of advances in cybernetics and information theory. This generation of
social systems theorists emphasized the permeability or porousness
of the boundary between system and environment. Inputs to and
outputs from the system regularly cross the system boundary in a
relation of "exchange" or "interchange" between system and environment.35 Through this process the system receives "inputs" from
its environment, processes them, and converts them into "outputs"
fed back to the environment. In turn, information about the outputs' effects on the environment and the system flows back into
the system, completing the "feedback loop."36
David Easton's influential analysis of the political system illustrates this feedback process. According to Easton, "wants" in
33 See, e.g., LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 16 ("There is agreement
within the discipline today that the point of departure for all systems-theoretical analysis
must be the difference between system and environment."); id. at 176; NIKLAS LUHMANN,
ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION 2 (John Bednarz, Jr. trans., 1989) [hereinafter
ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION] ("[Elvery problem of the system is ultimately reducible
to the difference between system and environment."); RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra
note 18, at 26.
34 For examples of this strategy, see RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 4243, 550-52; LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 1-11; Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1419-20 (1992) [hereinafter OperationalClosure and Structural

Coupling]. See also GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 13-15 (Ze-

non Bankowski ed., Anne Bankowski & Ruth Adler trans., 1993).
35 See, e.g., DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 25-26 (1965);
WALTER BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY 50 (1967).

36 See EASTON, supra note 35, at 29-32, 30 diag.1. This is the basic model. Matters get
more complicated once one acknowledges that a system has more than one "feedback
loop," indeed, an indefinite number. See id. at 372-76, 374 diag.5.
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the political environment press for entry into the political system.37
Some of these wants are expressed as political "demands," or,
"wants that the [society's] members would wish to see implemented through political outputs of some sort"'3 8 These demands
are inputted into the system.39 The system's "gatekeeping" function excludes some demands early on;40 others are condensed and
combined into "issues" for further processing;4 a few bypass the
gatekeepers and the "issue" stage entirely.42 A small fraction of
the demands that originally entered the political system survive in
some form to the stage of system output-a decision, in the form
of a statement or performance, that is fed back to the environment.43 The political system's output may well modify its environment; information about the output's effects feeds back into
the system, completing the loop.44 In this way, for Easton, the political system stands in an open, adaptive relation to its constantly
changing environment. 4 The system may increase its adaptiveness
by refining its gatekeeping mechanisms and improving its response
to informational feedback.
The model becomes more complex, however, when we consider that a system's environment typically includes other organized systems. If, for example, we distinguish the political system as
an organized system within society and describe its specific forms
of demand- and information-processing, the same sort of analysis
would seem to hold for the economic system as well. Sociological
systems theorists of the 1960s and early 1970s typically acknowledged this point and subscribed to some version of sociological
"functionalism,"46 according to which modem societies (at least)
are differentiated into a plurality of subsystems. Each such subsystem-the political system or the economic system, for example-is
devoted to the performance of some particular social function.

37 See id. at 71-72.
38

Id. at 71.

39 See id. at 85-116.
40 'See id. at 78, 87-88. "Gatekeepers" may be individuals or groups; they channel the
flow of political demands through the system, or check that flow. See id. at 87-88.
41 See id. at 79, 140-49.
42 See id. at 78-79. As an example of a demand that bypassed the "gatekeepers,"
Easton mentions the demand to "bring the boys back home" at the end of World War II.
Id.at 88.
43 See id. at 348-62.
44 See id. at 32 diag.2, 366-67.
45 See id. at 17-19, 345-47.
46 See KENNETH D. BAILEY, SOCIOLOGY AND THE NEW SYSTEMS THEORY:
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS at xiii-xiv, 19-21 (1994).
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Because these subsystems form "intra-societal"4 7 environments for
one another, the system/environment relation is in substantial
measure a system/system relation-a relation between and among
functional subsystems."8
But how are we to theorize the various relations among differentiated social subsystems? The most ambitious and probably
most influential attempt was the "interchange paradigm" developed by Talcott Parsons, the dominant figure in American sociology between the 1950s and the mid-1970s. Parsons proposed the
idea of "generalized media of interchange" as a way of explaining
the relations within, and among, the social system's functional subsystems.49 Parsons identified four such media-money, power, influence, and "value-commitment"-and located them in the subsystems of economy, polity, "integrative," and "pattern
maintenance" subsystems, respectively. 0 He then set about
charting the "interchange" relations among the four subsystems.
Each such relation, Parsons maintained, is controlled by the two
"media" proper to the related subsystems, and each involves a
"double interchange" of input and output between the two systems." Thus, for example, with respect to the interchange between
economy and polity, Parsons distinguished four boundary-crossing
2
inputs and outputs, two mediated by money and two by power.
The same sort of analysis holds, Parsons thought, for the other five
relations between systems, yielding a sum total of twenty-four
"media"-controlled system interchanges, relations to which Parsons duly assigned names."3
Parsons' justification for distinguishing four social subsystems
was his famous "four-function paradigm," or "AGIL" schema.
Any system of action, Parsons asserted, may be analyzed in terms
of the functions of "adaptation" (A), "goal-attainment" (G), "integration" (I), and "pattern-maintenance and latent tension47 EASTON, supra note 35, at 21-22.
48 "Subsystem" is always a relative

term, used to signal that the system under discussion is part of a larger system. Whether one speaks of "system" or "subsystem" depends
upon the intended level of analysis.
49 For Parsons' overview of this project, see TALCOTr PARSONS, SOCIAL SYSTEMS
AND THE EVOLUTION OF ACTION THEORY 43-48, 59-60, 204-69 (1977) [hereinafter
PARSONS, SOCIAL SYSTEMS].

50 See TALCOTr PARSONS, On the Concept of Political Power, in SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY AND MODERN SOCIETY 297, 348 fig.1 (1967) [hereinafter PARSONS, Political

Power].
51 See id. at 349.
52 See id. at 350 fig.1, 351.
53 See id. at 348 fig.1, 350 fig.2.
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management" (L).14 The four social subsystems of economy, polity, integrative subsystem, and pattern-maintenance subsystem
correspond, Parsons claimed, to those four functions, respectively.5 But if, as Parsons assumed, the four-function paradigm is
of wholly general application, then the same principles should operate not just at the level of the social system, but at a higher level
of analysis as well: the level of the so-called "general action" system.56 At this grander level, the social system takes its place alongside the cultural, personality, and behavioral systems, each of
which fulfills one of the four functions. Each of these four systems, Parsons claimed, has its own generalized medium of communication, and each is involved in the same sort of "double interchange" Parsons had analyzed at the level of the social system. 7
At this point, however, Parsons' interchange paradigm begins
to take on a life of its own. If, as Parsons claims, the four-function
scheme applies to any system," then the number of levels at which
one may identify subsystems and media is unlimited. If we take
the four-function paradigm as a guide, any system one chooses
would be one of four subsystems at a higher level of analysis; so,
too, would be those higher level systems, and so on. 9 Likewise,
any system one chooses to analyze could be subdivided further
into four subsystems; those four could be subdivided into four, and
so on. At some point, of course, the exercise becomes senseless. 0
54 See PARSONS, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 49, at 43 & n.34; see also TALCOTI
PARSONS, Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology, in id. at 229, 236 [hereinafter
PARSONS, General Theory] ("[Tlhe four-function scheme is grounded in the essential nature of living systems at all levels of organization and evolutionary development, from the
unicellular organism to the highest human civilization.").
55 See PARSONS, PoliticalPower,supra note 50, at 348.
56 See TALCOTr PARSONS, On Building Social Systems Theory: A PersonalHistory, in
PARSONS, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 49, at 22, 46-48; PARSONS, General Theory, supra
note 54, at 262-69.
57 See PARSONS, General Theory, supra note 54, at 243-49,262-69.
58 See supra note 54.
59 In his last years, Parsons indeed carried the analysis beyond the level of the "general
action system" to the more encompassing level of "the human condition." See TALCOTr
PARSONS, A Paradigm of the Human Condition, in ACTION THEORY AND THE HUMAN
CONDITION 352 (1978). Here the general action system takes its place alongside "physicochemical nature," the "human organism," and "ultimate structures." Theorists influenced
by Parsons have sought to extend the AGIL schema in different directions as well. See
infra note 61.
60 As Luhmann has put it:
At every level of system-building there is a subsystem that displays the whole
schema once again.... But how far can this process be repeated? Is there a
point past which it gives out? Does it become senseless after the second repetition, like the process of reflection? And, especially, is this the proper way to
represent the structure of functional differentiation? Does this theoretical
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And even at the level of the social system, the project of mapping
the various "media" and input/output interchanges seems, in large
part, only the task of naming the various logical possibilities that
Parsons' interchange paradigm creates.6
Further, entirely apart from the problems with the fourfunction paradigm, Parsons' conception of interchange as direct
input and output between systems is difficult to reconcile with the
premise of social differentiation. The various subsystems Parsons
distinguishes are differentiated systems, each possessing a distinctive function, a distinctive medium of communication, and a distinctive "code" (a system-specific "value-principle" and "coordination standard"). 62 But if these differentiated social subsystems
operate according to a system-specific logic, with system-specific
resources, then how can we describe interchange between systems
as the direct "input" of one system's distinctive resources into another? And how can the interchange between systems be controlled by a "medium" proper to one system but not the other? If
the two systems operate according to different standards and
logics, we have no reason to assume that an "output" from one system will be in a form that another system can process as "input."
Instead, an "output" from the political system, for example, will be
processed as "input" by the economic system only to the extent it
is economically relevant. Whether and how it is economically
relevant will depend upon the standards and criteria of the economic system.
It seems apparent, then, that differentiated social systems are
open to their environments only in a limited or qualified way. To
the extent that the legal system, for example, operates according to
its own standards and criteria, not those of some other social
schema yield not structural complexity but only structural complications?
(Stephen Holmes & Charles
Larmore trans., 1982) [hereinafter DIFFERENTIATION].
61 Many of the essays collected in a two-volume Festschrift for Parsons are good examples. See, e.g., Thomas J. Fararo, Science As a Cultural System, in 1 EXPLORATIONS IN
GENERAL THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 182 (Jan J. Loubser et al. eds., 1976) (applying
the four-function paradigm to name 16 subsystems of the scientific system, four levels removed from Parsons' original level of the social system); Victor Meyer Lidz, Appendix to
Charles W. Lidz & Victor Meyer Lidz, Piaget's Psychology of Intelligence and the Theory
of Action, in id. at 195, 231-36 (naming generalized communications media for the "adaptive" subsystem of the general action system); Guy Rocher, Toward a Psychosociological
Theory of Aspirations, in id. at 391, 404 (using the four-function paradigm to name 16
kinds of aspirations); Mark Gould, Systems Analysis, Macrosociology,and the Generalized
Media of Social Action, in 2 id. at 470, 470-78, 476 (suggesting a "refined version of the interchange paradigm").
62 PARSONS, PoliticalPower, supra note 50, at 353 fig.3.
NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 58
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sphere, it will remain only selectively attentive to the processes of
other social systems. Luhmann's insight is to see this partial "closure" of the legal system (and other systems) as intertwined with
its openness to the environment. In Luhmann's paradoxical slogan: a system's closure is a condition of its openness.63 Or to put it
more straightforwardly: in order to understand the relations
among different social spheres, such as law and the economy, one
must first understand their "internal" operations. The language of
input and output, however, is not designed to give such an account
of a system's internal workings. Indeed, as Luhmann notes,
it was
46
developed precisely to sidestep that problem altogether.
For these reasons, Luhmann presents his autopoietic theory as
a departure from more standard versions of systems theory. In
Luhmann's work, the model of input and output gives way to an
emphasis on systems' "internal" operations.
II.

CLOSURE AND OPENNESS: THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR
LUHMANN'S AUTOPOIETIC "PARADIGM CHANGE"

Luhmann's first formal training in sociology was as Parsons'
student6 and, as he admits, his work before turning to autopoietic
theory employed the input/output model. 66 In the body of Luhmann's work to be considered in this Article, however, the "accents" 67 Luhmann places differ from those characteristic of the
open systems model. He describes autopoietic systems not as open
systems, but as simultaneously open and closed systems, with a

63 See, e.g., LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 447; RECHT DER
GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 76, 86, 466; Niklas Luhmann, The Coding of the Legal
System, in STATE, LAW, AND ECONOMY As AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS 145, 145 (Gunther

Teubner & Alejandro Febbrajo eds., 1992) [hereinafter Coding]; Niklas Luhmann, The
Self-Reproduction of Law and Its Limits, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE
111, 113 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1985) [hereinafter Self-Reproduction]; Niklas Luhmann,
The Unity of the Legal System, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note 19, at 12, 20 n.17, 32
(Paul Knight trans. 1988) [hereinafter Unity].
64 Luhmann observes that in early versions of open systems theory, "input" and "output" were counterpart concepts to a "black box" conception of systems. See LUHMANN,
SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 201-02. By representing systems as black boxes or
transformation functions, "[olne can thereby represent the 'insides' of the system, which
cope with 'throughput,' as very complex and opaque ... yet still explain, in a 'systemstheoretical' way, observable regularities in the system's input and output behavior." Id. at
201 (translation amended).
65 See Knodt, supra note 20, at xi. Luhmann, however, was never converted to Parsons' project of constructing and mapping the various "interchange media."
66 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 442 n.5. For examples, see
DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 60, at 38-39, 111, 143.
67 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 42.
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stronger accent on closure.6 As Luhmann puts it, the "paradigm
change"6 9 he effects through autopoietic theory amounts to a shift
"from input-type descriptions to closure-type descriptions. "70
In the remainder of this section, I examine how Luhmann accomplishes this "paradigm change." I consider, first, Luhmann's
notion of "operative closure" and the associated notion of systemspecific "coding." I then examine how Luhmann accounts for
(what he calls) "cognitive openness"-the capacity of a system's
communication to "observe" the environment, conditioned always
by the system's operative closure. Just as "operative closure" is
paired with the notion of a system's "code," so is "cognitive openness" paired with the idea of a system's "programs."
A.

Operational(or Operative) Closure and System-Specific
Coding
Luhmann emphatically rejects the traditional conception of
society as an association among individual human beings. For
Luhmann, while human beings are necessary conditions for society
and "structurally coupled" to social systems, the elements of a social system are not individual human beings, but communications.71
Society, Luhmann says, is the "system that simply consists of
communication and of every communication. 72 Communications
are both the elements of society and, in Luhmann's terminology,
its "operations"-the means by which a society carries itself forth
and reproduces itself as a system. 7
Society, so conceived, is "operationally" or "operatively
closed. '7 This point is tautological, following from Luhmann's
68 See, e.g., LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 9 ("The... distinction between 'closed' and 'open' systems is replaced by the question of how self-referential closure can create openness."); id. at 447 ("[T]he theory of self-referential systems sublates
the difference between closed and open systems .... All openness is based on closure
... "); ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 40, 64-65; RECHT DER
GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 77; OperationalClosure and Structural Coupling, supra
note 34, at 1427; Self-Reproduction, supra note 63, at 113; Unity, supra note 63, at 15.
69 LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 4-5.
70 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 69.
71 See, e.g., NIKLAS LUHMANN, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, in ESSAYS ON
SELF-REFERENCE 1, 6 (1990) [hereinafter Autopoiesis of Social Systems]; RECHT DER
GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 35; LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 9899; OperationalClosure and StructuralCoupling,supra note 34, at 1422.
72 NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 282 (Martin Albrow ed.,
Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., 1985).
73 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 35; Autopoiesis of Social Systems,
supra note 71, at 2-3.
74 See LUHMANN, supra note 72, at 282 ("[Society... is an operatively closed system,
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definition of society as the system of all communications and his.
definition of communication as society's mode of operation.
Communications, the operations of society, establish the system's
boundaries. If something is a communication, then it is an element
and an operation of society. If not, then it is in the environment of
society as a system. The system of society is closed by its bounda-.
ries, and those boundaries are established by the operations called
"communications." In this uninteresting sense, then, society is an
"operatively" or "operationally closed" system.
Matters are more interesting with respect to the subsystems of
society as system. Luhmann retains the idea, discussed above with
respect to open systems theory, that modem societies are differentiated into a plurality of subsystems. The transition to modernity
has been a process of differentiation, according to Luhmann,
through which certain types of communication have separated out
from the general run of societal communications, linking up to
form specialized communicative networks. Examples of these specialized networks include the economy, law, science, politics, education, and art.75 Luhmann maintains that these subsystems, like
the boundaries of the society that encompasses them, are operationally closed. Again, the conclusion of "operative closure" is
tautological: "closure" refers to boundaries, and the system's
boundaries are established by (indeed, coextensive with) the system's operations. Still, tautological or not, Luhmann's conclusion
that social subsystems are operationally closed joins issue with
open systems theory-with respect to its account of the boundaries
between these subsystems, and its conception of the relations between and among social subsystems.
Luhmann rejects the idea, basic to open systems theory, that
social subsystems' boundaries are points of connection through
which information generated in one system may be exchanged for
information generated in another system. 76 This departure from
open systems theory follows from Luhmann's understanding of
operational closure. If, as Luhmann contends, subsystem boundaries are established "internally," through the system's own operations, then a system's boundary will not necessarily be something it
shares with another system, as in the picture underlying open sysnamely a system that simply consists of communication and of every communication.").
The terms "operationally" and "operatively" are synonymous.
75 See, e.g., RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 7, 16; Coding, supra note 63,
at 155.
76 See, e.g., RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supranote 18, at 85, 555; OperationalClosure
and StructuralCoupling, supra note 34, at 1432.
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tems theory. Further, Luhmann insists, information is systemspecific; it has meaning only in the terms of the system whose operations have produced it. From the perspective of one subsystem,
Luhmann says, the operations of another system provide (in the
first instance) not information, but "noise."" Whether and to what
extent that "noise" may be processed as information depends upon
the first system's internal structures and operations. 8
In place of the input/output interchange paradigm of open
systems theory, Luhmann emphasizes the "recursive closure" of
communicative subsystems. 79 A present communication links recursively to past communications and establishes fresh possibilities
for future communications. For example, when a court communicates a judicial decision, it typically relies on past legal communications, such as prior decisions, and in so doing it creates connective
possibilities for future legal communications. In this recursive
process, the system reproduces itself as a network of systemspecific communications.
This recursive closure illustrates what Luhmann means by
"autopoiesis" and the associated notions of self-production, selfreproduction, and self-reference. An autopoietic system is selfproducing, in the sense that it produces its own elements through
its own operations. It is self-reproducing, in the sense that its operations reproduce the system as a network of communications
(which includes the possibility of transforming it). And it is selfreferential, in the sense that it operates recursively upon its own
elements.
Still, to say only that a social subsystem establishes its own
boundaries through its own communicative operations is to leave
open precisely how this process occurs. Luhmann further specifies
the notion of operative closure through the idea of a systemspecific "code." A code is a binary opposition between a positive
and negative value. 80 The code establishes the system's boundaries
and organizes its communication. All communication invoking a
particular subsystem's code belongs to that system; all other communication is in the subsystem's environment. The system's code,
77 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAF, supra note 18, at 43.
78 See id. at 43 & n.11 (on the "order from noise" principle of general systems theory).

79 See Niklas Luhmann, Some Problems with "Reflexive Law" [hereinafter Some
Problems], in STATE, LAW, AND ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS, supra note 63, at

389, 392.
80 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 60, 69-70; ECOLOGICAL
COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 37-38; OperationalClosure and Structural Coupling,
supra note 34, at 1427-28; Coding, supra note 63, at 152.
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Luhmann contends, establishes the system's unity,"1 which always
at the same time means its distinction from its environment."' The
code closes the system off from the other systems in its environment by serving, as Luhmann puts it, as a "rejection value" for the
codes of other systems.83
The code of the legal system, Luhmann says, is the opposition
between "Recht" and "Unrecht"-terms not easily translated, but
best rendered as "legal" and "illegal." 84 All communication that
concerns the attribution of the code values "legal" or "illegal" belongs to the legal system; all other communication belongs to the
legal system's environment. 5 This conception of the legal system's
boundaries is expansive. The legal system consists for Luhmann
not in a set of rules, nor in a complex of institutions such as courts
and legislatures, but in communications that invoke the idea of legal validity or invalidity. Nor is law, for Luhmann, just "what officials do about disputes" (in Llewellyn's famous phrase). 6 While
legal communication may take place in a formal institutional context, it need not. The statement "get off my property" is a communication within the legal system, to the extent it invokes a legal
right to exclude.Y7 Further, the legal system includes, for example,
communications surrounding the formation of a contract s , or a
81 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 187. The unity is paradoxical,
however, because the code consists in an opposition between positive and negative values.
See id.
82 See id. at 214.
83 See id. at 181-82, 187; Coding, supranote 63, at 157.
84 See, e.g., RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 67, 131, 165-213; Operational Closure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1427-28; Some Problems, supra
note 79, at 393-94; Coding, supra note 63, at 145; ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra
note 33, at 36. Sometimes the terms "Recht" and "Unrecht" have been translated as
"right" and "wrong," see, e.g., Self-Reproduction, supra note 63, at 115, but that rendition
suggests something Luhmann wants to resist-the collapse of a distinction between law
and morality. See Coding,supra note 63, at 146-47 (noting the problem of translation and
stating that he employs "the terms legal and illegal quite independently of moral valuations").
One final note on the meaning of "illegal" or." Unrecht": Luhmann understands that
term to mean something broader than "criminal." Breach of contract counts as "illegal"
for Luhmann's purposes, as does the wrongful appropriation of property. The examples
following this note in text confirm this interpretation.
85 See Operational Closureand StructuralCoupling, supra note 34, at 1428.
86 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1930) (emphasis omitted).
87 See Niklas Luhmann, Law As a Social System, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 136, 141 (1989)
[hereinafter Law As a Social System] ("[E]very communication that makes a legal assertion or raises a defense against such an assertion is an internal operation of the legal system, even if it is occasioned by a dispute among neighbors, a traffic accident, a police action, or any other event.").
88 See, e.g., RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 107, 136, 229, 237, 321, 324,

2008

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:1987

corporation, 9 or the writing of a will.90 Nor is all law necessarily
state law for Luhmann; communication about "intra-organizational" law belongs to the legal system.9 Although, as discussed
below, 92 Luhmann treats communication in and around the courts
as "central" and other legal communication as "peripheral," his
expansive conception of the legal system's boundaries should
nonetheless be congenial to "legal pluralists" and others interested
in law's workings outside of formal legal institutions.93
So far, however, Luhmann's account of the relation between
the legal system (for example) and other social subsystems is almost entirely negative. Social subsystems such as law, politics,
economy, and science do not stand in a relation of input/output interchange. Information does not cross the boundaries from one
system into another. The systems are operatively closed, in that
they have distinct codes that serve as "rejection values" for one
another. Luhmann has accounted, at least in a preliminary way,
for systems' "autonomy":9 4 they are operatively closed networks of
specialized communication, processing system-specific information
according to system-specific codes. But how are these "operatively closed" systems positively related? Does Luhmann's emphasis on systems' operative closure and autonomy mean that he
denies interdependencies and influences among the various
spheres of society? Is he asserting a new brand of legal formalism
that insists on law's autonomy and denies the qualifications the
phrase "relative autonomy" signals?
The answer to these questions is "no." Autopoietic theory
does not deny the mutual influences and interdependencies among
the communicative subsystems it distinguishes. 95 While autopoietic
327, 338; OperationalClosure and Structural Coupling,supra note 34, at 1433-34; Coding,
supra note 63, at 154, 175; ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 64; SelfReproduction, supra note 63, at 112.
89 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAF, supra note 18, at 107.
90 See id. at 338.
91 See id. at 322, 324-25.
92 See infra Part III.B.
93 See Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992) (autopoiesis and legal pluralism); TEUBNER, supra note
34, at 111-12.
94 Recently Luhmann has begun to approach the term "autonomy" with caution. See
RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 62-66 (noting the confusions to which the
term has led). By "autonomy," Luhmann means "that structures of the system arise only
through the operations of the system." So understood, he says, autonomy is a consequence of operative closure. See id. at 63.
95 See, e.g., id. at 43-44, 76, 150, 204, 281-82; Operational Closure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1419-20, 1431-38; ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33,
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systems are, Luhmann says, operatively closed, they are at the
same time "cognitively open" to their environments. With this notion of "cognitive openness," and the associated concept of "programming," Luhmann begins his account of how the law (for example) is related to the various other differentiated systems of
communication. 96
B. Cognitive Openness and "Programming"
In describing autopoietic systems as "self-referential," Luhmann does not mean that an autopoietic system is autistic, operating as if the world consisted only in communications marked by
the system's own code. Luhmann defines self-referential systems
not as self-contained spheres isolated from everything else, but as
systems that, through their operations, necessarily differentiate or
distinguish themselves from their environments. The idea of a system, Luhmann emphasizes, includes this difference between the
system and its environment. 97 A system's self-reference, therefore,
involves not just "self-reference" in the narrow sense, but "external" reference as well. 98
Luhmann's account of legal communication illustrates this
relation between self-reference and external reference. In allocating the code values "legal" and "illegal," legal communication
engages in "self-reference" in the narrow sense, by referring to the
system's own code. But the something to which legal communication ascribes the code values "legal" and "illegal" is not necessarily
itself a legal communication. Legal communications may refer to
processes and events beyond the system's boundaries-that is, to
events and processes that are not themselves "coded" according to
the distinction between legal and illegal. In this way, the distinction between the legal system and its environment, implicit in all
legal communication, "re-enters" the legal communication.99 The
legal system is "cognitively open" to the extent that it offers,
within legal communication, the possibility of "observing" the
at 115-21; Unity, supra note 63, at 15.
96 The other parts of the story are in Luhmann's discussion of "interests" in legal argument, see infra text accompanying notes 241-62, and his account of "structural coupling," see infra Part IV.
97 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 23, 76, 92, 440; Closure and
Openness, supra note 25, at 335.
98 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 52 (stating that "self-reference
implies external reference, and vice versa"); Unity, supra note 63, at 23.
. 99 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 76, 89; Some Problems, supra
note 79, at 411.
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world beyond the legal system's boundaries.'0°
Legal communication is nonetheless "self-referential," in the
broader sense, because its observations of the legal environment
are conditioned by the premises, procedures, standards, and criteria of the legal system. The environment as it appears in legal
communication is "operatively constructed," Luhmann says101
not. passively or neutrally reflected, but framed by the operations
of the legal system itself, subject to the observational conditions
the legal system's operations presuppose and reproduce. In this
sense, the system's operative closure is the condition for its
cognitive openness-i.e., its openness to the environment beyond
the legal system's boundaries102
But to explain the sense in which the legal system is "open" to
its environment, Luhmann needs something more than the notion
of the legal code. The code is "invariant," Luhmann says, and accordingly it does not itself offer any way for the system to adapt to
its changing environment.'0 ' Nor does the code itself provide "criteria for the determination of legal and illegal." 14 The code by itself is only a tautology (legal is not illegal, and illegal is not legal)
or, if applied to itself, a paradox-the paradox of whether the distinction between legal and illegal is itself legal or illegal. 15 In
short, a system outfitted only with the legal code would be incapable of operation. 16
The solution to these problems, Luhmann maintains, is in the
"system-internal distinction between coding and programming."'07
A system's code, Luhmann has said, is the binary distinction between two opposed values, one positive and one negative (such as
legal and illegal). A "program" guides the allocation of those code
values in particular situations. 08 The domain of legal program100 See RECiTrr DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 85; Self-Reproduction, supra note
63, at 113.
101 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 41 (referring to his approach as
"operative constructivism").
102 See id. at 86; Self-Reproduction, supra note 63, at 113.
103 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 187-88; Coding, supra note 63, at
174.
104 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 189-90.
105 See id. at 188; see also Coding, supra note 63, at 172-73; ECOLOGICAL
COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 37 (noting problems of tautology and paradox associated with unsupplemented code).
106 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 187-91; Coding, supra note 63, at
172; ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 37.
107 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 189.
108 See id. at 93, 189; Operational Closure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at
1428; Coding,supra note 63, at 171-72.
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ming includes "the whole of positive law," Luhmann says-"constitutions, laws, regulations, court decisions with official precedent[ial] effect, and... contracts."' 19 While the code is invariantwithout it, the legal system would no longer be a legal system-legal programs are variable. 110 Indeed, the very meaning of positive
law is that its content may be changed."'
Luhmann connects the coding/programming difference to the
distinctions between operative closure and cognitive openness and
between self-reference and external reference. A system's coding
accomplishes its operative closure"' and corresponds to the "selfreference" side of the distinction between self-reference and external reference."' A system's programming is the basis for its
openness to the environment and its capacity for "external" reference.- A system is thus closed with respect to its code, but "cognitively" open with respect to its programs."' Coding and programming thus mutually presuppose one another"5 and combine
internal reference with external reference, closure with openness.

116

According to Luhmann, the prototypical legal program is the
"conditional" program: "if A, then B," where "A" is some past, ascertainable fact, and "B" is one of the code values, legal or illegal. 117 This version of the conditional program should be familiar
to American readers: it corresponds exactly to the idea of the
"rule" in American legal process theory."' But while the "rule" is
109 Coding, supra note 63, at 175; see also Operational Closure and Structural Coupling,
supra note 34, at 1434 (legal programs include "laws, regulations, contracts");
ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 64 ("laws or ordinances, statutes or
procedural rules.... judicial rulings or contractual agreements").
110 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 187, 193; Coding, supra note 63,
at 173-74.
"' See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 533.
112 See id. at 93; Operational Closure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1429;
ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 40.
113 See Coding,supra note 63, at 173; Some Problems, supra note 79, at 395.
114 See ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 40,45.
115 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 190. Programs refer to the code;
the code could not operate without supplementation by programs. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
116 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 195; ECOLOGICAL
COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 45; see also RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note

18, at 83.117 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 197; Unity, supra note 63, at 23.
118 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &

Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (claiming that a "rule," in "the narrow and technical sense," is
"a legal direction which requires for its application nothing more than a determination of
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but one form of legal directive for the legal process theorists, 19 the
conditional program is of much more general significance for
Luhmann. Contrary to "everything jurists have been accustomed
to thinking since the 'social engineering approach' at the beginning
of this century," Luhmann says provocatively, "the programs of
the legal system are always conditional programs."1 0 This claim
follows, Luhmann thinks, from his view that the legal program's
role is to establish a combination of openness and closure, external
reference, and self-reference. The conditional program makes this
combination explicit, referring in its "then" clause to the systeminternal code and in its "if" clause to the relevant event or process
in the environment. Only the conditional program, Luhmann
maintains, accomplishes an "ongoing connection of self-reference
and external reference," giving "the system's orientation to its environment a cognitive, and at the same time deductively usable
1 21
form.
Despite this bold claim, Luhmann is aware that many legal
"programs" do not appear to be cast in the form of conditional
programs as he has described them. "Purposive programs," such
as the "best interests of the child" standard in family law,122 state
general goals and give the legal decisionmaker discretion as to how
to realize them.' 23 In contrast to the "retrospective" orientation of
the conditional program,1 24 purposive programs are oriented toward the future, and they require weighing the likely consequences
23
of possible decisions, not just the ascertainment of past facts
Appearances notwithstanding, Luhmann argues, there are no
"genuine" purposive programs, in the sense of rules that would
make the present choice between "legal" and "illegal" contingent

the happening or non-happening of physical or mental events-that is, determinations of
fact").
119 See id. at 138-43.
120 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 195; see also Self-Reproduction, supra note 63, at 118 ("[Conditional programmes are the hard core of the legal system ....
All legal norms are conditional programmes and if they are not formulated that way they
can be translated into if-then relations.").
121 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 195; see also Unity, supra note 63, at
23.
122 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 200-01; Self-Reproduction, supra
note 63, at 118.
123 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 195; see also Helmut Willke,
Three Types of Legal Structure: The Conditional, the Purposive and the Relational Program, in DILEMMAS OF LAW INTHE WELFARE STATE, supra note 63, at 280.
124 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 197.
125 See id. at 198-204; Coding, supra note 63, at 171-77.
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upon actual future events. 26 The legal programs described as
"purposive" are, he says, better understood as variants of the conditional program. In these programs, the condition on which the
choice of code values depends is not a past fact, but a present projection of a future fact. 127 Luhmann expresses serious reservations
about this type of legal rule. He takes a skeptical view of the legal
system's capacity to forecast the future, 26 suggests that considerations of purpose come dangerously close to overstepping the
bounds of the judicial role, 12 9 and worries that the demonstrated
inaccuracy of judicial predictions undermines the authority of legal
decisions.130 Nonetheless, this "purposive" variant of the conditional program seems to satisfy the criteria of a valid legal program: it connects the system's self-reference with external reference, and it creates an "openness" of the system's operations
toward the environment (and toward the future).
C. Closure and Openness
To this point, we have at least the beginnings of Luhmann's
autopoietic reformulation of the open systems paradigm. Social
subsystems do not exchange information through inputs and outputs that cross system boundaries; rather, information is systemspecific, generated under the aegis of a particular code and with
respect to the system's programs (or, rules that govern allocation
of the code's values). Social subsystems are, by definition, "operatively closed": a system's coded communicative operations establish the system's boundaries, and no system performs operations in
another system, i.e., under another system's code. In this sense,
they are "autopoietic"-self-producing, self-reproducing, and recursively self-referential. A system's closure is the condition for
any "openness" systems can attain: communication in one system
may "observe" the system's environment, but only those aspects of
the environment that can be made relevant to the system's code,
126 See ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 66 ("[T]he basic form of law
remains the conditional program, no matter how much talk there is in environmental law
about 'goals."'); RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 200.
127 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 200; Self-Reproduction, supra

note 63, at 118.
128 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 200; Self-Reproduction, supra
note 63, at 118.
129 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 201; see also Closure and Openness, supra note 25, at 347 ("[O]ne may reach the point when the anti-trust courts can no
longer be distinguished from the anti-trust agency, or youth courts from the youth welfare
office itself.").
130 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 202-03.
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and only so far as they are communicable within the system's programs.
We have, further, some sense about the way Luhmann's autopoietic theory applies to the world of law. The legal system consists in communications coded by the distinction between legal and
illegal. Its boundaries therefore include all, but only, communications that concern legal validity or invalidity. Legal programs encompass "the whole of positive law"-constitutions, statutes,
regulations, court decisions, and also contracts. The prototypical
form of these programs is the conditional program (understood to
include also the so-called "purposive" program).
In no way, however, are we yet in a position to assess Luhmann's reformulation of the "relative autonomy" problematic.
First, the account of the legal system provided so far is at best a
sketch. More needs to be said about how the legal system operates
before we will have even a minimally adequate map of the legal
terrain. Second, the account of openness and closure, coding and
programming, has not focused specifically on how the legal system
is related to other particular subsystems, such as politics and the
economy. To say that communication in any particular system has
a limited capacity for openness to its various social environments-a capacity limited by the system's operative closure-may
be the beginning of Luhmann's account of how law and other systems are related, but it is not the end of his story.
The following Parts address these two points. In Part III, I fill
out Luhmann's map of the legal system. In Part IV, I discuss the
notion of "structural coupling" that Luhmann uses to specify the
relations between law and other communicative systems.
III.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S "INTERNAL" DIFFERENTIATION

All communications that invoke the legal code, Luhmann has
said, belong to the legal system. But not all legal communications
are equally important in the system's ongoing reproduction, nor do
they participate in this process in the same way. The legal system
is itself a differentiated system, Luhmann maintains, with its own
subsystems and particularized forms of communication. This section presents Luhmann's view of the legal system's "internal" differentiation.
A. Forms of Differentiation
Even in arguing for an expansive conception of the legal system's boundaries, Luhmann notes the centrality of its "organiza-
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tional-professional inner core."1' An essential condition for the
development of legally coded communication, Luhmann argues, is
the development of "a more narrow realm of legally binding decisions.' 112 This legal "subsystem," comprising both courts and legislatures, Luhmann calls "the organized decision system of the legal system." ' Within this organized decision system, Luhmann is
particularly interested in accounting for what he calls "the special
position of courts."1 14
The legal system, a subsystem of the differentiated system 1of35
society, is thus itself internally differentiated into subsystems.
But how should we conceive of this internal differentiation? How
are the legal system's subsystems ordered? Luhmann approaches
these questions, in the first instance, with a typology of "forms of
differentiation" he developed before his turn to autopoiesis, according to which systems may be differentiated "segmentally,"
"hierarchically," or "functionally." Luhmann has relied on the notion of functional differentiation in his general account of society
as a system: subsystems such as law, politics, and economy, he has
claimed, are differentiated communicative networks devoted to
particular societal functions. 136 The other two forms can be explained together. "Segmentation," in Luhmann's terminology, is
the differentiation of "equal subsystems." "Hierarchy" (or alter131
132

Id. at 68.
Id. at 145.

Id.
Id. at 305.
135 See id. at 298.
136 According to Luhmann, each subsystem has a single function. The function of the
legal system, he says, concerns "the stabilization of normative expectations," or, maintaining expectations about behavior even when those expectations are disappointed. See
id. at 131, 138; cf. OperationalClosure and StructuralCoupling, supra note 34, at 1426 (asserting that a legal system's function is "producing and maintaining counter-factual expectations in spite of disappointments" through the use of "the symbols of normativity"). The
reason I have not stressed Luhmann's functionalism is that it seems to me largely a remnant from his pre-autopoietic approach. Cf. BAILEY, supra note 46, at 21 (noting that recent systems-theoretical approaches have tended to jettison the assumptions of functionalism); Bob Jessop, The Economy, the State, and the Law: Theories of Relative Autonomy
133
134

and Autopoietic Closure, in STATE, LAW, AND ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS,

supra note 63, at 187, 243-44, 246, 255, 258, 260 (arguing against Luhmann's functionalism). In any event, Luhmann never adequately justifies his assumption that social systems
perform one and only one function. He gives two reasons for that assumption: first, he
says, only the "one function" hypothesis "leads to unequivocal [eindeutige] results," and
second, assuming a plurality of functions would lead to "unclarities in the demarcation
[Abgrenzung] of the law." RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 133. What
Luhmann means by "unequivocal results" is unclear. And as for Luhmann's second argument, the notion of the legal code suffices to individuate the legal system and distinguish it from other systems.
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natively, "stratification") is the differentiation of "unequal subsystems.' 3 7 A society comprised of a collection of families with
roughly equal wealth and power is "segmentally" differentiated,
but to the extent that the various families are ranked in order of
wealth or power, the society is "hierarchically" differentiated or
"stratified."'38
Given Luhmann's emphasis on functional differentiation in
his account of social subsystems such as law, politics, and the
economy, one might expect him to characterize the legal system's
"internal" differentiation in the same terms. An emphasis on functional differentiation would support a legal-process-style account
of the different functions of courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies, and the different forms of legal communication each
function requires. And Luhmann begins his account of courts'
"special position" by distinguishing between legislation and adjudication, describing that distinction as essential for an understanding of courts' activities.139 Nevertheless, for reasons he does
not make entirely clear, Luhmann does not discuss explicitly the
possibility that functional differentiation might be the primary
form for the legal system's internal differentiation. 140
With respect to the other two forms in his typology, Luhmann
does acknowledge instances of hierarchical and segmental differentiation within the legal system. 141 For example, the American
federal courts are arranged in a hierarchy from district courts to
courts of appeals to the Supreme Court. And at the first two levels
of this hierarchy, one finds segmental differentiation-the regional
courts of appeals, for example, are similar in structure and undifferentiated by rank. But neither form of differentiation describes
the organization of the legal system as a whole, nor is either, in
Luhmann's view, the most fundamental form of differentiation in
142
the "more narrow realm" of the "organized decision system.'

Neither form, he maintains, accounts for the courts' special position.

137 See DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 60, at 233-34; see also RECHT DER
GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 297,446-47.
138 See DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 60, at 234; see also RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT,
supra note 18, at 297, 447.
139 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 302.
140 He argues only that viewing the legal system as a functionally differentiated subsystem of society does not preclude other forms of "internal" differentiation. See id, at 33337.
141 See id. at 323-24 (discussing the court system).
142 Id. at 145.
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Luhmann is particularly interested in dispatching the idea that
the courts' position should be understood in hierarchical terms.
Despite his phrase "special position," Luhmann expressly denies
that courts are more important than legislatures, either within the
legal system, or in the legal system's relations with the rest of society.'43 But neither do courts stand below legislatures in a "hierarchy of instruction."'' " Traditional conceptions of legislative supremacy, in which the court is the legislature's faithful agent, miss
the circularity of the relation between courts and legislatures.
While courts seek to interpret the will of the legislature (or the
meaning of legislation), for their part legislatures must try to anticipate judicial interpretation and to determine "how new statutes
may be inserted into the totality of the courts' decision premises,"' 5 including prior judicial decisions.
This circularity in the relation between adjudication and legislation, between courts and legislatures, is the starting point for
46
Luhmann's analysis of the legal system's internal differentiation.
To explain that relation further, Luhmann introduces a form of
differentiation comparatively undeveloped in his earlier work, and
absent from his usual typology: differentiation according to a "center/periphery" schema.47 Courts' special position, Luhmann argues, is their "centrality" in the legal system's operations, in a
sense of "centrality" explained below.
B. The Central Position of Courts
As Luhmann acknowledges, the center/periphery scheme has
generally been understood in geographical or geopolitical terms.
It has been used, for example, to account for the distinction between town and country in precapitalist societies, 14 or to analyze
the economic and technological differences among nation-states
and other territorial regions in the early-modern capitalist world
economic system.'49 For his purposes, however, Luhmann ex143 See id. at 323; Self-Reproduction, supra note 63, at 119 ("Within the legal system the
priority passes onto the legislature.").
144 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 302.
145 Id. at 302.
146 See id. at 305.
147 Luhmann has mentioned this distinction in at least one work other than Recht der
Gesellschaft. See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 190. The invocation of
center and periphery in Recht der Gesellschaft, however, seems to be one of the few instances in which Luhmann has used the distinction systematically. See also Teubner, supra
note 93, at 1459-60.
148 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 333 & n.74.
149 See id. at 321 n.50, 333 & n.75. Luhmann mentions in this connection the work of
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ter/periphery metaphor might have. 5 He argues, further, that although this form of differentiation is more prevalent in premodern
societies,151 it persists in some modern contexts."' But if the center/periphery metaphor is not to be understood either spatially or
in its usual temporal setting, what sense is it supposed to have?
1. Center, Periphery,and "Empire"
One approach to what Luhmann means by "center" and "periphery" is through comparison with a familiar and apparently

similar position in American legal thought: Ronald Dworkin's
15

claims for the special place of judicial decision in "law's empire.
Like Luhmann's image of center and periphery, Dworkin's elaboration of the "empire" metaphor invokes premodern forms of so-

cial organization: "We are subjects of law's empire," Dworkin
says, "liegemen to its methods and ideals."'54 As in Luhmann's image of center and periphery, Dworkin's metaphor of law's empire
carries geopolitical connotations-connotations that Dworkin, like
Luhmann, ultimately tries to disavow. 55 And Dworkin, too, places
courts in the central position: "The courts," he writes, "are the

capitals of law's empire, and judges are its princes. "156

Unlike Luhmann's survey of the legal terrain (as we will see),
and despite the broad scope the "empire" metaphor suggests,
Dworkin's focus in Law's Empire is concededly "narrow": 51 7 he

visits only law's "capitals," the appellate courts, and leaves the
provinces or periphery unexplored. "A more complete study of
Immanuel Wallerstein. See id. at 333 n.75. For Wallerstein's use of the center/periphery
distinction, see, for example, IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLDSYSTEM: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-

ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 231-32 (text ed. 1976) (distinguishing among

"core," "peripheral," and "semiperipheral" states or geographical areas in a world economy).
150 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 321 n.50; cf. id. at 565, 567 (describing legal system as a social "immune system" and conflicts as "parasitic systems," but
denying that this description should be understood "purely metaphorically").
151 See id. at 333 (suggesting that the center/periphery scheme first appears to be "a
very old, certainly premodern form of differentiation").
152 See id. at 333-37.
153 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
154 Id. at vii; see also id. at 407 (judges as "princes" of law's empire).
155 See id. at 413 ("Law is not exhausted by any catalogue of rules or principles, each
with its own dominion over some discrete theater of behavior. Nor by any roster of officials and their powers each over part of our lives. Law's empire is defined by attitude, not
territory or power or process.").
156 Id. at 407.
157 Id. at 12.
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legal practice," Dworkin admits, "would attend to legislators, policemen, district attorneys, welfare officers, school board chairmen" and others, not just the "judges in black robes" who preside
over "formal adjudication."' 58 Despite this admission, Dworkin
nevertheless seeks to defend his choice of a narrower project
against arguments for (what he calls) "social realism." Precisely to
the degree a theory is "realist," he contends, it must recognize
law's "special feature," namely, its "argumentative" structure. 5 9 In
principle, Dworkin maintains, one can study law's argumentative
structure from either of two perspectives-the "internal, participants' point of view,"' 6 or the "external" perspective of the historian or sociologist. "Both perspectives on law," Dworkin at first
acknowledges, "are essential, and each must embrace or take account of the other.1' 61 But Dworkin reverses himself before the
paragraph is over. The "external" accounts so far offered, he announces, "ignore the structure of legal argument" and are therefore "perverse," "impoverished and defective," and "programmatic" rather than "substantive.' ' 62 Taken together, Dworkin
laments, these "external" accounts comprise the "depressing history of social-theoretic jurisprudence in our century."' 63 Given
that understanding of the situation, Dworkin of course opts for
"the internal, participants' point of view."
But even if Dworkin were correct in dismissing so-called "external" accounts-a point I would not want to concede' 641-why
does an "internal" or "participant's" perspective require him to
consider only judging and judicial decisions in his account of law's
empire? As Dworkin acknowledges, most participants in the legal
system are not judges, yet they too "worry and argue about what
the law is."' 16 If, as Dworkin says, he could have "taken their arguments as... paradigms rather than the judge's,"166 and if "judges

158
'59
160
161
162
163

Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.

Id. at 13-14.

Id. at 14.
Id.
164 Dworkin would almost certainly classify Luhmann's work as an "external" account:
it does not proceed from a participant's perspective, nor does it aspire to be a "practiceguiding theory." REcHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 24. Luhmann himself
describes the theory as "external description." See id. at 496-98. For a critique of
Dworkin's use of the internal/external distinction, emphasizing the questions the distinction excludes, see Schlag, supra note 10, at 917-22.
165 DWORKIN, supra note 153, at 14.
166 Id. at 14-15.

2020

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:1987

are not the only or even the most important actors in the legal
' then why single out judicial decision as the paradigm of
drama,"167
legal argument? Why focus only on "formal legal argument from
the judge's viewpoint"? 168
Dworkin's justification for judges' centrality in law's empire is
as follows: "the structure of judicial argument is typically more explicit, and judicial reasoning has an influence over other forms of
legal discourse that is not fully reciprocal. ' 169 Having said that,
however, Dworkin tells us in the next sentence that "[w]e need re1 and he
lief from the daunting abstraction of these ... remarks,"'70
immediately proceeds to take up permanent residence in the appellate court, the capital of law's empire. No further explanation is
forthcoming. 7 '
Luhmann's center/periphery schema shares Dworkin's sense
that courts are central to the legal system's operations. But Luhmann would reject both of Dworkin's reasons for why that is so.
The courts' "central" position is not a matter of their enjoying the
lion's share of influence, either within the legal system, or in the
legal system's relations to other social spheres. That conception
would posit the legal system as a hierarchy with courts at the top,
and as noted above, Luhmann rejects the idea that courts and
Nor would Luhlegislatures are hierarchically differentiated.'
mann agree with Dworkin's suggestion that judicial communications differ from other legal communications by making "more explicit" a "structure" common to both-as if judicial opinions were
the original document, and all other legal communications were
more or less faded copies. 7 1 In describing courts as the legal system's center, Luhmann does not mean that the court system expresses the system's unitary structure, allowing one to discern the
structure of the whole by examining the structure of a single (cen...

Id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
For many legal scholars, of course, there need be no explanation for focusing on
courts and judicial opinions. American legal scholarship traditionally has been courtcentered. That, perhaps, may be one reason why Dworkin's argument for courts' centrality is so abbreviated. The problem is that the very title of Dworkin's book, Law's Empire,
suggests a broader scope, and his various admissions about the possibility of other perspectives positively require him to justify why he selects the conventional "through the
eyes of the appellate judge" perspective.
172 See supratext accompanying notes 135-45.
173 This may not be what Dworkin is trying to suggest, but no alternative interpretation
is immediately apparent.
167
168
169
170
171
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tral) part. 114 The center/periphery scheme is thus neither a model
of causal influence, nor a notion of a totality whose essence is expressed by some central part.
.2. The Legal Obligation to Decide Legal Questions
Instead, the sense in which courts are "central" for Luhmann
concerns their relation to the process of legal decision. While all
communications invoking the legal code belong to the legal system, binding legal decisions are particularly important for the legal
system's operations and reproduction. In Luhmann's phrase, the
development of mechanisms for making and enforcing binding legal decisions tames what would otherwise be a "wild growth of
normative projections.' 1 75 By authoritatively allocating a code
value, legal or illegal, binding decisions both establish points of
connection for future communications (including future decisions),
and at the same time exclude, as a practical matter, certain other
communications that would otherwise be possible. The legal system's autopoiesis, Luhmann has said, depends upon the development of an "organized decision system. "176
Courts, of course, are not the only legal decisionmakers.
Luhmann includes legislatures ir his notion of the legal system's
"organized decision system," and within the category of legal decisions he includes not just court decisions, but also (for example)
contracts,'" "statutes, treaties, . .. administrative acts, wills, [and]
land registry entries"-in short, any operation that "change[s] the
situation of the law."' 17 What makes courts "central" for Luhmann
is not that they make legal decisions, but that they alone are under
the legal obligation to render legal decisions.79 Courts, Luhmann
points out, are legally required to render a decision in all cases before them, or else to explain why the case is not properly before
them-itself a legal decision. 11° By contrast, neither legislatures
nor contracting parties are ordinarily legally obliged to reach decisions, though they may be under political or economic pressures to
174See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 337. To see the courts as expressing a structure common to all subsystems of the legal system is a version of the "segmental differentiation" thesis Luhmann rejects, at least as an account of the legal system
as a whole. See supra text accompanying notes 135-42.
175 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 147.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
177 See RECFT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 320.
178 Niklas Luhmann, Legal Argumentation: An Analysis of Its Form, 58 MOD. L. REV.
285,286 (1995) [hereinafter Legal Argumentation].
179 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 320.
180 See id. at 310-14.
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decide.'
According to Luhmann, the legal requirement that
courts decide between legal and illegal, consistent with valid law, is
what establishes the courts' "special" or "central" position in the
legal system."i 2
One might well ask: what's so "special" or "central" about
that? Luhmann seems to rely here on an intuition that the legal
obligation to decide "surrounds" courts by law, while the legislature, free from the legal obligation to decide, remains legally unsurrounded. A better argument for courts' centrality, however,
would focus first on what makes communication outside the courts
"leripheral." According to Luhmann, legal communication outside the courts-legislation, or contract- or corporation-formation,
for example-is "peripheral" in the sense that it establishes "contact zones"'183 to other social subsystems, such as the political and
economic systems. As Luhmann will explain in his account of
"structural coupling,"'14 the enactment of a statute is, from the
point of view of legal communication, a legal decision that
"change[s] the situation of the law."' 1 But from the point of view
of the political system, it is an operation of politics, the product of
legislative maneuvering.' Similarly, the formation of a contract or
corporation counts as an operation of the legal system because it,
too, "change[s] the situation of the law." Considered as an economic transaction, however, it is an operation of the economic system that links up to past economic transactions and enables future
transactions. 87 The legal "periphery" is thus "peripheral" in the
sense that its operations may also be seen at the same time as operations of some other system, whether political or economic.
Legal communication in the courts is not, in Luhmann's view,
so closely connected to the operations of other systems. Courts
employ various procedures and formalities that insulate them,
through the law itself, from environmental pressures. Jurisdictional and procedural rules, for example, limit the kinds and numbers of controversies courts will have to decide,' and they also ensure that the legal uncertainties courts consider will be presented
181 See id. at 321.
182 See id. at 320.
183 See id. at 322.
184 See infra text accompanying notes 299-314.
185 Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 286.
186 See infra text accompanying notes 302-08.
187 Luhmann would speak here of "exchange" rather than contract, see infra text accompanying note 404, but the point remains the same.
188 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 322.
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in a manner suitable for court decision. 18 9 Luhmann emphasizes,
further, the way in which the courts develop, through law, their
own "temporality," a distinctive connection of the present to the
past and future. Courts "reconstruct the past into the format of a
case," he says, through a selective "framing" and presentation of
the events, in a manner governed by substantive and procedural
law. 190 And in deciding a present case, a judge will often consider
future cases that may be affected by the present decision, or other
kinds of future consequences-in either event imagining, in Luhmann's words, "the present as past of a future present."' 91 Luhmann speaks in this connection of the courts' "temporal autonomy":'9 courts' decisions connect past, present, and future,193 in a
way constructed and governed by law. And what one could call
the "internal temporality" of this process-the duration and timing
of court procedures-does not necessarily correspond to demands
from the legal environment. 94 Litigation does not simply settle
disputes and resolve legal uncertainty; instead, Luhmann contends,
one function of procedure is "the production of uncertainty
through the protraction of [legal] decision."'195
Luhmann describes the courts' central position, alternatively,
as one of "paradox management.' ' 196 A paradox arises when one
tries to apply the legal code to itself, asking whether the distinction
between legal and illegal is itself legal or illegal. Where the decision between legal and illegal is not itself legally required-as is
the case, Luhmann has said, outside the courts-this basic paradox
is more easily avoided. In the legislature, for example, the problem can be "externalized,"' 197 by presenting legislation as a politically (rather than legally) motivated determination of legal and illegal. 198 But in the courts, where legal decision is legally required,
the paradox is more intractable. Programming, Luhmann has said,
is a way of deflecting the paradox, by prescribing criteria, in the
189 See id.at 326.
190 Id.
'91

Id.

192 See id. at 208.

193See id. at 308, 325.
194 See id. at 208.
195 Id. at 209.
196 Id. at 320.

197 See Some Problems, supra note 79, at 401 (describing strategy of "externalizing"
paradoxes).
198 See Niklas Luhmann, The Third Question: The Creative Use of Paradoxes in Law
and Legal History, 15 J.L. & SOC'Y. 153, 159-60 (1988) [hereinafter Third Question] (stating that the paradox more easily avoided in legislature than in courts).
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form of legal rules, that govern the choice between legal and ille'
the foundagal. The idea is to suppress, or "make invisible,"199
tional question whether the legal system's distinction between legal and illegal is itself legal-the question whether law can be selflegitimating. On Luhmann's view, the paradoxes of self-reference
never fully disappear; they are only more or less successfully managed.2w This task of paradox management, according to Luhmann,
is a basic problem for the courts.201
The courts are thus "central" to the legal system, on Luhmann's view, because they are legally obliged to make legal decisions-or alternatively, because they are more insulated from their
environment than "peripheral" legal communication-and because they perform the task of "paradox management." But this
description does not itself provide much of a picture of how communication in the courts operates. Not all communication in the
courts takes the form of decision, Luhmann acknowledges.2m
What other forms of communication operate in the courts?
One important form of communication to which Luhmann's
recent work has devoted considerable attention is legal argument. 203

199 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 176, 215, 308 n.21, 500, 546-47 (on
strategy of making paradoxes invisible); see also Third Question,supra note 198, at 156-57
(same).
2O See, e.g., Third Question, supra note 198, at 156 ("Paradoxes have a fatal inclination
to reappear.").
201 In addition to the basic paradox involved in the code's self-application, Luhmann
mentions further paradoxes more or less parallel in structure. For example, the idea of
decision is paradoxical, according to Luhmann, because it is a unity, but a unity of the difference between alternatives that cannot be chosen simultaneously. (Much as the code is,
on Luhmann's analysis, a unity between the incompatible alternatives of legal and illegal.)
See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 307-08. Luhmann further mentions the
"paradox" that a judge must decide even if she cannot decide. See id. at 317.
Some autopoietic theorists argue that the discovery of these "paradoxes" is an important accomplishment of autopoietic theory. See, e.g., TEUBNER, supra note 34, at 4-5
(listing various legal paradoxes); id. at 10 (arguing that insistence on paradoxes is what
"makes theories of self-reference and autopoiesis potentially so promising"); see also
Teubner, supra note 93, at 1444. I am less convinced. I agree with Luhmann that the
foundational problem of how law can be self-legitimating is an important one. But for
reasons explained in Part V.B. below, I find Luhmann's thesis of binary coding unpersuasive, and thus I would not recast the substantive problem of law's legitimacy as a logical
problem of the code's self-application.
202 See Legal Argumentation,supra note 178, at 286.
203 Luhmann devotes a long chapter of his recent book on law to the topic of legal argumentation. See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 338-406. He has recently published an article, available in English, that covers many of the same themes. See
Legal Argumentation, supra note 178.
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3. Legal Argument
Luhmann presents his theory of legal argument as an alternative to conventional understandings. Some theories of argument,
Luhmann suggests, proceed from the perspective of a participant,
seeking (in Dworkin's phrase) "to grasp the argumentative character of our legal practice by joining that practice and struggling with
the issues of soundness and truth participants face." ' Luhmann
characterizes these accounts as "autological," or self-including:
they themselves offer reasons, seek justification, and try to avoid
error, in the very ways they prescribe for legal argument.m
Dworkin's use of the mythical Judge Hercules to specify how "law
as integrity" would operate in particular cases exemplifies this
theoretical strategy.2
The fundamental problem with such accounts, Luhmann suggests, is that to the extent they try to justify
argumentatively the techniques and criteria of argumentative justification, they run into self-referential paradox.20 "Figures of justification," Luhmann concludes, "are ultimately anchored dogmatically," not argumentatively.2 9
Procedural theories of argumentation, Luhmann says, seek to
avoid such self-referential paradoxes by exiting the context of substantive legal argument and offering, instead, general accounts of
the framework in which legal argument is to occur. But in Luhmann's view, these procedural theories are empty. While they
prescribe, for example, "appropriateness" as a principle, and recommend impartiality and attention to all the circumstances, 0
204 DWORKIN, supra note 153, at 14.
205 See Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 290 (stating that "autologically" means
that "what it establishes" must also "apply to itself").
206 See DWORKIN, supra note 153, at 225-75.
207 See id. at 15 (describing, under the heading "The Real World," various chestnut
cases that serve as "extended examples for the various arguments and discussions of later
chapters"); id. at 15-30; id. at 239-40 (introducing Judge Hercules); id. at 238-54 (Hercules
considers a case involving negligent infliction of emotional distress); id. at 317-37 (Hercules' mythical colleague Hermes considers the "snail darter case" under the Endangered
Species Act); id. at 337-54 (Hercules considers the snail darter case); id. at 379-92 (Hercules considers and decides Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); id. at 393-97
(Hercules decides Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
208 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 343.
209 Id. at 564; see also id. at 176 ("[A]ll justification has a dogmatic character.").
210 See id. at 345. Luhmann's primary target here is Klaus Guinther. See KLAUS

GONTHER, THE SENSE OF APPROPRIATENESS: APPLICATION DISCOURSES IN
MORALITY AND LAW (John Farrell trans., 1993). Another of Luhmann's targets is Robert Alexy. See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY
OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (Ruth Adler & Neil
MacCormick trans., 1989).
Luhmann's criticisms of participant-centered or procedural approaches are not ex-
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these accounts neither influence legal practice nor correspond to
the specificity and variety of actual legal argument.21'
Luhmann's account of legal argumentation is not a substantive theory that would "offer those engaged in argument ... assistance in the search for sound, convincing grounds."2 12 Unlike
Dworkin, Luhmann does not investigate legal argumentation by
performing it, either actually or virtually. His strategy, instead, is
to observe the process of legal argumentation from "outside" of
that process. And rather than propose a procedural theory of the
framework in which legal argument occurs, Luhmann seeks argumentation's "system function" 213-the connections between the
operation called "argument" or ."argumentation" and basic features of autopoietic systems, such as "self-reference" and "external
reference."
Luhmann begins with the idea that the context in which legal
argument occurs is a dispute over the meaning of legal texts,
whether "statutes or legal opinions.., or other noteworthy documents from legal practice. ' 214 In that situation, where "the texts do
not supply an unambiguous proposal for what decision should be
made, ' 215 one must engage in what Luhmann calls "second-order
observation," or, "an observation of the observation of texts, an
observation of readers. ' 216 Argument is, in Luhmann's terminology, the legal system's "self-observation"-a legal communication's observation of other legal communications, such as statutory
texts or judicial decisions-in a context where legal decision is un217
certain or contingent.
Luhmann further characterizes this "second-order observation" or "self-observation" with the distinction, borrowed from information theory, between "information" and "redundancy." The
notions of information and redundancy are opposites. A communication "produces information in so far as it produces surprises." 218 It produces redundancies "so far as that is not the
actly exhaustive or compelling. Here, and elsewhere, Luhmann's strategy is not so much
to argue against his opponents' positions as to "unask" their questions. See, e.g., Operational Closure and StructuralCoupling,supra note 34, at 1426.
211 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 345.
212 Legal Argumentation, supranote 178, at 285.
213 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 352 n.37.

214 See Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 287; see also RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 338.
215 Legal Argumentation,supra note 178, at 287.
216 Id. at 288.
217 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 351-52.

218 Legal Argumentation, supranote 178, at 291.
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case." 219
Redundancies are the information- and systemstheoretical versions of what participants in argument call "reasons" or "grounds."
And in Luhmann's view, they are the dominant feature of legal argument: 221 "Argument," he maintains,
"overwhelmingly reactivates known grounds. ' ' 2
Luhmann's point can be illustrated with a simple example.
Consider, for instance, a lawyer presenting a legal argument to a
common law court. That lawyer will almost certainly present
readings or interpretations of prior cases-"observations" of the
system's prior decisions, in Luhmann's terminology. He is likely to
emphasize that his case is essentially the same as other decided
cases that point in his favor-redundancy. And in writing her
opinion, the judge is likely to emphasize her decision's continuity
with precedent. In this way argument transforms the "information" of the case-the particular features that make it unique or
4
non-identical with all other cases-into redundancies.2
Id.
See id. at 292 ("Grounds are ... nothing other than redundancy functions ......
RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 373 ("Reasons are symbols for redundancy.").
221 Perhaps in order to distinguish his position decisively from participant-centered approaches, Luhmann claims at one point that "[an observation of argument using the distinction between information and redundancy can do without referring to grounds and
errors. In the description they are not mentioned (just as in higher-order types of calculus,
one no longer works with constants but with variables)." Legal Argumentation,supra note
178, at 292-93. Luhmann's account of argumentation in Recht der Gesellschaft, however,
continues to speak of "reasons" or "grounds" ("Grtnde"),even after introducing the notion of redundancy. See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 368-76. For the
reader's ease, I sometimes use the terms "reason" or "ground" alongside the term "redundancy."
222 Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 292; see also RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT,
supra note 18, at 353.
223 In an article Luhmann cites repeatedly, Martin Shapiro makes this connection between precedent and redundancy:
[Ilt is obvious that legal discourse organized by the rules of stare decisis emphasizes, and itself insists that its success rests upon, high levels of redundancy, and
therefore,. . . low levels of information. The strongest legal argument is that the
current case, on its facts, is "on all fours" with a previous case and that the decision in that case is deeply imbedded in a long line of decisions enunciating (repeating) a single legal principle. In other words, the strongest argument is that
the current case ... is totally redundant, and under the rules of stare decisis the
duty of the judge is to transmit a message that is equally redundant ....
[T]he
rules of legal discourse seem to require each attorney to suppress as much information and transmit as much redundancy as possible.
Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125,127 (1972).
224 "Legal cases... come forth as concrete and thus different. They provoke the system
to take account of their diversity. Argument takes up this provocation and transforms
them into redundancies .... " RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 374; cf Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 291 ("[C]ommunication may also be seen as the on219
220
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The example also illustrates Luhmann's further point: redundancies or reasons also exclude. In framing the matter to be decided, legal argument screens out, as legally irrelevant, certain aspects of the environment from which the litigation arose. And the
reasons or redundancies offered in legal argument exclude not just
environmental "noise," but "internally produced noise" as wellthat great bulk of legal communications, both past and potential,
that is irrelevant to a given argument."6 The adverse relation of
the parties and their attorneys dramatizes this exclusionary effect
of redundancies or reasons. Each side marshals reasons for its position that "repel," as it were, the opposing side's arguments. And
if the matter is presented for decision to a multi-judge panel, the
antagonism among reasons or redundancies may appear in argumentative sparring between majority and dissent. Reasons are
thus for Luhmann not just "attractors," or points of connection
that organize argumentative operations;227 they are also (one could
say) "excluders" and "distinguishers." Legal argument establishes
connections to past legal communications, but those connections
are always selective.?
The example, finally, illustrates the process Luhmann calls
"reapplication." Argument takes up a distinction made in prior
communication and reapplies it to a present case, perhaps envisioning further reapplication to future cases.2 9 Reapplication
thereby "confirms" and enriches the redundancy or reason by extending it to a new context. 030 Through this process of reapplication, perhaps most evident in common-law litigation, 2 1 reasons
or redundancies may "condense" as a rule, or ultimately as a principle?.2 For Luhmann, then, legal concepts, as "successful redundancies," are "condensed experiences and established distinctions"
of the legal system?13
This process of confirmation and condensation is intensified
through the development of what Luhmann calls "legal dogmatgoing conversion of information into redundancy.").

See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supranote 18, at 354, 368-72.
See id. at 354; see also Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 289-90 ("The instant
case, or the issue, specifies which [legal] texts are to be adduced.").
227 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supranote 18, at 354.
228 See id.
229 See id. at 380.
230 See id. at 386.
231 See id. at 370, 386.
232 See id. at 369.
233 Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 297; see also RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr,
supra note 18, at 387 (treating concepts as storehouses of the legal system's experiences).
225
26
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ics"-essentially, doctrinal analysis, both in the courts and in the
universities. By creating an "elaborated network" of legal concepts, Luhmann argues, dogmatics can make legal questions more
precise and mistakes more evident. 34 Legal dogmatics are thus not
necessarily "dogmatic" in the sense of "uncritical." While Luhmann generally
describes the effect of legal dogmatics as one of
"stabilization,"' 35 he notes that the process of conceptual clarification can also exercise a critical or even creative force in legal argument.236
Important as redundancies are to legal argument, Luhmann
maintains, the system could not operate only on that basis.3 A
system that turns all information into redundancy, Luhmann notes,
would lose its capacity to be stimulated by its environment. 38 Redundancy is but one side of a distinction; its counterconcept is "variety," "the number and diversity" of a system's operations. 2 9 Or,
in Luhmann's alternative formulation: variety is "the number and
multifariousness of events which set off information processing
within the system."' The concepts of redundancy and variety are
opposed. The greater a system's variety-the more numerous the
events that must be accounted for in the system's informationprocessing-the more difficult it will be for the system to connect
its operations through redundancies. 241 But like other binary oppositions in Luhmann's thought, this opposition between variety
and redundancy is not a simple one of mutual exclusion. Luhmann
emphasizes that both redundancy and variety are conditions for
the legal system's operation. 242 The system must therefore perform, in Luhmann's phrase, a "mediation of variety and redundancy" 24 -a balance between novelty and stimulation by the environment on one hand, and "reactivation of known grounds" on the
other.
Luhmann approaches this relation between variety and re234 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 388.

235 See id. at 265,275-76.
236 See id. at 276, 367-68, 388.
237 See id. at 358; cf. Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 291 ("[R]edundancy and
information mutually presuppose each other.").
238 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 374.
239 See id. at 358.

240 Legal Argumentation,supra note 178, at 292.
241 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAF, supra note 18, at 358; Legal Argumentation, supra
note 178, at 298 (observing that the increase in variety has "internal costs," i.e., costs of
maintaining adequate redundancies or conceptual structure).
242 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 358, 361.
243 Id. at 371.
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dundancy by considering the historical shift toward consideration
of "consequences" in legal argument. He distinguishes between
two kinds of consequences argument might consider. The first are
"system-internal" consequences-the consequences a decision will
have for future legal decisions.2" To consider these consequences,
Luhmann observes, is a "normal moment of recursivity":1 5 legal
decisions connect not just to past, but also to future decisions.
This sort of consequence-weighing, Luhmann argues, poses little
risk to the legal system. To determine whether a contemplated
decision would make some future behavior legal or illegal, were
the behavior to occur, does not involve an empirical prediction of
whether, how frequently, on what occasions, and with what consequences for the legal environment, the behavior is in fact likely to
occur.2 4

More problematic, in Luhmann's view, is this century's trend
toward consideration, in legal argument and decision, of "external" consequences, or, the effects a legal decision will have on its
environment. Luhmann acknowledges that it would be odd to decide, for example, the question whether a volunteer rescuer should
receive compensation for a rescue attempt, without considering
the effects the various possible rules would have on future behavior.24 7 But prediction of a decision's effects is by no means simple,
Luhmann maintains, particularly in cases involving complex questions of risk-allocation. If even science has difficulty in predicting
consequences, what reason is there to think that a judge will be up
to the task?'" "Seen according to the standards of empirical research," Luhmann contends, "orientation toward consequences is
nothing but imagination with the force of law."249 This skepticism
about directing argument and decision toward "external" consequences connects with Luhmann's misgivings, discussed above,

244 See id. at 380; see also id. at 293.
245 Id. at 380; see also Legal Argumentation, supra note

178, at 293 ("[A]II that is involved is a testing of the recursiveness of the autopoietic operations, something required
in any event.").
246 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 380; see also Legal Argumenta-

tion, supra note 178, at 293 ("It is relatively unproblematic to determine legal consequences, that is, the legal positions which would obtain if the rule used to justify the decision were to apply.").
247 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supranote 18, at 381.
248 See id. at 381-82; cf. Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 294 (contending that
correlations between future facts and present projections of future facts in legal argument
are "uncertain precisely where they are supposed to be scientifically guaranteed").
249 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 382.
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about purposive programming.250
In Luhmann's information-theoretical terms, the historical
trend toward considering "external" consequences marks a shift
toward variety and away from redundancy. 25 1 This tension between variety and redundancy, between "responsiveness" to the
legal environment and orientation toward legal concepts, appears
in legal theory as the debate between "interest jurisprudence"
(Interessenjurisprudenz)and "conceptual jurisprudence. 25 2 A central idea of the "interest" or "realist" approach, of course, is that it
is absurd to decide basic legal issues simply by analyzing legal concepts, without considering and self-consciously weighing the social
2 In Luhmann's view, however, the
interests and values at stake.53
polemic against "conceptual jurisprudence"-begun with Jhering's
work in the late nineteenth century, and continued in this country
under the headings of sociological jurisprudence and legal real24
ism-has produced a "massive simplification" of the issues .
Luhmann attempts to reconstruct the debate and ultimately to recast it into systems-theoretical terms.
Luhmann is particularly interested in connecting the distinction between concepts and interests to a basic distinction of autopoietic theory-the distinction between self-reference and external
reference. All legal communication, he has said, employs both
self-reference and external reference, referring both to its own
250 See supra text accompanying notes 117-30. Luhman notes that an orientation toward consequences in argument is not the same thing as purposive programming in decision. See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 379. But he means only that argument must be distinguished from decision, see supra text accompanying notes 214-17,
and that the consideration of "internal" consequences does not require purposive programming. See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 379-80.
251 See Legal Argumentation, supranote 178, at 295 (referring to the "increase in variety
which results from the consideration of consequences"); RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 383.
252 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 389; cf. Legal Argumentation,
supra note 178, at 296-97 (arguing that systems theory must "detach[]" the notions of concepts and interests "from that unfortunate controversy between Begriffsjurisprudenz and
Interessenjurisprudenz").
253 See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141

(1921) ("judge as legislator," balancing social interests); Felix S.Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) (criticizing "transcendental nonsense" of conceptual jurisprudence and recommending conscious evaluation of ethical, economic, and policy issues implicitly decided in conceptual approach);
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (1897);
Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605-10, 615-16 (1908)
(criticizing conceptualism or "mechanical jurisprudence" and touting Interessenjurisprudenz); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 955-59
(1923) (outlining "social engineering" approach).
254 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 389-90.
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coded realm of legal communication and to events, processes, or
communications that are not themselves coded as legal or illegal.,5
This distinction between self- and external reference appears, at
the level of argumentation, in the form of the distinction between
concepts and interests. The "concept" side corresponds in Luhmann's scheme to the "self-referential" aspect of legal argument,
and the "interest" side to argument's "external reference." 526
"Formal arguments," in Luhmann's terminology, are those that
operate primarily on the basis of legal concepts. "Substantive arguments" are those that explicitly weigh interests recognized in the
legal system's environment.257
Establishing this "external" link to the environment through
"interests" is an accomplishment of the legal system, not a pregiven fact. In their "natural condition," Luhmann says, environmental interests are homogenous from the legal system's perspective, mere "wishes" or "preferences" with no particular claim on
the legal system's operations. 58 Environmental interests become
relevant to legal communication only when they are constructed
not as interests simpliciter, but as "legally protected interests."' ' 9
This construction is an achievement of legal argument.m° The legal
constructions of "interests" do not simply reflect the legal environment passively or neutrally. Here, too, argument operates selectively, framing the environment in such a way as to make it
relevant to legal concepts and to the legal/illegal code. As Luhmann puts it: "With the concept of 'interest' the system constructs,
for internal purposes, an external reference."26 1
In one sense, Luhmann's description of interests is unremarkable, following as it does tautologically from the notion of operative closure. The distinction between a system and its environment, he has said, is a distinction "internal" to the system (i.e.,
accomplished through the system's operations), and accordingly,
characterizations of the environment (through the notion of "interest" and otherwise) are also "internal" to the system.62 2 Never255

See supra text accompanying notes 97-102.

256

See

RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 394-95; OperationalClosure and

Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1430; Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 29697.
See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 394.
See id.
Id. at 391-92.
See id. at 395.
261 Id. at 394.
257
258
259
260

262 See, e.g., RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 394-95; OperationalClosure
and Structural Coupling,supra note 34, at 1431.
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theless, Luhmann's account of the distinction between concepts
and interests allows him to recast the traditional debate. The issue
is not one of choosing between concepts and interests, Luhmann
argues.2 Instead, concepts and interests each express one side of
legal argument's connection between self-reference and external
reference." Because concepts and interests are related to this basic feature of autopoietic systems, the relation between them is a
lasting problem of the system, Luhmann maintains. 65 And the
particular balance established between these two sides-whether
toward self-reference and concepts, or toward external reference
and interests-is historically contingent. There can be no "'natural' . preference for self-reference" over external reference, or
for external reference over self-reference.
This idea of ongoing tension between self-reference and external reference, concepts and interests, has consequences for what
Luhmann calls the "interest" or realist project. Put negatively, the
effect of Luhmann's account is to dismiss, as incapable of realization, the early Legal-Realist dream of mirroring, in law, the world
beyond law. 167 Focusing on "interests" is not a matter of lifting the
veil of legal form and gazing, unmediated by law, upon real social
life, as the Realists were sometimes prone to suggest.2 8 While consideration of "interests" and consequences may develop the legal
system's responsiveness to its environment, 69 the world as it appears in law will still be structured by legal concepts and legal procedures. One legal construction replaces another.2 70
Put positively, Luhmann's account of the tension between
concepts and interests suggests new strategies for legal regulation.
26 See Operational Closure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1431 (arguing
that while there may be tension in particular cases "between giving priority to the urgency
of interests or to the purity of legal concepts,.., the system as such cannot choose in this
way").
264 See supra text accompanying notes 255-57.
265 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 399.
266 Id.
267 Robert Gordon has described autopoietic theory as:
a novel way of expressing why the aspirations of Legal Realism or Interest Jurisprudence for a method of legal decision-making that would be completely open
to [the] environment-to the "raw facts" of a dispute-situation, to commercialcustomary norms, to social and economic science, etc.-were in some ways absurd and bound to fail.
Gordon, supra note 13, at 6.
26 Cf. Gordon, supra note 11, at 109 (stating that while the Realists "yearned to break
through the formal shell to... the 'living' reality beneath it," the "living essences of power
and need" they discovered were still legally structured).
269 See Legal Argumentation,supra note 178, at 298.
270 See, e.g., TEUBNER, supra note 34, at 81.
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Improving law's responsiveness to its environment indeed requires, as the Realists recognized, improvements in the law's
"models" of its social environment. But it also requires attentiveness to what Luhmann describes as the "internal" side of the distinction between self-reference and external reference. According
to Luhmann, attempts to transform the legal system's "modeling"
of its environment must include in the model the legal system itself, with its "internal" concepts, procedures, and operations. Proposals to incorporate social-scientific information and techniques
into legal communication must consider how that information
could be connected to legal concepts and how it might be acquired,
in particular cases, through legal procedures. Luhmann emphasizes that developing these procedures and gathering the requisite
information is no easy task, particularly in cases addressing difficult problems of social risk.27' Further, Luhmann suggests, strategies for increasing law's openness to its environment need to examine systematically how the legal system appears in the "internal
models" of other systems-more systematically than in, for example, conventional references to the economic system's need for legal certainty."'
At this point, Luhmann's discussion of legal argument, and
the "special position of the courts," is complete. The courts are
"central" to the legal system's operations, Luhmann has said, because unlike other domains in the legal system, courts work under
the legal obligation to render legal decisions, placing them in the
position of "paradox managers." Legal argument, Luhmann has
maintained, is an important form of communication in this center
of the legal system: it presents the courts with alternative paths for
271 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 563. This accounts in part for
Luhmann's skepticism about consequence-oriented decision, see supra text accompanying
notes 122-30.
272 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 395. Another typical example is
the general social interest in law's uniformity and impartiality. See id. at 392. Luhmann
mentions the possibility of "oscillat[ing]" between the two perspectives from which the
legal system may observe itself-from its own perspective, or from the (imputed) perspective of the legal environment. See id. at 395.
Other theorists influenced by autopoietic theory have developed the idea that the
legal system and other social subsystems, though operatively closed, may be strategically
linked through their mutual "observations" and "modeling" of one another. See, e.g.,
Gunther Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-Regulatory Law,
in DILEMMAS OF LAW INTHE WELFARE STATE, supra note 63, at 299; Willke, supra note
123, at 280. For his part, Luhmann investigates the links between law and other social
spheres primarily through the idea of "structural coupling." I defer discussion of these
ways of describing law's connections to other social subsystems until Part IV, when I analyze Luhmann's notion of structural coupling.
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decision; it frames the issues for decision by excluding most of the
legal environment (and for that matter, most legal communication)
as irrelevant, and it connects courts' decisions to past and future
legal decisions. Legal argument thus helps reproduce the legal system as a network of communication. And particularly in the form
of consequence- or interest-oriented argument, it provides an "external reference," or connection to the environment, within the legal system's communication. The tension in legal argument between "redundancy" and "variety," between "interests" and
"concepts," is a "basic problem" of the legal system,273 Luhmann
has argued, and it is a medium through which legal communication
maintains both self-reference and external reference. Such, in
Luhmann's view, is the "system function" of legal argumentation
in the courts.
C. The Legal "Periphery"
In Luhmann's center/periphery model of the legal system's
differentiation, all legal communication outside the courts-notably legislation and contract-is in the legal system's "periphery." 274
Compared to his lengthy discussions of courts' "central position"
and legal argumentation, Luhmann's treatment of the legal periphery is brief.275 But Luhmann states clearly that neither the
brevity of his discussion, nor the term "periphery" itself, signifies
that he considers communication outside the courts less important
than communication inside the courts." 6 Indeed, the legal system's
"real dynamism" occurs at its periphery.277 For Luhmann, "peripheral" legal communication is the legal system's "contact zone[]
to other functional systems of society,"2 78 such as the economy and
the political system-that is, it is an important conduit for the mutual influences -running among the legal system and other social
spheres.279
See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 400.
See id. at 321.
Luhmann devotes only about six pages to the periphery in his 1993 book on law,
Recht der Gesellschaft. See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 321-23, 333-37.
To my knowledge, he never used the center/periphery schema to describe the legal system's internal differentiation before Recht der Gesellschaft.
276 See id. at 323.
277 The quotation comes from Gunther Teubner, see Teubner, supra note 93, at 1459,
but Luhmann would likely agree.
278 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 322; see also Teubner, supra note 93,
at 1459-60.
279 This idea of "periphery" as the contact zone to other systems beyond the legal system's boundary perhaps explains Luhmann's selection of the "center/periphery" model
273
274
275
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This role as "contact zone" explains why Luhmann spends so
little time discussing the periphery in his account of the legal system's internal differentiation. To describe the operation of "peripheral" communication-such as legislation and contract-Luhmann needs to explain how social subsystems can be linked. The
concept Luhmann uses to account for the mutual influences among
social subsystems is "structural coupling."
IV.

STRUCTURAL COUPLING

So far, Luhmann's description of the legal system accounts for
law's "autonomy": its self-production and self-reproduction as an
operatively closed network of coded communications, distinct
from other social spheres. Despite his emphasis on closure and
autonomy, however, Luhmann acknowledges the extensive and reciprocal influences and interdependencies running between law
and its environment.u ° These relations between law and its environment-relations conventionally classified as the "relative" part
of "relative autonomy"-are, according to Luhmann, fully consistent with law's autopoietic self-reproduction.
We have not yet encountered, however, Luhmann's account
of how this can be so. The focus to this point has been on law as
an internally differentiated system facing a more or less undifferentiated environment, to which it is cognitively open but operatively closed. From this perspective, even the "external" links to
the legal system's environment-through, for example, the notion
of "interests" in legal argument-appear as accomplishments of
the legal system alone. The problem of how the legal system might
be reciprocally related to other organized social subsystems, such
as the political or economic systems, simply does not appear from
this perspective.
Matters change when we consider that the legal system's social environment includes not just communications in general, but
the coded communications of other social subsystems. From that
perspective, the legal environment appears not simply as an unorganized mass of "not-law," but as an environment that includes
other organized, operatively closed, autopoietic systems. The relations among these systems are not products of a single system
better than his explicit arguments for the courts' centrality. See supra text accompanying
notes 183-87.
280

See, e.g., RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 43-44, 76, 150, 204, 281-82,

407-95; Operational Closure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1419-20, 1431-38;
ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 115-21; Unity, supra note 63, at 15.
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alone. Nor, according to Luhmann, are they merely random. Instead, Luhmann maintains, social subsystems' autopoietic processes may be linked through "structural coupling."
In this Part of the Article, I first explain what Luhmann
means by "structural coupling" in general, then turn to his more
particularized analysis of the structural couplings among the legal,
political, and economic systems.
A. The Concept of Structural Coupling
From the perspective of one system's communication, Luhmann has said, other systems' communication presents not information, but a stream of "noise." 28 ' Some communications in that
stream of noise, however, may "irritate" the system-that is, "register" or "resonate" in the system's communication as (for example) a problem, surprise, anomaly, or disappointment.m Whether
and how this "irritation" (or, "perturbation")2 will occur, Luhmann says, depends upon the structures, categories, and criteria of
the irritated system, not the system whose communication is perceived as an irritation. 4 This point follows directly from Luhmann's more general notions of operative closure and cognitive
openness: a system's openness to its environment is always conditioned by the system's specific form of closure. The ideas of "irritation" and a system's "irritability" simply specify that general thesis where the relation between system and environment is a
relation between autopoietic systems.8
Some irritations may be easily converted into information and
processed within the irritated system's communication. Others,
however, may be more problematic: they may not fit easily within
the system's categories, yet not readily be dismissed as irrelevant
to the system's communication. Such irritations may stimulate the
system to transform its structures or categories.2 This process of
structural change in response to irritation is the autopoietic
equivalent for what open systems theory calls "adaptation to the
281 See

supratext accompanying notes 76-78.

282 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 443.
283 The terms "irritation" and "perturbation" seem to be synonymous for Luhmann.

See, e.g., OperationalClosure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1432-33; RECHT
DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 225 (equating "irritability," "perturbability," "sensitivity," and "resonance").
284 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 443; Operational Closure and

Structural Coupling, supranote 34, at 1427 n.24.
285See OperationalClosure and Structural Coupling,supra note 34,at 1432 (referring to
the "twin concepts of closure and structural coupling").
286 See id. at 1433.
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environment." But unlike simple models of adaptation in social
systems theory-and, as Robert Gordon has observed, in most
"law and society" models in mainstream legal theory as wellLuhmann does not treat this process as a simple causal transaction
in which the environment causes the system to change.w Nor does
Luhmann assume that environmental events determine the path
along which the irritated system "responds" or "adapts" to the irritation. Instead, he treats the system's response to irritation as
thoroughly contingent, dependent upon the system's own history,
structures, and communicative possibilities. And he focuses on the
processes, "internal" to the system, by which the system's communication "perceives" the irritation and changes its own structures.
Luhmann argues that systems can channel their mutual irritations, and increase their mutual responsiveness, through structural
coupling. By "structural coupling" Luhmann means a connection
between systems more durable than what he calls "momentary
coupling"-the connection of two systems through an event relevant to both systems, such as a payment (economy) that satisfies a
legal judgment (law).m Structural coupling, as the name suggests,
connects systems through system structures, not merely through a
single event.
Consistent with Luhmann's usual approach,"9 structural coupling has two sides-it excludes as well as includes, and separates
as well as connects. 290 Structural couplings both "provide a continuous influx of disorder against which the system maintains or
changes its structure" and, at the same time, they exclude most
287 Gordon's article, Critical Legal Histories, describes mainstream legal theory's
"dominant vision" as one of "evolutionary functionalism," in which legal change is a matter of the legal system adapting to changing environmental needs. See Gordon, supra note
11, at 59-65. Gordon argues that the simple idea of adaptation grossly underestimates the
contingency and variety of responses to alleged environmental imperatives, and in particular, it understates the importance of law's "peculiar internal structures." Id. at 101.
Legal forms and practices, Gordon contends, are "[t]o some extent.., independent variables in social experience." Id. He concludes that legal forms and practices "tend to become embedded in 'relatively autonomous' structures." Id. But as Gordon has acknowledged elsewhere, and as argued in the introduction to this article, the notion of "relative
autonomy" is not theoretically satisfying.
288 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 441; Operational Closure and
Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1437 (events may "participate" in more than one
system).
289 Luhmann's standard move is to distinguish between an "internal" and an "external"
side of a distinction, then to note that each side of the distinction presupposes the other.
This move is apparent in his discussion of the distinctions between closure and openness,
between coding and programming, and between self-reference and external reference.
290 See Operational Closure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1433; RECHT
DER GESELLSCHAF, supra note 18, at 441, 465.
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"environmental facts from immediate relevance."291
Structural
couplings both "admit[] irritation" and allow systems to "remain[]
indifferent" to the great bulk of each other's communications.292 In
other words, while structural couplings connect communications in
the coupled systems, these connections are selective. Even in
linking two systems' autopoietic processes, structural couplings
presuppose those systems' separation as operationally closed networks of communication. Structural coupling is not fusion. 293 But
by limiting the irritations and "interferences" between systems'
communications, structural couplings can heighten the systems'
sensitivity or responsiveness to one another. Without structural
couplings, everything in a system's environment would be potentially relevant to the system's communication, and that means,
paradoxically, that nothing could be actually relevant: the system
could not operate unless it selected some, but not all, of its environment as relevant at any particular time.
Luhmann applies the notion of structural coupling at all theoretical levels. The legal system, he says, is structurally coupled
both to the more comprehensive societal system (of which it is a
subsystem) 294 and to "psychic" systems (or, individual consciousnesses).295 Most important, for present purposes, are the legal system's structural couplings to other functional subsystems of the
general societal system. Two sets of structural couplings are especially significant for Luhmann-the connection of law and politics
through constitutions, and the connection of law and the economy
through property and contract.

B.

Structural Coupling of Law and Politics

Conceiving law and politics as "structurally coupled" presupposes their separation. Luhmann acknowledges the difficulty of
this presupposition at the outset, allowing that the "close and obvious connections between politics and law" suggest a "weakness"
in his thesis of operative closure. 296 Further, Luhmann acknowlOperationalClosure and StructuralCoupling,supra note 34, at 1433.
Id.
See id. at 1436.
See id. at 1433-34.
295 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 481-90.
296 See id. at 407; see also id. at 421 (claiming that there are "intensive causal relations"
between politics and law); id. at 426 (observing a "reciprocally parasitic relation" between
politics and law); id. at 429 ("in modern societies politics and law are attuned to one another"); id. at 434 (referring to the "indisputable thickness of the connections between law
and politics").
291
292
293
294
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edges, a long tradition since early modernity has linked politics
and law under the single concept of "state.''297 This tradition has
found expression in American legal theory: the Legal Realists, for
example, sought to relativize the distinction between law and politics by describing the legal institutions of property and contract as
delegations of state power to "private" individuals, and by presenting the state as sitting in the middle of all transactions governed by private law. 298 As Luhmann realizes, these attempts to
collapse law and politics into "the state" present his theory of
structural coupling with a threshold question: he must first explain
why he conceives of law and politics as two systems rather than
one.
1. Law and PoliticsAs DifferentiatedSystems
In Luhmann's view, the distinction between the two systems
appears first in their different coding. 299 Legal communication,
Luhmann has said, operates under the distinction between legal
and illegal. Political communication, Luhmann argues, is organized by two codes: the distinction between government and opposition codes party-political competition for political power,3 ° and
the distinction between governing and governed codes the application of political power.3 1' Luhmann acknowledges that an observer
can trace the political consequences of, for example, a judicial decision, or attribute a political motivation to that decision. But the
decision itself will not be coded in the language of party politics,
nor will the lawyers' argument before the deciding court likely
See id.at 407.
See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 495 (1988).
For representative Realist versions of this argument, see Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11, 12 (1927) (characterizing Lochner-style decisions as
"the passing of a certain domain of sovereignty from the state to the private employer of
labor," and describing property right as "sovereign power compelling service and obedience"); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. Sci. 0. 470, 471 (1923) (describing property right as the right to invoke government
compulsion); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 603, 604 (1943) (same); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract,43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 641, 640 (1943) (describing contract
law as "delegat[ing] to individual citizens a piece of sovereignty which enables them to
participate constantly in the law making process").
299 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 420,436.
300 See id. at 421,436.
301 See id. at 436. Luhmann never explains why, despite his position that a system's
code establishes the system's unity, the political system is entitled to two codes rather than
one. I argue below that this inconsistency, together with other difficulties, indicates the
need to revise Luhmann's notion of system coding. See infra Part V.B.
297
298
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point directly to considerations of political advantage.
The distinction between the legal and political systems ap302
pears further, Luhmann argues, in the different "prehistories"
and different "possibilities for connection" 3°3 of their respective
communications. Even what seems to be a single event, such as
the enactment of a statute, may indicate these differences between
systems. An observer may view the statute's enactment either as a
political success or as a decision changing the "validity position" of
the law. 3 4 Viewed from the perspective of the political system, the
statute's "prehistory" is its emergence from a process of legislative
maneuvering and (perhaps) manipulation of public opinion. From
this perspective, the legislative success alters the balance of power
between government and opposition and creates fresh possibilities
for further political maneuvers. 5 From the perspective of the legal system, by contrast, the statute appears simply as valid law, the
product of legally prescribed legislative procedures,3o and a point
of connection for future legal decisions. And interpretation of the
statute in adjudication, Luhmann observes, is not simply a matter
of reenacting the political battles that led to the statute's enactment.3o7
Luhmann insists that legislation's double significance is comprehensible only if we posit two separate networks of communication, political and legal. But at the same time, Luhmann argues,
legislation helps bring these two networks into connection. Luhmann's distinction between the legal and political systems thus
emphatically does not mean their mutual indifference. Instead,
legislation is the "place of transformation of politics into law," and
conversely, its legally
prescribed procedures effect a "legal restric308
tion of politics.
Finally, Luhmann distinguishes between the legal and political
systems by noting their different "temporality." Modern political
systems, Luhmann observes, are under heavy time pressure.3 °9 Legal procedures, by contrast-and particularly adjudicative procedures-operate comparatively slowly, both in settling controversies and in effecting politically desirable structural change.
302 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT,
303 Id. at 436.
304 Id. at 434.
305 See id. at 435.
306 See id. at 435-36.
307 See id. at 420.
308 Id. at 429.
309 See id. at 427.

supra note 18, at 435.
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Legislation offers a way of closing this time gap and maintaining
the systems' mutual responsiveness. From the perspective of the
political system, legislation responds relatively quickly to political
pressures.310 And from the perspective of the legal system, statutes
operate as new law that need not be reconcilable with, let alone
derived from, prior judicial decisions.311 Here, too, Luhmann insists that legislation's important function in connecting the legal
and political systems is comprehensible only if those systems are
seen as separate in principle.
Luhmann acknowledges that his "separation" thesis is counterintuitive. From the perspective of the legal system, he notes,
law is everywhere; there are no "law-free spaces." '
Law constrains and channels political activity, and thus, from a legal point
of view, politics appears as communication within legally established boundaries. From the perspective of the political system, by
contrast, law is an instrument of politics, a means of attaining politically desirable goals. The notion of the Rechtstaat, or rule of
law, brings these contrary perspectives into a single formula.'
But
despite what Luhmann calls the "optical difficulties13 14 in seeing
the two systems as separate, law and politics are differently coded
systems, on Luhmann's view, with distinct, but "structurally coupled," reproductive networks.
2. Forms of Structural Coupling Between Law and Politics
Luhmann's account of legislation-as the "contact zone" between law and politics and the "place of transformation of politics
into law"-indicates that legislation is an important form of structural coupling between legal and political systems. Another form
of structural coupling Luhmann discusses intermittently concerns
the enforcement of legal judgments.315 As Luhmann notes, systematically unenforced judgments would threaten the legal system's long-run stability.316 The enforcement of such judgments re' between the legal and
quires a "certain functional synthesis" 17
' that secures,
political systems, a "reciprocally parasitic relation"318
310

See id.; Self-Reproduction, supra note 63, at 119.

311 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supranote 18, at 427.
312 Id. at 422.
313 See id.
314 Id. at 428.

315 See id. at 283 (describing enforcement as a form of structural coupling).
316 See id. at 153.
317 Id.

318 Id. at 426.
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for the legal system, the likelihood that its decisions will be enforced.
Luhmann does not elaborate on how this reciprocal relation
counts as a form of structural coupling, but the argument is not difficult to complete. A system is structurally coupled to another system, Luhmann maintains, if it "presupposes specific states or
changes" in the other system and "relies on them."3 19 Indeed, most
communication in the legal system's core (the courts)3 20 presuppresupposes and relies upon the possibility that the political system
will apply political power to enforce legal judgments.
Although legislation and enforcement are important forms of
structural coupling between law and politics, Luhmann devotes
more systematic attention to constitutions.32' Modern constitutions, Luhmann argues, are suitable mechanisms for structural
coupling because they have both legal and political significance.
From the legal system's perspective, a constitution is a legal text,
susceptible to interpretation and argument. Constitutions accomplish what Luhmann calls a "secondary coding" of legal communication-the distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional.3 22 Considered as a legal text, a constitution is "autological,"
or self-including, foreseeing itself as part of the legal order it establishes. As the "positive law that grounds positive law,"3 23 a constitution exempts itself from the rule that new law trumps old law,
except under conditions of amendment the constitution itself prescribes.3 24 From the point of view of the legal system, the constitu32
tion proceduralizes and normalizes the process of legal change.
From the perspective of the political system, by contrast, the constitution is an act of political will that creates a governmental organization, "determin[ing] how political power is organized, and
... plac[ing] legal restrictions on political power."3 2 In establishing the conditions by which positive law can be created and transformed, constitutions bring an "immense potential for political ac327
tion.
OperationalClosure and Structural Coupling,supra note 34, at 1432; see also RECHT
at 441.
320 See supra text accompanying notes 148-203.
321 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 452, 468-81; OperationalClosure
and Structural Coupling, supranote 34, at 1436.
319

DER GESELLSCHAFT, supranote 18,

322 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supranote 18, at 474-76.
323

324
325
326
327

Id. at 471.
See id. at 471-73.
See id. at 473.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 479.
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The coupling of law and politics through constitutions accomplishes, further, a solution of sorts to each system's self-referential
paradox-the paradox of a legal grounding for law, and a political
grounding for politics.3" From the side of the legal system, the
constitution "externalizes" the paradox of legal validity by locating
the legal system's foundations outside the legal system, in the political act of the sovereign people. Similarly, from the side of the
political system, the constitution represents the system's ground as
lying beyond the system's boundaries-not in ordinary politics, but
in the rule of law. In Luhmann's formulation: "The constitution
... creates political solutions for the self-reference problem of law
and legal solutions for the self-reference problem of politics."329
But at least in developed Western societies, Luhmann contends, the coupling of law and politics through constitutions has
become deeply problematic. The second half of this century,
Luhmann argues, has seen a shift toward "fundamental values" or
moral-intuitions forms of constitutional interpretation, and a trend
toward case-by-case balancing in constitutional law.330 Luhmann
allows that these tendencies have increased the "variety" in legal
argumentation-i.e., the system's openness toward environmental
"interests" and particular facts of individual cases. Yet, according
to Luhmann, this openness has come at the cost of the system's
"redundancies," or, its network of legal concepts.331 The valueand interest-weighing
approach may be "flexible," but it is also
'
"vacuous."332
According to Luhmann, it remains unclear whether
the "apparatus of classic constitutionalism" can be adapted to the
conditions of the welfare state.333
Luhmann's critique of constitutional "value jurisprudence"
parallels his polemics against "purposive" programming and consequentialist judicial decision,334 and it sounds themes familiar to

328 See id. at 478; see also OperationalClosure and StructuralCoupling, supra note 34, at
1436-37.
329 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 478; see also OperationalClosure and
StructuralCoupling,supra note 34, at 1436-37.
330 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 479-80. Luhmann mentions both
the United States and Germany in this connection. See id. For a summary of the German
debate over "value jurisprudence" in the Federal Constitutional Court, see JORGEN

HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY

OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 240-61 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
331 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 480,485-86.
332 Id. at 539.
333 Id. at 480.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 126-30, 247-50.
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American constitutional theory.335 Nonetheless, the critique's fit
with the basic premises of autopoietic theory is less than clear. In
his more general account of the relation between "concepts" and
"interests" in adjudication, Luhmann has insisted that both are
"internal" creations of the system itself.336 Thus, the idea that the
values in "value jurisprudence" have illicitly impinged on the legal
system "from without" seems difficult to reconcile with autopoietic
theory. If Luhmann is arguing, instead, that the shift toward interests or values has undermined some essential minimum basis of
conceptual clarity or sophistication, that claim would require more
analysis of actual patterns of constitutional argumentation than
Luhmann provides, and an explicit defense of some standard of
conceptual sufficiency.
Nor does Luhmann's characterization of "value jurisprudence" as "politicized" connect easily with his account of political
communication. "Fundamental values" talk in constitutional adjudication does not seem to track either of the "codes" Luhmann
suggests for political communication-the distinctions between
government and opposition (in party-political competition for political power) and between governing and governed (in the application of political power).337 In short, Luhmann's critique of contemporary constitutional law seems to be at least in tension with
the premises of his theory.
C. Structural Coupling of Law and Economy
The economy, like the political system, is in Luhmann's view
an autopoietic system structurally coupled to other social subsystems, including the legal system. As an autopoietic system, the
economic system must operate under a "code," or system-defining
binary distinction, parallel to legal communication's distinction between legal and illegal. Luhmann is not altogether rigorous or
consistent in defining this code. His usual formulation, however, is
that the economic system has two codes-property and money-or
more precisely, the binary distinctions between having/not having
property, and payment/nonpayment.33
335

For two-very different-examples, compare

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND

DISTRUST 43-72 (1980), with ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE

POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). Of course, neither Ely nor Bork operates
with the same conceptual repertoire as Luhmann.
336 See supratext accompanying notes 255-61.
337 See supratext accompanying notes 300-01.
338 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 456; ECOLOGICAL
COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 36. But see Coding, supra note 63, at 155 (suggesting
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Historically, Luhmann says, the property code is the economic
' As the determination of who has dissystem's "primary code."339
posal over which commodities, property counts as the "minimal
3 40 But with the increasing imcondition" of economic autopoiesis.
portance of economic exchange, the "secondary code" of money

has become dominant. In a thoroughly monetized economy, the
economic meaning of property is its potential exchange value 34 1

so much so that Luhmann sometimes defines an autopoietic economic system in terms of the money code alone, as, for example,
the network of "all those operations transacted through the payment of money."34 2 And accordingly, with the development of an
exchange economy, contract, the mechanism by which property
rights may be assigned through exchange, likewise has become increasingly important.343 Law and economy, then, have come to be
4

coupled not just through property, but also through contract.
For Luhmann, property and contract are the principal forms of
structural coupling between economy and law.345
1.

PropertyAs Mechanism of Structural Coupling (with Special
Attention to "Takings" Law)
Property has a "double meaning, ' 34 Luhmann claims-different, but related, significance in economic and legal communicathe sole economic code); ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 52 (explaining that property was the original economic code, but that it was supplanted by money); id.
at 51 (defining the autopoietic economic system as the network of "all those operations
transacted through the payment of money"); LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 20,
at 461-62 (suggesting money as the code and payments as the elements for the "modem
economic system").
339 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 456; cf. ECOLOGICAL
COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 52 (property as historically original code for economic system, but supplanted as code by property); RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra

note 18, at 453 ("decisive condition" for an autopoietic economic system is the development of a money economy).
340 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAF, supra note 18, at 454; see also OperationalClosure
and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1435 ("Without a clear divide between having
and not having property rights, no transaction would be possible.").
341 See RECHT DER GESELLSCAF, supra note 18, at 448, 456,465.
342 ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 51; see also LUHMANN, SOCIAL
SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 461-62 (economic system as system of money payments, closed
with respect to money code).
343 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAF, supranote 18, at 456.
344See id.

345 See id. at 453-54; Operational Closure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at
1435. Luhmann does not contend that property and contract are the only mechanisms of
structural coupling between law and economy. His examples of other structural couplings,
however, are sparse. See infra Part V.D. (criticizing this aspect of Luhmann's theory).
346 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAF, supra note 18, at 455.
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tion. The economic meaning of property, Luhmann has said, is its
potential exchange value in a monetary transaction.34 7 The currently dominant legal meaning of property, by contrast, appears in
the familiar formula, "property as bundle of rights."3a Yet despite
the different meanings assigned to property in legal and economic
communication-or rather, through these different meanings-the
two systems manage to accomplish an ongoing connection to one
another. Much as the double significance of legislation couples the
legal and political systems,34 9 Luhmann argues, so the double
meaning of property structurally couples the economic and legal
350
systems.
Luhmann, however, does not elaborate much on the different
meanings of property in law and economy. Nor does his primarily
historical discussion of property351 explore in much detail how
property operates in modern societies as a mechanism of structural
coupling.
What follows is my sketch of how Luhmann might have addressed these issues. To give the sketch some particularity, I refer
to recent developments in federal constitutional "takings" law.
Other examples-from, for example, the law of real property or
intellectual property would have been possible, and a complete account of property as a mechanism of structural coupling would
have to attend to them as well. Thus, the focus on takings law is
illustrative only; it should not be understood to suggest that some
essential meaning of property appears only in that body of law.
The "bundle of rights" conception of property, increasingly
evident in Supreme Court takings opinions,352 presents property as
347

See id. at 448, 456, 465.

34 On the dominance of the "bundle of rights" formulation, see, for example, J.E. Pen-

ner, The 'Bundle of Rights' Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712-15 (1996).
Luhmann mentions the formulation, see RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at
457, but as noted in text, infra, he does not discuss the legal meaning of property very
clearly or in much detail.
349 See supra text accompanying notes 299-314.
350 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 455.
351 His discussion in Recht der Gesellschaft focuses on the historical development of
modern notions of property and their role in the differentiation of a modern economic system. See id. at 447-50, 457-58.
352 For examples in opinions for the Court from the last 20 years, see Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 401 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1027 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528 (1992); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716, 717 (1987);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497, 500 (1987); Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433, 435-36 (1982); Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). In most of these cases, dissenting opinions also
invoke the "bundle of rights" schema.
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a legal institution consisting in legal rights established in and
through the law. To that extent, the formulation refers "internally" to the legal system's own operations. But the various rights
in the bundle-among them, the rights to use, exclusive possession, disposition, and profit 353 -correspond to economic interests.
This connection to interests allows legal communication to establish an "external" reference to the economic system.35' And takings law establishes, at the same time, another "external" reference-to the political system, framed as "the state" or "the
government," whose regulation or other action allegedly has taken
property without compensation.355 Thus in takings-law argument,
on one side of the legal dispute stands the property owner, with
her various economic interests and "investment-backed expecta'
On the other side stands the government, whose regulations."356
tion purportedly advances various "state interests." Through the
references to interests and expectations, takings-law argument
"observes" and "models" both the economic and the political systems, allowing the legal system to respond to "irritations" from
systems is what Luhmann
both systems. This relation35 between
7
means by structural coupling.
To be sure, in characterizing and evaluating the various economic interests implicated in a property claim-in our particular
example, a takings claim-courts do not necessarily duplicate the
way economic communication constructs the notion of property.
For example, while the Supreme Court has recognized a broad
range of economic interests as "property" protected by the Takings Clause, it has excluded from that embrace a number of economically valuable interests, such as employment, government entitlements, tax exemptions, licenses, and money owed in taxes.358
353 See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36 (describing the "bundle of rights" in a thing as
the right to possess, use, and obtain a profit from it, and the right to exclude others from
possession and use).
354 See supra text accompanying notes 255-61.
355 This second external reference-to the political system-arises because takings
claims are constitutional claims, and, according to Luhmann, constitutions structurally
couple the legal and political systems. See supra text accompanying notes 321-29.
356 The Court has characterized the once-standard regulatory-takings test as an "ad hoc,
factual" inquiry that considers a number of factors, including the "character of the governmental action," the action's "economic impact" on the takings claimant, and the degree
to which the government's action has "interfered with [the claimant's] distinct investmentbacked expectations." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).
The Court has partially supplanted this inquiry with a new system of rules, as explained
infra.
357 See supraPart IV.A.
358 See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its In-
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Nor has the Court treated all recognized property interests as fungible, differing only in extent of economic value. Instead, the
Court has extended much more stringent constitutional protection
to interests in land than to other interests, regardless of the
amount of economic value at stake.359 This special solicitude for
land seems more responsive to legal tradition than to modern economic analysis.
Further, among the "bundle of rights" constituting ownership
of land, the Court has selected some of the "sticks" as more essential than others. Thus, while the Court has tolerated many regulations that substantially reduced the economic value of a claimant's
land,3 60 it has scrutinized carefully regulations that threaten the
owner's legal right to exclude others from the property. This right
to exclude, the Court has said, is "one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property. 3' 61 The right is so fundamental to property ownership, the
Court held in the Loretto case,3 62 that a government-authorized
"permanent physical occupation" of land is a taking of property
per se 63-even when the physical intrusion is minimal, 364 and even
when it has "only minimal economic impact on the owner."36 As
the Court has acknowledged, this emphasis on the legal right to
of economic value, does not
exclude, rather than the diminution
366
logic.
economic
an
follow
to
seem

pact on Economic Legislation,76 B.U. L. REV. 605,624, 653-54 (1996).
359 See id. at 608; id. at 653 ("[T]he Court gives little consideration under the Takings
Clause to purely economic regulations that do not affect land, even when large amounts of
wealth are at stake."); id. at 655-56 & nn.213-22 (citing cases); id. at 656 ("In this Court's
[R]eal property receives more protection than
view, land is first among all assets ....
other property .... "); id. at 664-65.
360 See id. at 656-57.
361 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also id. at 179-80 (explaining that the right to exclude is "universally held to be a fundamental element of the
property right"); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982) ("The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.").
362 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
363 See id. at 426.
364 In Loretto, for example, the intrusion amounted to one-eighth of a cubic foot of

space on top of a Manhattan apartment building. See id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The property owner admitted that she "would have had no other use for the
cable-occupied space." Id. at 453-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
365 Id. at 435.
366 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020 n.8 (1992) (describing the property owner's interest in Loretto as "noneconomic"); cf. Loretto, 458 U.S.
at 450 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's distinction between permanent
occupation and temporary intrusions "finds no basis in ... economic logic").
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An additional example of the difference between economic
and legal understandings of property is the case of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,367 in which the Court decided that regulations "depriv[ing] land of all economically beneficial use" are
unconstitutional per se.3 The Court acknowledged that this categorical "total takings" rule might provide full compensation for a
100% deprivation of value but no compensation for a 95% diminution.369 From an economic point of view, one would not attach
such great significance to the difference between a 95% diminution in value and a 100% diminution in value. But in the Court's
words, speaking from the perspective of legal communication:
"[tiakings law is full of these 'all-or-nothing' situations."3 70 Here,
too, the legal and economic significances of property seem to diverge.37'
Takings law illustrates another of Luhmann's points about
structural coupling-that it enables mutual and reciprocal "observation" among autopoietic systems. Legal communication, as
mentioned, observes the economic system, in part through a property schema that connects various economic interests to the bundle
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1027. The Court qualified this per se "total takings" rule by recognizing a
"nuisance" exception. See id. at 1029-32.
369 See id. at 1019-20 n.8.
370 Id. at 1020 n.8.
371 A similar analysis might apply to a difficulty the Lucas Court noted in determining
whether a regulation effected a "total taking" or a "mere diminution in value." "Regrettably," the Court said,
the rhetorical force of [the] "deprivation of all economically feasible use" rule is
greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured. When, for example, a
regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state,
it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the owner
has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of
the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value
of the tract as a whole.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
The Court suggested that,
[t]he answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to
what degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the
particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a
diminution in (or elimination of) value.
Id. at 1017 n.7. From an economic point of view, however, this inquiry would seem irrelevant. As Justice Stevens observed in dissent, "[f]rom the 'landowner's point of view,' a
regulation that diminishes a lot's value by 50% is... 'the equivalent' of the condemnation
of half of the lot," id. at 1066, whether or not either half of the lot corresponds to a legal
interest protected by state property law. On the strategy of interpreting owners' "expectations" by consulting state law, see infra text accompanying notes 387-91.
367

368
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of legal rights recognized in law, such as the rights of possession,
exclusion, use, and disposition.3 72 And for its part, Luhmann would
argue, economic communication observes the legal system as well,
through a property schema of its own. From an economic point of
view, property is something with an economic value, and that
value depends in part upon the likelihood that governmental entities might "take" or reduce the value of the property, upon the
amount of compensation (if any) they would likely pay, and upon
the likely expense and burden of legal procedures aimed at compensation.373 In order to predict the outcome of these legal procedures, economic communication must "observe" and "model" the
decisions and legal argument in takings cases.
The mutual observations among systems may become more
complicated. The legal system, for example, may observe its own
observations of the economic system-as when legal communication reflects on the connections between the property schema it
employs and the role of property in the economic system. This
sort of reflection may become more complicated still. The legal
system may observe, in its own communication, the way in which
the economic system observes the legal system. In terms of the
particular example of property: legal communication may examine
the way in which legal communication over property appears from
the perspective of the economic system, and the way in which the
economic system responds to its own observations of the legal system.
Takings law does not present many examples in which courts
explicitly recognize this reciprocal observation of economic and
legal communication. When courts are aware of the matter
(never, of course, in Luhmann's vocabulary), it typically appears as
a problem to be solved. For example, in his Lucas concurrence,
Justice Kennedy notes what he calls an "inherent tendency toward
circularity" in the takings-law inquiry "whether the deprivation is
contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations. 3 74 This
372 Again, property is not the only mechanism of structural coupling between the economic and legal system. Luhmann discusses contract as another important mechanism, see
infra Part IV.C.2., and he does not deny that there are other such mechanisms through
which legal communication can observe the economic system on an ongoing basis. See,
e.g., RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 464-65 (arguing that one of the most
"noteworthy" structural couplings between law and economy is the privilege to inflict
harm intentionally through economic competition).
373 More generally, and apart from the particular "takings" problem, the economic
value of property depends in part upon the availability and expense of legal protection.
374 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Here Justice
Kennedy is invoking the once-standard regulatory-takings test, an "ad hoc, factual" in-
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"circularity" arises because expectations concerning how much
constitutional protection property will receive depend upon how
much protection courts are willing to extend. Courts trying to decide how much protection to provide, then, cannot simply consult
the "expectations" prevailing in economic communication, apart
from the law. As Justice Kennedy puts it: "if the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what
courts say it is. 3 75 In other words, in answering the question
quiry that considers a number of factors, including the "character of the governmental action," the action's "economic impact" on the takings claimant, and the degree to which the
government's action has "interfered with" the claimant's "distinct investment-backed expectations." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The
Court still applies this test to property interests unconnected to land. See Concrete Pipe &
Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 643-45 (1993); see also
McUsic, supra note 358, at 655-56. It does not, however, apply the test when one of the
"per se" rules applies. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Nor does the
Court seem to apply the "ad hoc" balancing test when the challenged regulation affects
what the Court considers a core property interest in land, such as the right to exclude. In
the latter sort of case, the Court applies a form of heightened review, focusing on the
"nexus" between the government's asserted interest and the burden placed on the property owner. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385-97 (1994); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
375 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy's insight is reminiscent of Felix Cohen's critique of "transcendental nonsense."
Cohen criticized trademark law as resting on a "vicious circle": "It purports to base legal
protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a
sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected." Cohen, supra
note 253, at 815. And of the constitutional jurisprudence concerning rate regulation,
which based a fair rate of return on the utility's market value, Cohen observed that this
value depended upon the rates the court would permit the utility to charge. Thus, "[t]he
actual value of a utility's property.., is a function of the court's decision, and the court's
decision cannot be based in fact upon the actual value of the property." Id. at 818 (emphasis omitted).
Cohen traces the problem of "circularity" and "transcendental nonsense" to the
"fallacious" idea, id. at 814 n.14, that law is an autonomous or self-referential discourse.
"To justify or criticize legal rules in purely legal terms," he says, "is always to argue in a
vicious circle." Id. at 814. In the examples just discussed, however, courts have attempted
to solve a legal problem by establishing an external reference-to economic value. The
problem is not that the law is referring directly to itself, but instead that because of the
coupling of law and economy, through property, the "external" reference to economic
value is not in fact independent of law. Cohen's proposal that courts improve (as Luhmann would put it) their "observation" and "modeling" of the legal environmentthrough closer attention to social and economic "facts," and through "frank facing," id. at
817, of economic, political and ethical questions-would amount to a reformulation and
deepening of law's external reference, not the replacement .of self-reference with external
reference. See supra text accompanying notes 271-72.
As Justice Kennedy points out, the same problem of circularity appears in references to "reasonable expectations of privacy" in Fourth Amendment law. See Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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whether property has been taken, courts seek to break out of the
circle of legal communication by referring, "externally," to the expectations of property owners. But to the extent that these economic expectations are themselves formed by modeling and predicting legal decisions, the circle remains unbroken. In looking
outside the law for an answer to the takings problem, the law
meets itself.376
While explicit discussion of this "circularity" problem in Supreme Court opinions is rare, one can read much of the Court's recent takings law as, in part, an attempt to respond to it. Takings
doctrine once relied heavily on the "expectations" inquiry Justice
Kennedy mentions. 377 Recently, however-and perhaps in part because of the apparent vacuity and circularity of the "expectations"
inquiry-the Court has followed a number of alternative strategies. 7s One strategy is to abandon the effort to observe the economic system through property owners' expectations and to retreat, instead, to a purer form of self-reference.
With this
approach, the Court looks "internally" to its own prior decisions,
and discovers in them a categorical or per se rule that can supplant
the expectations test. In Loretto, for example, the Court mentioned the expectations test,379 but shifted quickly to a review of
the Court's cases involving physical invasions of property. Those
cases, the Court concluded, "uniformly have found a taking" in
cases of permanent physical occupation, even where the economic
impact on the owner was "minimal. ' '310 That conclusion rendered
the owner's expectations irrelevant.38' Similarly, in Lucas the
Court justified its "categorical" rule-that deprivation of all economic value is a taking-by invoking a line of precedents that, it
said, established that rule.382 This "long-established" rule, the
376 The circularity becomes more apparent still when one realizes that the "expectations" the Court invokes are merely imputed from the safety of the Justices' chambers, not
discovered through some sort of empirical research technique.
377 See McUsic, supra note 358, at 624-26.
378 Certainly one idea behind the changes in takings doctrine has been to increase the
level of constitutional protection for property owners. But while that motivation explains
why the Court might want to refashion the takings test, it does not necessarily explain how
the Court should refashion the test. See infra note 386.
379 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
380 Id. at 434-35.
381 Irrelevant, because the Court had described the expectations factor as part of a
more general inquiry into the regulation's economic impact. See id. at 432. As the Court
put it, the per se rule it distilled from prior cases classified all government-authorized
permanent physical occupations as takings, "without regard to other factors that a court
might ordinarily examine." Id.
382 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992).
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Court said, was one that the Court did "not invent but merely
appl[ied]. 381 Here, too, the Court did not need to consult the expectations of property owners to find a taking.
The Loretto and Lucas decisions are still circular, in the sense
that they involve the legal system's self-referential observation of
its own communications. But they do not involve the embarrassment of purporting to break out of the legal circle. Analyzing
cases to generate categorical legal rules is perhaps a more congenial task for the Court-certainly, more congenial for some members of the Court384-than case-by-case evaluation of regulations'
"economic impact ... and, particularly the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations."381 Whatever reasons might have motivated the Court, one
effect of shifting toward categorical rules has been to unburden the
3 6
legal system of its external reference to economic expectations.
A second and related strategy for responding to the "circularity" problem also breaks the external reference to economic expectations but extends the legal circle to include legal decisions
other than those rendered by the Supreme Court. The Court followed this approach in Lucas. After fashioning its "categorical"
rule that government may not "deprive[] land of all economically
beneficial use" without paying compensation, the Court turned to
Id. at 1016 n.6.
The Justice most famously attracted to rules rather than open-ended standards is
Justice Scalia. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989). Justice Thomas shares this preference. See Hon. Clarence Thomas,
Cordell Hull Speakers Forum, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 611, 616-17 (1994).
385 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
386 Of course, one likely motivation behind Lucas and other recent Supreme Court
takings decisions has been to strengthen constitutional protections for owners of land, particularly those with interests in development. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (prohibition on building beachfront house is a taking); see also
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (conditioning permit to expand hardware
store on dedication of floodplain land and easement for bicycle path is a taking); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (conditioning permit to expand beach
house on granting public right of passage along owner's beach is a taking). The results
under the old expectations-based balancing test almost invariably favored the government.
See McUsic, supra note 358, at 625 & n.85.
Still, there is no self-evident connection between the use of categorical rules, such as
those employed in Lucas and Loretto, and more stringent constitutional protection for
property owners. The centerpiece of Dolan, after all, is not a categorical rule but a "rough
proportionality" test that compares the "degree of the exactions demanded by the [government's] permit conditions" and "the projected impact of [the property owner's] proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388; see also id. at 391. How much protection
this rule provides depends upon the degree of justification the Court demands from the
government and how willing the Court is to insist that governments consider alternative
regulatory strategies that are less burdensome on property owners.
383
384
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the question whether its new rule has any exceptions. It began its
analysis by invoking the expectations test. According to the Court,
"the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to
be restricted, from time to time, by ... the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers,"3"" and in the case of personal property,
the owner "ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation
3 ' The
might even render his property economically worthless.""
words "necessarily expects" and "ought to be aware." indicate that
the Court was speaking not of actual economic expectations, but of
legally imputed expectations. And when the Court focused on
whether the same analysis holds true of land, it shifted its attention
from the expectations or awareness of hypothetical property owners to the "background principles of the State's law of property
and nuisance."38 9 To defend a regulation that totally deprived an
owner of his land's economic value, the Court held, the state
would have to "identify background principles of nuisance and
property law that prohibit the uses [the owner] now intends."39
With this strategy, the Court avoids the "circularity" problem
Justice Kennedy mentioned. Instead of conditioning its decision
on economic expectations that the decision would itself create,
reinforce, or alter, the Court refers to some other body of lawsuch as state nuisance or property law, or perhaps even "the whole
of our legal tradition" 391 -that the Court may consult but does not
create. The decision, while circular from the perspective of the legal system as a whole, does not appear to be circular from the perspective of the Supreme Court in particular.
A third approach to the "circularity" problem is to shift the
external reference from economic expectations to the other system
involved in takings law-the political system. This approach appears in the Court's decisions in Nollan3 9 and Dolan.3 93 In Nollan,
the Court considered a regulation that conditioned approval of a
building permit upon the beachfront property owner's granting
public access to part of the beach. The Court focused on the
state's justifications, examining' whether there was a "nexus" beLucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
Id. at 1027-28.
Id. at 1029. The Court also referred to the inconsistency between total deprivation
and "the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our
constitutional culture." Id.
390 Id. at 1031.
391 Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
392 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
393 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
387
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tween the exaction and the asserted governmental interest,39 4 and
between the exaction and the impact of the proposed development.39 5 The question then became not whether the regulation interfered with the property owner's "reasonable, investmentbacked expectations," but instead, whether the state interest was
legitimate, and whether the exaction "substantially advance[d]"
that interest.3 6
In Dolan, the Court sharpened this focus on the government's
justifications for an exaction. The Court held that the government
must make "some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."'3 97 On the "extent" issue, the
Court said that while the government need not present a "precise
mathematical calculation," it would have to "make some effort to
quantify its findings."39 Only if the impact of the exaction and the
projected impact of the development are roughly proportional
may the government insist upon its exaction conditions.3 99
By avoiding the inquiry into economic expectations, the Nollan/Dolan approach limits courts' direct observation of the economic system. In each case, the Court emphasized the legal significance of impairing property owners' right to exclude.4 But in
neither case did the Court determine the economic consequences
of such an impairment for the property owner. 0 1 The Court's
strategy, instead, was to observe the political system. What interests does the governmental entity assert? How tight is the connection between the asserted interest and the exaction condition?
And how thoroughly has the governmental entity examined the
impact of the proposed development and the consequences of its
exaction condition? This observation of the political system's observation avoids the circularity of the expectations test, and it is
probably more manageable for courts than direct inquiry into a
regulation's economic consequences.
In none of these shifts away from the expectations test-cateSee Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35, 837-38.
See id. at 838-39.
Id. at 834-35. The Court held that the exaction condition entirely failed to advance
the state's asserted interests.
397 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
398 Id. at 395.
399 See id. at 391 (adopting "rough proportionality" requirement).
400 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393-94.
401 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The record does not tell us the
dollar value of petitioner Florence Dolan's interest in excluding the public from the
greenway adjacent to her hardware business.").
394
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gorical rules, recourse to state nuisance law, and focus on the political system's justifications for exaction conditions-has the
Court responded to the vacuity of the expectations test by developing a more sophisticated model of the economic system. Notwithstanding the various suggestions of commentators for improved models,4 the Court seems content with its schema of
property as a bundle of rights, among which the right to exclude
and the right to develop real property deserve special solicitude.
Primitive as this model may be from an economic standpoint, it
still provides a point of connection in takings discourse to the
world of economic transactions. And, viewed from the other side,
economic communication can observe, and respond to, legal decisions concerning the taking of property.
2.

ContractAs Mechanism of Structural Coupling (with Special
Attention to Remedies and the UCC)
Luhmann identifies contract as a second important mechanism of structural coupling between the legal and economic systems103 Put more precisely, he identifies "contract" as the legal
name for a mechanism of structural coupling that economic communication identifies as "exchange."
As with his account of
property, however, Luhmann's discussion of contract is primarily
historical; he does not provide much elaboration as to how contract serves in modem societies as a mechanism of structural coupling between law and economy. 40 5 The kind of elaboration he
might have given, however, seems readily apparent from a quick
review of basic principles of contract law. The account that follows is sketchy and selective, but it should suffice to illustrate
Luhmann's general point.
Contract law's focus on the bargained-for exchange suggests
402 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS (1995); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny,
75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1265-1303 (1997) (questioning whether judicial review under Nollan
and Dolan can be justified on efficiency grounds); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensationfor Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984).
403See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 443, 451, 452; OperationalClosure and Structural Coupling,supra note 34, at 1434.
404 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 456. For an account of the distinction between contract and exchange, and the difference that distinction might make in
the context of premarital agreements, see Katharine Silbaugh, MarriageContracts and the
Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 63-71, on file with
author).
Q5 See id. at 446-50,458-63; OperationalClosure and StructuralCoupling, supra note 34,
at 1434-35. Here, too, Luhmann is most interested in the question of how the economic
system developed into a differentiated, autopoietic system.
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an obvious connection to the world of market transactions. Consistent with Luhmann's general account of "external" reference,
contract law establishes this connection between the legal and
economic systems by attributing various "interests" to market participants, primarily the "expectation interest" in obtaining the
promised benefit of a bargain.4 The basic contract-law remedy
vindicates this interest, in case of breach, by seeking to place the
plaintiff in the economic position he or she would have occupied
had defendant performed. 40 7 Accomplishing this remedy requires
the court or jury to observe at least a small slice of the economic
system-determining, for example, the price prevailing in the relevant market at the relevant time. °8 Glosses on the basic expectations remedy, such as the "lost volume seller" rule,m require further observation of the parties' particular economic situation.
Other rules-such as the principle of avoidable losses (also known
as the "duty to mitigate damages")-adjust the measure of recovery by incorporating norms of economically reasonable behavior
into contract law.4 10 This coupling of law and economy through
contract remedies appears in the diagnosis of economically minded
commentators: contract law's protection of the expectation interest, they have argued, conforms to norms of economic efficiency. 11
Developments in contract law during this century-developments that could be described as a shift from "formalism" to "realism" or "post-realism"-illustrate another aspect of structural
coupling. Contract law has increasingly come to rely on systematic
observation of the economic sphere and to incorporate these observations into legal rules or decisions. The sales article of the
Uniform Commercial Code is a rich source of illustrations. 12 The
46

The other interests contract law protects are, of course, reliance and restitution in-

terests. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,

CONTRACTS

40 (1982).

See id.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-708 (providing basic damage remedy for seller of goods against
breaching buyer as "difference between the market price at the time and place for tender
and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages ...but less expenses
saved"); id. § 2-713 (providing damage remedy for buyer who has not "covered" as "difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and
the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages ... but less expenses saved").
49 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 406, at 851-55 (discussing conditions under which
seller who, but for the breach, would have made two sales rather than one, may recover
lost profits for lost sale despite having resold).
410 See id. at 858-73.
411 See, e.g., id. at 816-18 & 816 n.1 (citing sources); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS ch. 16 introductory note & reporter's note (1981).
412 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
47
408
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Code's parol evidence rule, for example, "definitely rejects" the
idea that written contractual language acquires meaning "by rules
' Instead, the Code explains,
of construction existing in the law."413
in interpreting contractual language courts and juries must consult
"the commercial context" in which the language was used,414 including the parties' course of performance,415 the course of their
prior dealings,416 and customary usages of trade. 17 Under this approach, then, in arriving at a legal decision about the meaning of
written agreements, courts must observe their economic environment and incorporate this observation into' legal communication
itself.418 Luhmann would describe this observation as a form of
structural coupling.4 19
A second and similar illustration is the Code's treatment of
formation issues. In its transformation of common-law offer-andacceptance rules, the Code prescribes that "[a] contract for the sale
of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract." 42 The official comment to the quoted
provision notes, in opposition to restrictive common-law notions,
that "commercial standards on the point of 'indefiniteness' are in1765, 1765 (1996) (describing "the fundamental premise of the Uniform Commercial
Code's adjudicative philosophy, the idea that courts should seek to discover 'immanent
business norms' and use them to decide cases"); id. at 1766-68 & nn.1-9 (marshalling, to
the same effect, authority from statutory text, official Code commentary, judicial opinions,
academic commentary, and Llewellyn's writings).
Hereinafter, when I say "the Code," I mean Article 2 of the Uniform Commer'cial
Code, governing the sale of goods. Obviously the Code does not apply in terms to all contracts, but it may nonetheless operate as persuasive authority beyond its terms. See, e.g.,
FARNSWORTH, supra note 406, at 33-34; see also id. at 25-26 (noting reliance by drafters of
the Restatement (Second) of Contractson analogies to the Code).
413 U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1.
414 See id.
415 See id. §§ 2-202(a), 2-208.
416 See id. §§ 2-202(a), 1-205(1).
417 See id. §§ 2-202(a), 1-205(2).
418 The incorporation of usages of trade also has an economic justification: "The drafters assumed that commercial parties would not long persist in an inefficient practice. The
mere fact that a trade practice is time-tested is evidence that it is 'efficient' and therefore
desirable from an economic perspective." Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption
After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53,68 (1997).
419 In a 1988 article--one of the few articles by American legal academics that systematically examines autopoietic theory-Richard Lempert takes this feature of the Uniform
Commercial Code to be a counterexample to Luhmann's autopoietic theory. See Lempert, supra note 19, at 181. I think Lempert's interpretation would have been different,
had he been able to consult Luhmann's post-1988 discussions of structural coupling. Only
in his most recent work has Luhmann begun to develop the idea of structural coupling, as
well as the idea of cognitive openness Lempert discusses.
420

U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
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tended to be applied."42' Here, too, the Code prescribes openness
to commercial realities and observation of the actual conduct of
the parties, in partial replacement of legal formalities and selfreferential interpretation of court decisions. The Code's provisions on interpretation handle missing or open-ended contractual
terms in a similar fashion.422
On Luhmann's understanding of the term, law and economy
were "structurally coupled" through contract even before the tri-

umph, or partial triumph, of realist-inspired conceptions.423 But so
long as legal conceptions of contract did not adequately model the
economic world they regulated-and, viewed from the other side,
so long as practices in the economic sphere did not track the law's
formalities-the connections between law and economy could remain only haphazard.424 What the realists and their followers
sought to accomplish was not the creation of a structural coupling
between law and economy, but rather the systematic observation of
this coupling and the reflexive incorporation of this observation
into the law itself. Their project involved, as previously men-

tioned, developing a greater openness in law to the world of economic transactions, in place of classical formalism's relative indifference toward actual commercial practice. 43

But the project

Id. § 2-204, cmt.
See, e.g., id. § 2-305(1) (to fulfill "dominant intention" of most contracting parties,
contract with open price terms need not fail for indefiniteness; "reasonable price" may be
implied); id. § 2-306(1) cmt. 1 (provision governing "output" or "requirement" contract
incorporates "the general approach of [the Code] which requires the reading of commercial background and intent into the language of any agreement").
423 Luhmann describes structural coupling in terms of systems' mutual "irritations." See
supra Part IV.A. Even during the heyday of classical formalism in contract law, the world
of economic transactions supplied a steady stream of "irritations" for the legal system,
through contract law, and courts' contract-law decisions registered in the economic sphere.
424 Here one might think of the "battle of the forms":
Attorneys representing each side of recurrent transactions ... will have prepared
their respective forms in an effort to shape the transaction in as favorable a way
as possible....
At the formation stage, each party usually will attempt to get the other's assent to its own form. Typically this is done by a term requesting that the form be
signed and returned, or by a provision declaring that failure to object within a
specified time shall constitute assent. In most cases, the purchaser's order will
be acknowledged by the seller's own form, or vice versa, with neither party expressly assenting to the other's form. Occasionally, both forms may be signed by
both parties, with no effort made to reconcile conflicting terms. Whatever the
mechanics of the particular exchange of forms, appropriately dubbed "the battle
of the forms," it is obvious that this process of achieving assent differs greatly
from that presupposed by orthodox formation doctrine.
JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACrS 415 (5th ed. 1987).
425 The classic statement of classical formalism in contract is Langdell's observation
421

422
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further involved observing how law appears from the other side of
the law/economy coupling-considering, that is, how participants
in economic transactions observe the law.
This latter part of the project is particularly evident in the
Uniform Commercial Code. In attempting to "simplify" and
"clarify . ..the law governing commercial transactions," 26 the
Code's drafters "treated businessmen, as well as lawyers and
judges, as the principal addressees," 427 crafting the Code's provisions to make them accessible to those engaged in the transactions
the Code would regulate. 42 Further, in distinguishing between
mandatory rules and those that may be varied by agreement, 429 the
Code's drafters sought to anticipate, at least in some small measure, the way in which those engaged in commercial transactions
would respond to the Code. The recent literature on default
rules430 and "bargaining in the shadow of the law" '31 has pursued
this objective further and more systematically, seeking to make
relevant, for legal communication, the way law's environment responds to the law. Indeed, one distinctive feature of realist and
post-realist approaches to law has been the attempt (as Luhmann
would put it) to model the law's economic environment, and, in so
doing, to observe the way in which the law is observed within economic communication.
Nonetheless, this greater legal openness to the world of ecoabout the mailbox rule:
It has been claimed that the purposes of substantial justice, and the interests of
contracting parties as understood by themselves, will be best served by holding
that the contract is complete the moment the letter of acceptance is mailed ....
The true answer to this argument is, that it is irrelevant ....
C.C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 20-21 (1880). Langdell continued by crafting a quick policy argument in favor of his position, see id. at 21, but the
statement, as quoted above, has "ever since been taken to express the wretched essence"
of Langdellian formalism. Thomas Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4

(1983).
426 U.C.C. § 1-102.
427 WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
428

304 (1973).

See id. at 303-05.

429 See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) ("The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care ... may not be disclaimed by agreement ....
").
430 See, e.g., Symposium, Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 3 S.CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 1 (1993) (symposium issue on default rules and contractual consent); Ian Ayres &

Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
431 See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J.LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979).
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nomic activity is still selective and still governed by law. For one
thing, as Luhmann suggests in passing, 432 various court-imposed
doctrines-such as unconscionability, duress, undue influence, 43
and other public policy concerns434-operate to circumscribe the
sphere of contract, as does protective or paternalistic legislation.
Further, even with respect to the instances of legal openness I discussed above, Luhmann would emphasize that law's openness is
always conditioned by legal premises and procedures. 435 For example, even in prescribing that interpretation of contract language
must be open to the commercial context, the Code specifies a legal
rank order for the various "extrinsic" sources,436 and, together
with background rules of evidence and procedure, it specifies procedures by which courts are to acquire information from these
sources.437 These rules and procedures condition and structure legal communication's observation of its economic environment.
In short, as Luhmann maintains in his general account of selfreference and external reference in legal argument, the construction of "interests" and the observation of the legal environment
are accomplishments of the legal system, not its environment.
Even when legal argument incorporates external references to the
economic system, it remains an operation of the legal system. That
is the meaning of operative closure.
D. Coevolution and StructuralDrift
Structural couplings, like contract or property or constitutions, mutually attune the autopoietic processes of the various social subsystems (such as the legal, political, and economic systems).
In a relatively underdeveloped part of his analysis, Luhmann suggests that these couplings "evolve together ' 438 and may themselves
coalesce into (what one might call) a common project. These "co432 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 464.
433 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 406, at 257-70, 293-323.
434 See id. at 325-47.

435 See supratext accompanying notes 101-02.
436 See U.C.C. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2) (stating that express terms, course of performance,
course of dealing, and usage of trade are to be construed consistently whenever "reasonable," but otherwise, these interpretive sources are ranked in the order just given).
437 See id. §§ 1-205(2), (5), (6) (rules governing evidence of usage of trade); id. § 2202(b) (rules governing evidence of "consistent additional terms" not stated in the written
document); see also, e.g., id. § 2-302 (providing that an unconscionable contract or clause is
unenforceable and establishing procedures by which unconscionability is to be determined); id. §§ 2-723, 2-724 (prescribing procedures and evidentiary rules for proof of market price).
438 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 495.
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ordinated structural developments" Luhmann calls "structural
drift." 439
Luhmann does not discuss the idea of structural drift very extensively or systematically. In one passage, he suggests that
"trends in the direction of the welfare-state, the positivity of law,
and decentralized economic development" belong together as a
structural drift common to the political, legal, and economic systems, respectively. 0 In another passage, he indicates that the idea
of compensating for risk is a theme common to welfare-state politics and the "arbitrariness and autocracy of judicial interventions
into social valuations." 441 One would think, after considering his
account of structural coupling, that Luhmann would have to specify the "mechanisms" by which various structural couplings among
systems might coalesce into a common structural drift. Unfortunately, he does not, and the idea of structural drift, intuitively
plausible as it might be, remains undertheorized in his work.
A more adequate account of coevolution or structural drift
would require descending from the heights of general theory to a
more concretely specified account of actual societies. Simply to
say, for example, that contract operates as a mechanism that structurally couples law and economy does not adequately account for
how, precisely, legal and economic communication are coupled in,
and with what consequences for, particular legal and economic systems. Still less can one conclude anything with confidence about
the common structural drift those structural couplings create.
Only a more complete and specific elaboration of Luhmann's general account of structural coupling could make evident the "coordinated structural developments" among systems that he calls
"structural drift."
I suggest in the next section-my critical account of the theory
as a whole-that this descent from general theory to more particularized accounts would have other salutary effects on Luhmann's theory of legal autopoiesis.

Id. Teubner uses the term "coevolution." See Teubner, supra note 93, at 1445, 1446;
supra note 34, at 61.
4Q RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 495.
44' Id. at 561.
439
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CRITIQUE AND REFORMULATION OF LUHMANN'S
AUTOPOIETIC THEORY

A. Autopoiesis and "Relative Autonomy"
Before beginning my critical assessment of Luhmann's autopoietic theory, I want to return to the question of "relative autonomy" with which I opened this Article. The central problem with
the notion of relative autonomy, I said, is that, by itself, the formulation is theoretically empty. Understood as a claim about the
causal influences bearing upon the law, the idea of relative autonomy excludes only the extremes of complete determination by
some other social sphere, on one hand, and complete independence from law's social environment, on the other. Any other set of
relations among social spheres is consistent with the "relative
autonomy" formula. Thus, intuitively attractive as the formulation
may be, to say only that law is "relatively autonomous" in this
sense is to say very little.
Luhmann's theory of legal autopoiesis, I have been suggesting, can be understood as an attempt to theorize the untheorized
intuition behind the "relative autonomy" formula. The two central concepts of this reformulation are operative closure and structural coupling. These "twin concepts" 442 correspond to the two
parts of the "relative autonomy" formula: operative closure corresponds to "autonomy" and structural coupling to the qualifications
expressed in the word "relative."
According to the notion of operative closure, the legal system's boundaries are established by, and coextensive with, the legal system's coded communicative operations. If a communication
is coded according to the distinction between legal and illegal, then
it belongs to the legal system; if not, it belongs to the legal system's
environment. The notion of operative closure, further, emphasizes
the recursive connections among a system's communications. An
autopoietic legal system, Luhmann maintains, reproduces and
transforms itself by linking up to past legal communications and
establishing points of connection for future communications. The
operatively closed legal system, so understood, is autonomous,
Luhmann contends, but not in the causal sense that the idea of
"relative autonomy" typically presupposes."3 Rather, the system is
442OperationalClosure and StructuralCoupling,supra note 34, at 1432.
443See Law As a Social System, supra note 87, at 139 ("[The concept of the autonomy

of the legal system cannot be formulated on the level of (causal) relationships of dependence and independence.").
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autonomous in the sense that it establishes its own boundaries and
elements and reproduces itself through its own operations, not
through the operations of some other system." 4
As Luhmann's critics have pointed out, this argument for the
legal system's autonomy is tautological: Luhmann defines the legal
system as operatively closed, and he defines autonomy in terms of
operative closure. 445 In my view, the critics are also correct that
Luhmann uses the term "autonomy" idiosyncratically, 46 not with
the sense of independence from external influence that the term
has traditionally carried. 447 Luhmann would be well-advised, I
think, not to speak of operative closure as "autonomy," given the
settled
sense of this term in (at least Anglo-American) legal the8
4

ory.

What many of Luhmann's critics miss, however, is that operative closure and autonomy are only half the story for autopoietic
theory. The other half is structural coupling, together with the associated notions of cognitive openness and external reference.
According to Luhmann's idea of "cognitive openness," legal communication "observes" the world beyond its own coded communications, incorporating "external references" to the extra-legal
world-though always under the premises, standards, and procedures of the legal system itself. Further, communication in other
social subsystems both observes and refers to the legal system as
well. Structural coupling, as I explained above, involves this mutual observation of systems-as when legal communication observes the economic system through the schemata of contract or
property law. With structural coupling, systems presuppose and
444 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 63.
445 See, e.g., Danilo Zolo, The Epistemological Status of Autopoiesis, in STATE, LAW,
AND ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS, supra note 63, at 67; Lempert, supra note 19,
at 186 (stating that as a theory of legal autonomy, autopoietic theory is "true trivially or by
definition"); cf. Richard Mijnch, Autopoiesis by Definition, 13 CARDOzO L. REV. 1463,
1465, 1468 (1992) (arguing that operational closure and autopoiesis are definitional for
Luhmann; a system cannot be autonomous and yet dependent on another system).
406 See, e.g., MUnch, supra note 445, at 1468-69 (arguing that "autonomy" is incompatible with system's dependence on another system's operations); Michel Rosenfeld, Autopoiesis and Justice, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1681, 1684-85 (1992) (noting that Luhmann's
notion of autonomy is controversial); Zolo, supra note 434, at 118 (asserting that Luhmann's "tautological" notion misses important problems the idea of "legal autonomy"
should address); Lempert, supra note 19, at 173-78 (noting that defining "autonomy" in
terms of autopoietic theory obscures interesting issues).
447 See Lempert, supra note 19, at 173 (stating the "Anglo-American" definition of legal
autonomy as "the (material) independence of applied law from other sources of power
and authority in social life").
448 Cf. RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 62-66 (noting the confusion over
the term "autonomy").
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ely upon each other's operations-as when legal communication
presupposes that legal judgments will be politically enforced."9
Structural coupling is Luhmann's way of accounting for the extensive and organized interrelations among "autonomous" systems of
communication.
The idea behind the "relative autonomy" formula, I think, is
that legal theory must account for both the legal system's "peculiar
internal structures" 450 and the legal system's interrelation with its
nonlegal environment. Luhmann's combination of operative closure and structural coupling speaks to both parts of this intuition.
For that reason, and despite his disdain for the term "relative
autonomy," I take Luhmann's work to be an attempt to theorize
the untheorized concerns that inspire invocations of law's "relative
autonomy."'41
Whether the attempt is entirely successful is another story. In
the remainder of this Part of the Article, I indicate four general
problems with Luhmann's elaboration of autopoietic theory. 4 2
The first problem concerns the idea of binary coding. In my view,
the idea of binary coding is less fundamental to autopoietic theory
than Luhmann suggests, and it seems to me an unnecessarily mechanical way of accounting for legal (or other) communication.
Accordingly, I recommend that the idea simply be discarded. 453
The other three criticisms proceed from the premise I suggested at
the close of the preceding section: if it is to be useful, autopoietic
theory must be specified not just at the lofty heights of general
theory,454 but also at a more particularized level. From that perspective, Luhmann's tendency to present systems as if they were
themselves perceiving, communicating subjects would be more
449 Cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (asserting
that legal interpretation is inextricably linked with violence of political enforcement).
450 Gordon, supra note 11, at 101; see also Lempert, supra note 19, at 159 ("We may
think of the relative autonomy of law as the degree to which the legal system looks to itself
rather than to the standards of some external.., system for guidance in making or applying law.") (emphasis omitted).
451 See Law As a Social System, supra note 87, at 139 (explaining that in autopoietic
theory, "both the dependence and the independence of the law are more strongly emphasized than in the customary expression 'relative autonomy').
452 I have noted other disagreements with Luhmann already-such as my skepticism
about Luhmann's argument that contemporary constitutional law is "politicized," see supra text accompanying notes 334-37, and my skepticism about the importance of functional analysis, see supra note 136.
453 See infra Part V.B.
454 The metaphor of height is Luhmann's own. See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra
note 18, at 376 (autopoietic theory sees "the lightly rippled sea of [legal] arguments" "as if
from an airplane").
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evidently dubious than it already is at the level of general theory.455
It would be apparent, also, that the connections among systems are
more dense and extensive than Luhmann's account of structural
coupling suggests.456 More apparent, too, would be the problem of
specifying the boundaries of autopoietic systems. 7
One could of course criticize autopoietic theory "externally,"
from the perspective of some other developed theory. Much criticism of autopoiesis has proceeded on that basis, but for purposes
of this Article, I prefer to diagnose autopoietic theory's deficiencies from a more "internal" perspective, examining whether the
theory, as Luhmann elaborates it, realizes Luhmann's purpose of
accounting both for law's distinctive qualities and its interrelations
with other social spheres. Readers utterly unpersuaded by Luhmann's project will then have an additional set of reasons for their
critical judgment.
B. Problems with the Idea of Binary Coding
According to Luhmann, a binary code of opposed values governs communication in each of the functionally differentiated systems he distinguishes-law, science, politics, economy, education,
religion, and art.458 The code is basic to the system's identity. It
"closes" the system's operations, establishing the system's boundaries and its unity.
One symptom of weakness in Luhmann's idea of binary coding appears in his specification of codes for the political and economic systems. According to Luhmann, as mentioned above, the
political system operates under two "power" codes: the distinction
between government and opposition, and the distinction between
governing and governed.459 As for the economic system, Luhmann
is not consistent about what code governs, or even how many
codes govern. Sometimes he says the economic system operates
under two codes-property (the distinction between having and
not having property) and money (the distinction between payment
455 See infra Part V.C.
456 See infra Part V.D.

457See infra Part V.E.
458 This list compiles Luhmann's usual examples of social subsystems. See, e.g., RECHT
DER GESELLSCHAFr, supranote 18, at 7, 16; Coding, supra note 63, at 155.
459 See supra text accompanying notes 299-300. Luhmann probably should just describe
the political code, instead, as the distinction between having and not having power, a distinction that is specified differently depending on whether one considers the vertical dimension of applications of power, on one hand, or the horizontal dimension of competition for power, on the other.
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and nonpayment). On other occasions he posits only one code for
the economic system, but he is inconsistent on whether that code is
the money or the property code. Luhmann's equivocation about
the number and identity of codes for the economic system raises
red flags. If binary coding were as basic to a system's operations as
he suggests, it seems implausible that we would be unable to determine what those codes are, or even how many there are. Further, the idea of a system having multiple codes makes no sense if
the very reason for positing a binary code is to establish the unity
of a system's operations. A "system" with two codes would seem
to be two systems rather than one, if we accept the idea that only a
binary code can establish a system's unity. Luhmann's confusion
over the economic and political system's coding casts doubt on the
very idea of binary coding.
A second problem with the idea of binary coding, and the associated notion of system programming, is that they invite misunderstanding. To describe legal communication as the legal system's allocation of the code values "legal" or "illegal," according
to the legal system's "programs," is to make the process of legal
communication seem mechanical. The impression created is that
legal communications process information according to fixed programs and terminate in the flat conclusion, "x is legal" or "x is illegal." But in fact, even communications that most closely resemble
this model--court pronouncements of decisions-are more nuanced. For one thing, distinctions other than the simple legal/illegal distinction are critical to the meaning of legal decisions.
Luhmann mentions the "secondary coding"'461 of constitutional/unconstitutional; similar distinctions that seem important
are, for example, the distinctions between civil and criminal, substantive and procedural, mandatory and permissive. Each
of these
'' 462
distinctions inflects the meaning of "legal" and "illegal.
Further, courts in rendering decision do not simply classify a
defendant's conduct; they must decide, also, the consequences
their classification will carry. When, for example, a court decides a
breach-of-contract case in favor of the plaintiff, the court must decide, also, whether the defendant must perform the agreement
specifically or instead pay money damages. If the latter, the court
must decide further whether the award should be based on the expectation, reliance, or restitution interests, as well as how much
460 See supra notes 338-39 and accompanying text.
461 See supra text
462 I thank David

accompanying note 323.
Lyons for his suggestion along these lines.
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money will be required to vindicate the relevant interest. The
court's statement of these legal consequences will not take an entirely "binary" form. A money judgment for $11,413, for example,
is not describable as one side of a binary distinction-unless one
describes, as the other side of the distinction, every other consequence the court could have imposed. One might try to save the
theory by saying that the court, at the end point of its analysis, has
allocated to its own judgment the code value "legal," and to all
other possible judgments "illegal." But that description would add
nothing to the simple statement that the court has rendered a legal
decision. Thus, in my view, even the ultimate outcome of legal
communication in the courts-a legal decision-is not aptly described as a choice between opposed binary code values, the simple allocation of a code value, "legal" or "illegal." The idea of legal communication as a binary choice between "legal" and
"illegal" does not do justice to the richness or texture of legal
communication. ' 6
My statement that the notions of coding and programming
"invite misunderstanding" was not just a courtesy to Luhmann.
He is in fact Well aware that legal communication cannot be understood simply as mechanical information-processing in which "the
system" operates fixed "programs" to allocate a value, positive or
negative, from a binary code. His account of legal argument
makes clear that much legal communication occurs in a context in
which the meaning of legal texts, and the course of legal decision,
is uncertain.4" And as Luhmann recognizes, argument does not
concern only the way in which fixed rules should apply to a given
case; it often involves, also, a choice among various potentially applicable rules. Why, then, the emphasis on the binary code, and
the associated notion of legal rules as "programs" for allocating
code values, given the misunderstanding that almost inevitably results?
463 Cf. George P. Fletcher, Law As Discourse, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1636 (1992)
(questioning whether Luhmann's emphasis on binary coding is consistent with "legal standards of degree, such as discretion and the amount of damages"); Rosenfeld, supra note
446, at 1706 ("[Legal practice can hardly nontrivially be reduced to the classification of
actions as either legal or illegal.").
44 See Legal Argumentation, supra note 178, at 285 ("[Wlhere decisions are concerned,
it cannot really be disputed that any decision could have been made differently."); id. at
287-88, 290; id. at 292 (noting that given the "endlessly changing situations" the legal system confronts, legal texts "remain indispensable as a reference, but do not sufficiently determine decisions"); see also RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFF, supra note 18, at 68 (arguing
that every legal communication "leads very quickly into uncertainty"); id.at 207-08 (stating that a legal system creates, intensifies, and protracts uncertainty).
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Luhmann never explains in a convincing way why he finds it
necessary to posit a binary code as basic to autopoietic theory.
When he operates in a mode other than simple dogmatic pronouncement,6 he tends to suggest that the idea of binary coding is
a basic principle of systems theory'" and that it has significant
technical advantages over other methods of information processing. A binary code, he suggests, is relatively easy to use and allows
the system to "cross,' 467 through a simple operation of negation,
from the positive to the negative value. 46 The difficulty with these
arguments, however, is that Luhmann is relying on a body of literature on information theory and artificial intelligence whose
emphasis on binary coding has become-even in its home domain-at least controversial, and perhaps entirely obsolete. 49 Its
application to social systems seems to me even less obvious.470
The argument on which Luhmann relies perhaps most heavily
is that the assumption of binary coding is necessary to account
both for the boundary between legal and other social communication and for the system's unity. The legal/illegal code, in other
words, establishes the system's operative closure and its identity as
a differentiated system. 471 While the system's "programs" change
historically, Luhmann argues, the code remains invariant.4n
But even if we take the legal system's closure and unity as
facts to be accounted for, then still, binary coding-in Luhmann's
465 See, e.g., Self-Reproduction, supra note 63, at 115 ("[Tihe legal system, for its own
reproduction of legal events by legal events, needs a binary structure in terms of which all
events can be described as not being their counterpart."); Coding, supra note 63, at 145
(assuming the binary code as a "thesis" that follows from "systems theory premises"); id.
at 149-50 ("If we today accept this formality of a matured binary code, then the next step
is to look at the special nature of binary coding.").
466 See Unity, supra note 63, at 15-16.
467 Luhmann borrows the term "crossing" from Spencer Brown. See RECHT DER
GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 177, 183.
468 See id. at 174-85; Coding, supra note 63, at 150-51.
469 See Alan Wolfe, Sociological Theory in the Absence of People: The Limits of Luhmann's Systems Theory, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1729,1731-34 (1992) (arguing that the "algorithmic understanding of communication" on which Luhmann relies "has been substantially discredited"; the newer paradigm of parallel data processing rejects Luhmann's
emphasis on binary coding in communication).
470 Cf. Law As a Social System, supra note 87, at 137 ("Current uncertainty is due primarily to the fact that a general theory of [autopoietic systems] does not exist, and consequently one is frequently working too directly with concepts borrowed from mathematics
or biology, without adequate concern for the appropriateness of the transposition.").
471See, e.g., id. at 140 (arguing that the "dual function" of the legal/illegal code isto
"differentiate the system for the specific task of the law" and to accomplish the system's
closure).
472 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 204; Coding, supra note 63, at
173-74.
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sense, and with Luhmann's emphasis-is not the only means of
explanation. Elsewhere in his work, Luhmann has suggested the
idea of legal validity as a "circulating symbol" 473 for legal communication, a symbol that is not exhausted in any particular reference
but exists only in its "permanent reproduction" through ongoing
legal communication.474 Legal validity in this sense is not a substantive norm 475 but a "symbol of the system's dynamic stability" 47 6-dynamic because it can take on various references, and
stable because it outlasts any particular reference or particular
specification through legal rules. The symbol of legal validity transcends particular institutional locations, Luhmann indicates, operating to organize legal communication both in the legal system's
"center" in the courts, and also in the "peripheral" regions of, for
example, legislation, contract, and corporation-formation. 477 This
symbol, Luhmann says, "produces the unity of the system amidst
the change in its operations."478
This idea of legal validity as an organizing and unifying symbol for legal communication seems more appropriate to me than
Luhmann's notion of binary coding. Luhmann's account of legal
validity as a "circulating symbol" suggests that legal communication is differentiated from other social subsystems by (what one
could call) its distinctive communicative theme. The idea of legal
validity transcends the particular ways in which it is specified
through legal rules. The legal system's identity is established by its
orientation toward this theme of legal validity. One need not describe legal communication as the "allocation of code values," the
binary choice between legal and illegal according to system "programs," in order to account for the legal system's unity, its differentiation from other social systems, and its "dynamic stability."
Let me be clear about the extent of my disagreement with
Luhmann. He is unquestionably correct that the legal system operates, and presumably must operate, with a distinction between
legality and illegality, or validity and invalidity. The question is
the theoretical significance one gives this distinction. It seems to
me better to describe legal communication as oriented toward and
473
474
475
476

RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 107.
See id.
See id. at 103.
Id. at 107.

477 On Luhmann's "center/periphery" schema for the legal system's internal differentiation, see supra Parts III.B-C.

478 RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 98; see also id. (symbol of legal validity maintains and reproduces the system's unity in the diversity of its operations).

2072

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:1987

bounded by the theme of legal validity than to describe it as a system that operates by allocating the binary code values "legal" and
"illegal" to states of affairs according to system "programs." The
former description seems to me more consistent with Luhmann's
emphasis on legal communication's uncertainty, ambiguity, contingency, nuance, and indeterminacy, than does the mechanicalsounding vocabulary of "binary code" and "program." And it
does not depend upon controversial (perhaps outdated) assumptions in general systems theory about the binary nature of communication and information-processing.
C. System As Subject?
Throughout Luhmann's discussion of legal autopoiesis, the legal system as a whole appears as a grammatical subject: it operates,
distinguishes, refers, and couples. Often it appears as an epistemic
subject: it observes, self-observes, perceives, and reflects. While
Gunther Teubner has defended explicitly the idea that the legal
system is an epistemic subject,479 the probability that this conception will resonate in American legal theory seems to me very low.
Those sympathetic with the traditional idea of the subject will reject Teubner's notion on the ground that "only individuals
think"-notwithstanding Teubner's defense that he has not "deconstructed" or denied the individual subject, just "decentered" it
and "multiplied the centers of cognition."4° Those hostile to traditional conceptions of the subject will see the idea of law as supraindividual subject as a reinstatement of the traditional problematic
at a different level, 41' or else as the mere inversion (and thus repli479 See Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology
of Law, 23 L. & SOC'Y REV. 727,730 (1989) ("law as an autonomous epistemic subject...
constructs a social reality of its own"). But see TEUBNER, supra note 34, at 83 ("The legal
system and the economic system do not as such have the capacity for action."); see also
Operational Closure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1434 ("The legal system
cannot communicate as a unity and the society has no address.").
480 See TEUBNER, supra note 34, at 45 ("[T]he autonomous reflecting subject ... has...
not been deconstructed, merely decentred."); see also id. at 44, 45 (arguing that autopoietic theory "is reinstating the autonomy of the individual" and "breathes new life into the
individual"); Teubner, supra note 479, at 741 ("The point is not the individual subject
withering away, but the multiplication of centers of cognition."); see also id. (although
autopoietic theory characterizes individuals in their "social existence" as "constructs of
autopoietic systems," it sees them in their "psychic existence" as "vibrant autopoietic systems"); Michael King, The 'Truth' About Autopoiesis, 20 J.L. & SOC'Y 218,228 (1993).
481 See, e.g., Thomas McCarthy, Interaction, Indeterminacy, Normativity: Comments on
Gumbrecht, Yablon, and Cornell, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1625 (1992) ("[Slystems theory
actually reproduces almost the entire repertoire of the classical philosophy of the subject
in a new medium."); Gfinter Frankenberg, Down By Law: Irony, Seriousness, and Reason,
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cation) of that same problematic.4 2
In any event, to describe the legal system as a whole as an
epistemic subject seems at least in tension with Luhmann's emphasis on the legal system's "internal differentiation." With his account of that differentiation, Luhmann begins to connect autopoietic theory to a more conventional institutionalist approach: his
distinction between "center" and "periphery" is, in part, a distinction between courts and legislatures, adjudication and legislation.4 3
And in his account of legal argument, he distinguishes between argument and decision, suggesting a further distinction between the
roles of judge and lawyer. Connecting the general concepts of
autopoietic theory to an institutional framework of courts, legislatures, and contracting parties makes it more difficult to speak simply in terms of the legal system as such. Not all operations within
the legal system connect to the network of legal communications
in the same way, and not all operations have the same role in the
reproduction of that network. Decision is not argument, and legislation is not adjudication. The differences among types of communication in the legal system are important, not just their common character as "operations of the legal system."
This move away from exclusive focus on the legal system as a
whole would accelerate if Luhmann were to descend from the
level of general theory, at which his account of legal autopoiesis
has so far operated, to a more particularized account of actual legal communications. Consider, for example, the legal communication that might take place concerning the termination of a public
employee fired for activity arguably characterized as protected
speech. This legal communication could take place at various locations and levels of the legal system's "organized decision system":4 informal procedures within the government agency; formal
83 Nw. U. L. REV. 360, 381 (1989) ("the old European project is here rethought: In place
of the self-referential subject stands the self-referential system, the self-reference of system operations replaces the self-reassurance of thinking, and instead of knowledge of the
world we are now dealing with the observation of observations"); JORGEN HABERMAS,
Excursus on Luhmann's Appropriation of the Philosophy of the Subject Through Systems
Theory, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 368, 369 (Frederick G.
Lawrence trans., 1987) ("The system's relation to itself is modeled after that of the subject.").
482 Teubner's description of his project in How the Law Thinks suggests such an inversion: human beings do not construct law as a "cultural artifact" through their intentional
actions, he says; instead, "law as a communicative process ... by its legal operations produces human actors as semantic artifacts." Teubner, supra note 479, at 730.
483 See supra text accompanying notes 131-202.
484 Luhmann uses this term to refer to the complex of institutions responsible for binding legal decisions, legislative and adjudicative. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
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grievance and arbitration procedures, perhaps with union representation; state administrative review of the agency's decision,
perhaps with state judicial review; litigation in state court under
the state law of wrongful discharge with appeal to higher state
courts; federal constitutional litigation in state or federal court
with appellate review; or, conceivably, legislative activity
prompted by the termination. In each of these locations and at
each of the various levels, different regions of the network of past
communications would be relevant or irrelevant, and the argumentative links to past and future legal communications would be accordingly different. The form that particular communications
would take would depend, further, upon whether they communicated decision, or only argument intended to influence decision.
To be sure, particular legal communications participate in a
network of other legal communications. That network opens some
possibilities for connection and tends to close off others. But simply to say that the legal system as a whole generates particular
communications is to understate the extent to which the content of
those communications depends upon their location in the differentiated legal system. And it is to understate, also, the agency and
potential creativeness of those who engage in legal communication.4
If Luhmann were to develop a more particularized account of
the legal system than his general theoretical discussions offer, he
would need to specify both the particular features of definite legal
institutions in which communication occurs, and also the identity
and nature of the agents, individual and collective, who exploit, or
fail to exploit, the system's discursive and strategic possibilities.
Focusing at a more particular level, not just the level of social subsystems like the legal, political, and economic systems, would also
allow autopoietic theory to incorporate into its mapping the various dimensions of stratification, such as race, gender, class, and
sexual orientation, that Luhmann's systems-focused analysis al4
most entirely neglects. 8
485 Cf. Rosemary J. Coombe, Room for Manoeuver: Toward a Theory of Practice in
Critical Legal Studies, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 69, 89-93 (1989) (developing a theory of
creative agency as both constrained and enabled by social structures).
486 Luhmann occasionally mentions the problem of differential access to legal protection, but never identifies any particular dimension of inequality. See RECHT DER
GESELLSCHAF, supra note 18, at 116; Self-Reproduction, supra note 63, at 120. In another passage he rejects notions of "hegemony" and class domination, calling it "questionable" whether one can find "a relation of structural coupling between the legal system and
social stratification." RECHT DER GESELLSCHAF, supra note 18, at 494.
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Objection to Luhmann's tendency to treat systems as subjects
would thus not necessarily be a simple protest that "only individuals think." Nor would it necessarily be a call for the reinstatement
of the sovereign individual subject.4 But the more particularized
account I am recommending, with its emphasis on institutions and
social divisions, might call into question a basic premise of Luhmann's autopoietic theory: that communications and nothing else
are the elements of society and social subsystems.4 If the meaning and effects of communications depend upon their connection
(or lack of connection) to an institutional framework, then why
should we insist that communications are elements of the system
and institutions are not?
I am not arguing that Luhmann should respond by classifying various institutions, such as the courts, as elements of the legal
system. Nor do I disagree with Luhmann's assumption that communication is central to the operation of modern societies. I
would prefer, instead, to avoid both the question whether the system has "elements" or "components," and the further question
what those elements and components are. The point is simply that
to understand a legal system's operation, one needs to know something about legal and other institutions, and something about the
agents, individual and collective, who engage in legal communication. This critical point seems to me often obscured in Luhmann's
presentation-both by his emphasis on the legal system as subject,
and by his emphasis on communications as the sole elements of society as system.
D. Problems with the Notion of "StructuralCoupling"
Luhmann's account of "structural coupling"-the ongoing
connections among differentiated communicative systems-examines only a few instances. Constitutions, as well as legislation
and the enforcement of legal judgments, couple law and politics.
Property and contract couple law and economy. While Luhmann
occasionally mentions other instances of structural coupling, 48 9 he
focuses almost exclusively on the above examples. 49 And while
4V Cf. Coombe, supra note 485, at 89 (arguing that the emphasis on agency as well as
"structure" does not necessarily recreate traditional ideas of the autonomous liberal subject).
488 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
489 See, e.g., RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 464-65 (describing, in passing, the privilege to inflict economic harm intentionally through competition as a "noteworthy" coupling of law and economy).
490 Sometimes the list of structural couplings Luhmann considers is even shorter. In
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Luhmann mentions the possibility that systems may be coupled
"momentarily" through single events, he downplays this sort of
connection between systems in favor of his preferred forms of
structural coupling.49 1 Luhmann's discussion of structural coupling,
then, tends to suggest that the connections among systems are few

indeed, however important they might be.
The examples of structural coupling Luhmann does provide,
however, are hardly exhaustive. In considering the connections

between the legal and economic systems, for example, the idea of
negligence seems a good candidate for the category of structural
coupling. The term "negligence" has a legal meaning: failure to
meet the legal standard of the reasonably prudent person. And as

law and economics scholars have observed, negligence has an economic meaning as well: the failure to take cost-justified precautions.4 92 These two meanings of negligence 49 allow for reciprocal
observation between the two systems. From the side of the economic system, the legal negligence rule imposes the costs of accidents on those who "unreasonably" inflict them, and the prospect
of having to pay those costs influences the course of economic de-

cision. In this sense, economic communication "observes" the legal system and its negligence rule and incorporates that observa-

tion into economic decisionmaking. From the side of the legal
system, the economic costs and benefits of an "untaken precaution ' 494 are at least important factors in determining whether the
one of his accounts of the coupling between law and politics, for example, he mentions
only constitutions, ignoring legislation and the political enforcement of legal judgments.
See OperationalClosure and StructuralCoupling,supra note 34, at 1436-37.
491 See, e.g., RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 440-41 (referring to momentary coupling in passing as an "ambiguity of [system] identification," and beginning a
lengthy discussion of structural coupling).
492 See Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972)
(discussing the "Learned Hand" or "BPL" formula stated by Judge Hand in United States
v. CarrollTowing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)).
493 One might wonder whether there are two notions of negligence rather than one. I
distinguish between legal and economic conceptions of negligence for two reasons. First,
the official statement of the negligence rule in most legal contexts does not expressly incorporate the Hand Formula or other cost/benefit formulations. See Stephen G. Gilles,
The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1015-19 (1994). But see id. at 1024 n.20
(discussing a jury instruction tracking the Hand formula factors given in the special context of product-liability design-defect cases). Second, even if the negligence rule were
stated in terms of the Hand Formula, the use of that formula to observe the economic system still would be subject to the conditions and procedures of the legal system. Application of the Hand Formula by a jury, for example, would remain an operation within the
legal system.
494 On the notion of "untaken precautions" as central to negligence litigation, see Mark
F. Grady, Untaken Precautions,18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989).
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defendant was unreasonable or negligent in refusing to undertake
it. Sometimes courts have made this observation of economic
costs and benefits explicit, incorporating notions of cost/benefit
analysis directly into their statement of the applicable legal rule.495
"Negligence," then, has meaning in both economic and legal discourse, and it establishes a schema for reciprocal observation between the two systems. On Luhmann's understanding, then, it
counts as a form of structural coupling.
Similar analysis would establish a whole series of other "structural couplings" between law and economy. Obvious examples
would be the idea of the corporation, various notions of tax law,
"competition" in antitrust law, and for that matter, the very idea of
"liability"-all of which are significant in both legal and economic
discourse, and all of which allow reciprocal "observation" between
the two systems. One could discover innumerable other couplings
between law and economy simply by following the path of the lawand-economics movement.
This point is not specific to the relation between law and
economy. Examination of legal communications and legal rules
would reveal many similar "couplings" between law and the other
systems Luhmann distinguishes. Evidence law, for example, establishes the conditions under which legal communication may
"observe" and incorporate scientific communication in litigation.496
Principles of intellectual property law establish couplings between
the legal system and both scientific and artistic communication, by
extending legal protection to original works in those spheres. 497
The criminal law notion of "insanity" directs legal argument and
decision to observe medical discourse, though under specifically
legal premises and criteria. Administrative law, to take one last
example, couples the legal and political systems by regulating the
procedures and conditions under which governmental agencies
495 See, e.g., Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Colo. 1987) (holding
that a motorcycle manufacturer has a duty to "provide reasonable, cost-acceptable safety
features"). While courts in "design defect" cases like Camacho often insist on calling their
test one of "strict liability" rather than negligence, the drafters of the proposed Third Restatement of Torts governing products liability explain that the standard test is essentially
a negligence inquiry. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY §
2(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1997); id. § 1 cmt. a.
496 Cf. RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 87-88, 90-91 (legal system's observation of scientific and technical information structured by legal rules and procedures).
497 Further, by limiting nonowners' ability to appropriate such works for their own economic purposes, intellectual property law couples the legal and economic spheres. This
point is consistent with Luhmann's notion of property as a mechanism of structural coupling between law and economy.
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may permissibly operate. And so on. Although the details of
these various couplings would have to be filled in much more
thoroughly than I have done here, my general point should be
clear. Law and other systems are "coupled" much more densely

and extensively than Luhmann's overview of structural coupling

would suggest.498
The same conclusion follows when one examines the other
way in which, according to Luhmann, systems can be connected.

In introducing his idea of structural coupling, Luhmann distinguishes it from "momentary coupling," or, the coupling of systems
through events simultaneously relevant in more than one system.499

Luhmann does not give much attention to this idea of momentary
or event coupling because his version of autopoietic theory focuses
on systems, not events. Systems and their coded operations are
primary for Luhmann; what one might in ordinary conversation
describe as an "event" is relevant only so far as it can be seen as
the coded operation of an autopoietic system. Thus, events that

are simultaneously relevant to two systems of communicationsuch as a payment (economy) that satisfies a legal judgment
(law)-appear in Luhmann's formulation not as a single event, but
as two separate operations of two systems.10 This departure from
common-sense or "event-centered" ways of framing the social
498 From within the camp of autopoietic theorists, Gunther Teubner has come to similar
conclusions. Law and other social discourses, he suggests, are more open to one another
than Luhmann's account of structural coupling implies. See Teubner, supra note 93, at
1447. In partial replacement of the notion of structural coupling found in General Systems
Theory, see id., Teubner proposes the ideas of "interdiscursivity" and "productive misreading." See id. at 1447. Legal communication may "productively misread" other social
discourses, Teubner indicates, by incorporating a communication, concept, or process
from the other discourse. With the word "misreading," Teubner signals that this borrowing is always at the same time a transformation of what is borrowed-a reinterpretation to
accommodate what is borrowed from the other discourse to the context of legal communication.
499 See supra text accompanying note 288. As an example of momentary coupling,
Luhmann mentions a payment (economy) in satisfaction of a legal judgment (law). See
RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 441. In another passage Luhmann suggests
the following examples:
A payment can be at the same time ... the fulfillment of a contractual obligation
in the legal system and part of an economic transaction which transfers the capacity to make further payments in the economic system. The same holds true
for an act of legislation which may have both political and legal relevance. An
observer may identify these aspects as one event and may even find himself unable to see two different operations.
Operational Closure and Structural Coupling, supra note 34, at 1437. I have described
legislation as a form of structural coupling above, but in this passage he seems to identify it
as a form of "momentary" coupling. If so, then the category of momentary coupling, or
coupling through events, is more important still.
500 See OperationalClosure and Structural Coupling,supra note 34, at 1438 ("[A]ny ob-
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mon-sense or "event-centered" ways of framing the social world is
one of the bewildering features of Luhmann's work.
In my view, the connection of systems through events, not just
system structures, is more significant than Luhmann suggests.
Consider, for example, a communication even in the "core" of the
legal system: an argument presented by a plaintiff's attorney in a
civil case to a court of law. This argument is an operation within
the legal system. 0 1 But if the lawyer is private counsel retained for
a fee, the "event" of presenting this argument can also be seen as
an operation within the economic system: the rendering of services
in exchange for payment. These two "operations" are related.
The kind of "observation" of the legal system in which the lawyer
will engage of course will not be neutral, but instead will be tailored to the interests of the paying client. Indeed, it will be directed toward influencing the legal decisionmaker to render a
judgment that, when enforced, will produce a further economic
operation favorable to the client-the payment of money damages.
One would not fully understand the legal operation of argument
without considering its connection, through the "event" autopoietic theory sees as legal argument, to the economic system. Were
it not for the event's connection to the economic system, it would
never occur, and there would be no operation within the legal system 102
In the above example, the event through which the two systems are coupled is an operation within both systems. Another
way in which systems can be connected through events, rather than
system structures, is when an event that counts as an operation
within one system is relevant to communication in, but is not itself
an operation of, another system. A judicial decision, for example,
may prompt extensive communication in the political system.103 A
server who cares for the perspective of the system itself--of course, there can be other observers with other frames and interests-cannot cross-identify events across boundaries.").
501 I prefer to speak of "an operation within the legal system," rather than "an operation of the legal system," to avoid the problem of "system as subject" I identified in Part C
supra.
502 Perhaps Luhmann might describe these connections between law and economy as
forms of structural coupling. The advocacy system is articulated as both an economic and
a legal structure, the argument might go, with different but related meanings in the two
systems. Even if Luhmann did take that path, however, two points would follow. First, as
I have been arguing, the connections among the systems of communications Luhmann distinguishes would still be more dense than Luhmann's overview of structural coupling suggests. Second, the connection between systems would not be discoverable without seeing
the "two operations" (legal and economic) as linked in the same event.
503 The most obvious examples are the Supreme Court's "big" cases, such as Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), or Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but these
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scientific or technological discovery may stimulate economic
communication. More generally: the events that are "operations"
in one system may be relevant to the communication of another
system. Whether they are relevant, how they are made relevant,
and the consequences of their relevance for the system in question,
is determined within the communication of the observing system.
The point I am making follows directly from Luhmann's general account of systems' operative closure and the "irritation" and
"resonance" among systems.: 4 It has become difficult to see for
two reasons. First, Luhmann places so much emphasis on structural coupling as the mechanism connecting autopoietic systems
that it virtually replaces the more general principle of "irritation"
or "resonance." Second, Luhmann's work is pitched at such a high
level of abstraction that particular events have almost no significance.
As I have been arguing throughout this Part of the Article,
autopoietic theory should be specified not just at the general theoretical level, but also at a more particularized level.505 These two
levels of analysis need not be incompatible. Particular legal communications acquire significance in their connection to the more
encompassing system of legal communications, and that system
structures the possibility for such connections. Working in the
other direction, what Luhmann describes as "the legal system" is a
network reproduced through particular communications that are
articulated in particular contexts of events and institutions. The
point is thus not to choose between two levels of analysis, particular and general; the two levels have meaning only in relation to
one another. Specification of the institutions and practices
through which legal communication operates would connect the
two levels of analysis. Luhmann's account of the legal system's internal differentiation begins, but by no means completes, that task.
E. Boundary Problems
I do not mean to suggest that connecting autopoietic theory to
an account of institutions and practices would be easy. One difficult question concerns the boundaries of what Luhmann calls "the
legal system." When one first encounters autopoietic theory, one
tends to identify Luhmann's notion of "society" with a particular
nation-state, so that "the legal system" would refer to the legal sysare only the most obvious examples.
504 See supra text accompanying notes 281-87.
505 See supra Part V.C; see also supra Part IV.D.
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tem of a particular political territory. But this way of specifying
the legal system is by no means obvious. If, as Luhmann claims,
the comprehensive autopoietic system called "society" consists in
every communication, then, as he notes, society can only be world
society.5 °6 And the functional subsystems of society, such as the
political, legal, and economic systems, would therefore not coincide with the boundaries of nation-states.
Luhmann begins to address this problem by noting that world
society, and its various functional subsystems, are internally differentiated. He relies on the typology discussed earlier in this Article, with its distinctions among functional, segmentary, hierarchical, and center/periphery principles of differentiation. 07 According
to Luhmann, the form in which the world political system is differentiated is geographical "segmentation" into nation-statessca The
world economy, Luhmann says, increasingly transcends national
boundaries, 0° but a pattern of differentiation into center and periphery (developed and less developed) still persists. 10° What of
the legal system? Luhmann has already described the legal system
as internally differentiated according to a center/periphery
scheme, a form of differentiation Luhmann presents in institutionalist terms as a distinction between the courts and all other arenas
of legal communication. But what is the relation between this kind
of "internal differentiation" and the geographically articulated "internal differentiation" Luhmann describes for the economic and
political systems? In what sense is there a world legal system, and
in what sense is the world legal system differentiated segmentally,
like the political system, according to the framework of nationstates? These are difficult questions Luhmann has not gone far in

506 See LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 20, at 410 ("[T]here is finally only one
society: the world society, which includes all communication and thereby acquires completely unambiguous boundaries.") (footnote omitted); see also RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 571.
507 For Luhmann's typologies of internal differentiation, see supra text accompanying
notes 135-38. "Functional differentiation" means a subsystem's specialization with respect
to a particular social function. "Segmentation" is the differentiation of "equal subsystems." "Hierarchy" (or "stratification") is the differentiation of "unequal subsystems"
that stand in a rank order. Luhmann illustrates the notion of center/periphery differentiation in his account of the courts' central role in the legal system. See supra text accompanying notes 148-201.
508 See ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 85; RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 582.
509 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 555-56 (questioning whether it
still makes sense to speak of national economies).
510 See ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 85.
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answering."'
Accounting for the legal system's internal differentiation is
complicated even with respect to a single nation-state. How
should one describe the complex structure of federal and state law
in the United States, for example? With respect to the differences
among states, does communication about each body of state law
constitute a separate, operationally closed subsystem with "internal" observation of its own circuit, and only "external" observation of communication concerning the law of other states? With
respect to the difference between state and federal law, does federal law communication constitute a separate subsystem, a distinct
network of legal communication? If we posit separate subsystems
for state and federal law, how should their differentiation be understood-as hierarchical, as segmental, as functional, in some
other way, or (more likely) in some combination of the above? Is
there an autopoietic theory of federalism(s)?
I am by no means certain how autopoietic theorists would, or
should, answer these questions. My sense is that they would do
best by looking to the communications themselves to determine
whether they form a network differentiated from other legal communications-sufficiently differentiated, that is, to justify positing
a separate subsystem of the legal system. That is Luhmann's justification for positing the various subsystems of "society," such as
the legal, political, and economic subsystems, and for positing
courts and legislatures as separate subsystems of the legal system. 12 I can imagine disagreement among autopoietic theorists
about the way in which the legal system should be carved up into
subsystems, and disagreement about the way in which the subsystems are differentiated from one another. I can imagine, also, the
difficulties in charting the relations among, on one hand, the geographically defined subsystems-the legal systems for supranational, national, and subnational geographical regions-and on the
other, the subsystems of courts and legislatures Luhmann has already introduced.
Suffice it to say that these problems are too difficult to solve
here. Their solution would introduce an enormous amount of
complexity into an already complex theory. But it is difficult to
511 He discusses them toward the end of Recht der Gesellschaft, noting briefly the senses
in which different nations could and could not be said to have different legal orders. As
Luhmann notes, one difficulty in describing the legal system as a world legal system is that
enforcement of law is coupled to the political system, and the world political order is segmented geographically. See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 18, at 571-86.

512 See supra Part III.A.
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see how autopoietic theory could avoid facing these problems.
VI.

CONCLUSION: AUTOPOIETIC THEORY AND AMERICAN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

I have described Luhmann's work as an attempt to theorize a
common but usually untheorized assumption of much American
legal scholarship: the assumption that law is, in some sense, "relatively autonomous" from other social fields. In this conclusion to
the Article I want to examine, briefly, how autopoietic theory
could be "observed" from the perspective of other theoretical
projects, and how it would observe them in turn.
As a purely predictive matter, I would not expect autopoietic
theory to make much impression on those who practice what Edward Rubin has called, nonpejoratively, "standard legal scholarship": the primarily doctrinal work whose "most distinctive feature
...is its prescriptive voice, its consciously declared desire to improve the performance of legal decision-makers."513 Autopoietic
theory, as so far developed, does not speak directly to doctrinal issues, and its conceptual architecture is forbidding enough to discourage casual visitors.
Nonetheless, as I have tried to suggest in my discussion of
takings law,514 I think autopoietic theory could illuminate the
analysis of doctrinal issues. Autopoietic theory indicates that the
significance of a legal communication, such as a court decision,
needs to be understood first in terms of its connections to the network of other legal decisions. This "internal" focus is consistent
with the practice of doctrinal scholarship, as is Luhmann's discussion of the important role doctrinal analysis can play in stabilizing-but also transforming-legal communication.515 His account
of legal argument, although written from the perspective of an
"observer" rather than a participant, focuses on the courts, and
513

Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L.

REV. 1835, 1847 (1988). Rubin further characterizes standard legal scholarship as follows:
[T]he point of an article about a judicial decision is usually to remonstrate with
the judge for the conclusion reached and for the rationale adopted. The point of
an article about a statutory provision or a regulation is to expose the errors
made in drafting it, and to indicate what should have been done instead., Occasionally, an article will actually speak about a legal decision with total approbation, but that does not alter its prescriptive quality. The point is then to recommend the same course of action to other decision-makers, or to encourage the
original decision-maker to keep up the good work.
Id. at 1848.
514 See supra text accompanying notes 352-402.
515 See supra text accompanying notes 234-36.
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through the distinction between self-reference and external reference he recasts the debate between "formalist" and "realist" ap-

proaches to adjudication.516

Some fields of substantive law may be particularly suitable for
inquiry informed by autopoietic theory. Evidence scholars and

proceduralists might be attracted by Luhmann's account of the
crucial role those bodies of law play in framing the issues of a case

and in structuring the "couplings" between law and other social
spheres.517 And scholars interested in regulatory issues might consult Luhmann's ideas about the possibilities of improving, law's

openness and responsiveness to its social environment.51 A litera-

ture on regulatory issues has begun to grow around Gunther
Teubner's idea-inspired in part by autopoietic theory-of "reflexive" law, or, legal strategies that take seriously both law's closure and its coupling to other social spheres.519
The most likely consumers of autopoietic theory, however,
are those committed more to systematically interdisciplinary
scholarship than to purely doctrinal work.520 Two very different
of
sorts of projects come to mind for illustrative purposes, neither
5 21

which, however, has much engaged autopoietic theory so far.

The first project includes work referred to more or less

loosely as "postmodernism." Some features of autopoietic theory
are consistent with the general approach of postmodernist theories. Luhmann envisions society as a decentered plurality of com-

municative systems, or (if one prefers) discourses, without a constitutive human subject. No single organizing principle unites the
516
517
518

See supra text accompanying notes 251-72.
See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
See supra text accompanying notes 267-72.

519 See, e.g., REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW: STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND

EMPLOYMENT REGULATION (Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen eds., 1994); Eric W. Orts,
Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995); Michael Herz, Parallel
Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property,93 COLUM. L. REV. 1668 (1993).
520 Autopoietic theory might also illuminate the critique of purely doctrinal scholarship.
Because legal scholarship and judicial decision belong to different circuits of communication, without strong couplings between the two, the former does not often influence the
latter. Doctrinal scholarship might better be described as a self-referential network of
scholarly communication rather than a force that regularly influences decision, even if the
criteria for argument in doctrinal scholarship generally track the criteria for argument in
the courts. Cf. Schlag, supra note 10, at 844 (noting that while "normative legal thought"
is directed toward judges, "instead of reading normative legal theory in terms of what it
means for adjudication or 'law,' we can usefully read these theories for what they reveal
about the enterprise of normative legal thought"); id. at 838-45.
521 I do not mean to suggest that scholars committed to either project will necessarily be
persuaded by autopoietic theory or adopt its conceptual paraphernalia wholesale. I mean
only that an engagement with autopoietic theory might be stimulating or productive.
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various systems, and there is no privileged position from which society as a whole can be surveyed.522 Further, according to Luh-

mann, communication does not passively reflect the world, but actively constructs it, according to system-specific criteria of
relevance and value--criteria that no single communication or

communicator creates. The subject, or the "individual," is a construction or set of "subject-positions" within the communication of
the various social subsystems, not their ground."' And the development of these systems of communication is contingent and historical, not teleological.524 These aspects of autopoietic theory
seem to resonate with "postmodernist" approaches."
This is not to say, however, that autopoietic and "postmod-

ernist" theory coincide. Foucault-inspired postmodernist work has
emphasized the ubiquity of power and its circulation through non-

state as well as state channels. 26 Luhmann's autopoietic theory, by
contrast, seems to be indifferent to issues of power, except so far
as they are "coded" in terms of political power 27-- and for Luhmann, political power is by definition governmental power. 26 Fur-

ther, if one were to attempt to incorporate something like a postmodernist conception of power into autopoietic theory, one would
have to specify Luhmann's theory not just at the level of systems,
but also in terms of the particular institutions and practices
through which power circulates."' Incorporating such a concept of
522 See, e.g., ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 63, 106, 134 (no system
is central).
523 Autopoietic theory posits "psychic systems," or individual consciousnesses, as environments to the socialsystem. See supratext accompanying notes 71,295.
524 See RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 243, 277, 286, 355, 553, 559;
ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION, supranote 33, at 108.
525 See, e.g., W.T. Murphy, Systems of Systems: Some Issues in.the Relationship Between
Law and Autopoiesis, 5 LAW & CRITIQUE 241, 252-53 (1994); Wolfe, supra note 469, at
1730-31, 1735. But cf. RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr, supra note 18, at 539 (refusing the
term "postmodernity" as a description of contemporary society); Teubner, supra note 93,
at 1444 (arguing that postmodernism and autopoietic theory are similar except that the
latter seeks to move "beyond deconstructive analysis into reconstructive practice").
526 For discussions of Foucault's analysis of power relations, see, for example, Steven L.
Winter, The "Power" Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 721, 793-819 (1996); Hugh Baxter, Bringing
Foucault Into Law and Law Into Foucault,48 STAN. L. REV. 449, 451-65, 473-79 (1996).
527 Cf Michael King & Anton Schlitz, The Ambitious Modesty of Niklas Luhmann, 21
J.L. & SOC'Y 261, 265 (1994) (observing that use of system as unit of analysis might preclude "theories based upon the power inequalities between races or genders"); id. at 26465; King, supra note 480, at 230-32 (noting criticism that Luhmann's autopoietic theory
lacks a notion of power, but emphasizing that Luhmann has an idea of political power).
528 The two "power" codes of the political system, Luhmann says, are the distinctions
between government and opposition, and between governing and governed. See supra
text accompanying notes 300-01,459.
529 Cf. Jessop, supra note 136, at 256-57 (arguing that Luhmann does not reduce power
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power would also require attending to power-related differences
among social groups, such as race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. Finally, apart from the issue of power, I would expect
postmodernist theorists to reject, as I have, both Luhmann's tendency to treat systems as supraindividual subjects530 and his notion
of the binary code. In short, postmodernists would find much to
criticize in autopoietic theory,531 but they might also find engagement with the theory productive.
A second project that converges in interesting ways with
autopoietic theory is the developing literature on law and social
norms.532 While generalizations about this diffuse literature are
difficult, the term "social norms" seems to refer to informal norms,
as distinguished both from (formal) legal rules and from individual
preferences or behavior. The emphasis on norms as a determinant
of individual preferences and behavior distinguishes the social
norms project from orthodox law and economics work.533 And the
to state power, but noting that the focus on systems obscures power's strategic aspects).
530 Ginter Frankenberg quips: "Were [Luhmann's] system theory completely cynically
intended, one might with appropriate malice say that it was as postmodern as the neutron
bomb, which eliminates the subject while leaving everything else as it was." Frankenberg,
supra note 481, at 381. Frankenberg goes on, however, to note that "it would be more accurate to see [autopoietic theory] as an admittedly ingenious, but not postmodern, enterprise." Id. The reason, Frankenberg maintains, is that autopoietic theory is only too
modern in adopting a "fixed point" of analysis-not the individual subject, but the selfreferential system as subject. See supra Part V.C (criticizing Luhmann's tendency to place
autopoietic social subsystems in the position of subject).
531 Postmodernists will also object to autopoietic theory, as Luhmann has so far developed it, as a "totalizing" theory. See, e.g., COSTAS DOUZINAS ET AL., POSTMODERN
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAW at x (1991) ("[P]ostmodern
theory... distrusts all attempts to create large-scale, totalising theories in order to explain
social phenomena" and seeks to "unsettle apparently closed systems and empires of
meaning"); id. at ix. Luhmann's theory is a totalizing theory, in that he would apply the
same general principles of autopoietic theory (openness and closure; self-reference and
external reference, etc.) in every possible context of social life. But at the same time
Luhmann emphasizes the specificity and incommensurability of communication in the
various social subsystems. If he pressed further in particularizing the general principles of
autopoietic theory-a project he begins with his account of the legal system's internal differentiation-the theory might be less suspect from the point of view of postmodern theorists. Further, autopoietic theory's emphasis on systems' "closure" is qualified by Luhmann's account of their possibilities for openness.
532 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903
(1996); Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). For an
overview of the emerging literature, on which I have relied, see Richard McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338,339-54 (1997).
533 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 532, at 910-11; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning,and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); cf. Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning
and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996) (describing "norm talk" as a supplement to orthodox law and economics, but recommending "meaning talk" as a refinement
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call to consider the interplay between informal social norms and
legal rules distinguishes the norms project from what one might
call "naive legal instrumentalism"-the idea that legal rules have a
direct or unmediated influence on behavior. By developing a
more complex and accurate understanding of the social determinants of human behavior, the law-and-social-norms project aims at
more effective strategies of legal regulation (or deregulation).534
Emphasis on indirect legal regulation is a point of convergence between law-and-norms scholarship and autopoietic theory.
In his critique of consequence-oriented judicial decision, Luhmann
argues-and I think most "norms" theorists would agree-that
prediction of legal rules' effects is difficult for social scientists, let
alone generalist judges.535 Effective legal regulation requires accurate modeling of the context being regulated and attentiveness to
its extralegal forms of organization. It requires, also, consideration
of how communication in the regulated context would "observe"
the law. This complex relation of mutual observation and modeling is what Luhmann calls "structural coupling."
"Norms" theorists have proposed different strategies, in different contexts, for how this coupling between law and the norms
of a particular social sphere should be accomplished. One proposed strategy, particularly in the commercial context, has been to
discover and incorporate the norms of the regulated sphere, either
by direct incorporation into a legally enforceable rule, or by legal
deference to the social norm and its extralegal enforcement.536
of both).
534 Norms theorists differ about the criteria for effectiveness. For some, "effectiveness"
would mean that the regulation promotes efficiency; for others, it would mean that the
regulation promotes important public values other than efficiency. Examples of articles
using efficiency as a criterion include Robert D. Cooter, DecentralizedLaw for a Complex
Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1643 (1996), Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697 (1996), and Bernstein, supra note 412. Examples of articles invoking public
values instead of or in addition to efficiency include Sunstein, supra note 532, at 907-08,
and Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Productionand Race Discrimination,108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995).
535 See supra text accompanying notes 248-50. Luhmann would likely extend the point
to legislatures, although he might argue that revision of statutes in response to contrary
experience, while difficult, is more likely than the overruling of judicial decisions.
536 See*Cooter, supra note 534, at 1696 (discussing a direct incorporation of norm "if it
evolved from an appropriate incentive structure"); Bernstein, supra note 412 (relying on
an empirical study of industry norms to recommend amending the UCC to allow parties to
opt out of the UCC's interpretive approach); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The
Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1950
(1996) ("When parties choose to adhere to norms by not writing contracts, the efficiency
minded court will stay out .... ").
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Another proposed strategy has involved the "management" of social norms, by coupling legal rules and informal norms in a way
that would reinforce desirable norms and undermine undesirable
norms.537 As norms theorists have generally recognized-and as
Luhmann would emphasize-the attempt to couple law and norms
can be extraordinarily complex. Information about the relevant
norms, and the likely consequences of coupling those norms with
legal rules, can be difficult to acquire and more difficult still to incorporate into legal (particularly adjudicative) procedures.53 Effective strategies of regulation must take those difficulties into account and determine how legal communication can accomplish the
required modeling of the regulated sphere.
Despite these convergences with autopoietic theory, social
norms theorists would likely object to the level of abstraction of
autopoietic theory, or at least the level of sociological (rather than
economic) abstraction. But for some norms theorists, at least,
autopoietic theory might offer a helpful way of theorizing more
precisely the distinction between law and norms, the meaning of
claims that law and norms influence or "interact with" one another, and the difficulties inherent in the project of enforcing or
"managing" informal norms through law. The norms project suggests that informal norms enjoy a sort of "relative autonomy" from
both legal rules and individual behavior. Perhaps autopoietic theory might help specify the nature of that relative autonomy.
Finally, and apart from specific interdisciplinary projects,
autopoietic theory might offer insights into the general impulse
toward interdisciplinary scholarship. The various "law and" approaches that today dominate legal scholarship all involve forays
across disciplinary boundaries. Itself an interdisciplinary project,
autopoietic theory might defend interdisciplinary legal scholarship
against charges that, for example, law-and-economics isn't really
economics, or law-and-moral-philosophy isn't really philosophy.
Autopoietic theory would emphasize that observation of other disciplines within legal scholarship isn't, but more important can't be,
537 See Sunstein, supra note 532, at 947-67; McAdams, supra note 534; see also Lessig,
supra note 532 (describing techniques for regulating social meaning).
538 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 515, at 1679-81, 1694-96 (recommending "structural
adjudication" rather than direct inquiry into a social norm's efficiency, and recommending
legal enforcement of the norm if it arose from an "appropriate incentive structure"); Jason
Scott Johnston, The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic
Model, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1860 (1996) ("It is ... far from clear that the legal factfinding process is such that judges will be accurate in determining actual commercial
norms from the evidence presented to them in litigated disputes.").
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a simple mirroring or reproduction of what occurs on the other
side of the disciplinary boundary. Instead, this observation proceeds from premises and problematics established in legal theory-even if it seeks to transform them. 39 One might still complain that interdisciplinary legal scholarship has diminished the
complexity or nuance of the work it borrows. But the question
would be whether greater complexity and nuance in observing or
modeling the other discourse would improve the borrowing for
purposes of legal scholarship, not just whether the borrowing has
been a faithful copy of the original.
Autopoietic theory, however, would also offer two caveats to
interdisciplinary scholarship-caveats that would apply to autopoietic theory itself. The first concerns the consequences, for theory itself, of interdisciplinary borrowing. Legal scholars who borrow from other disciplines cannot assume an automatic connection
to their own discipline; instead, that connection must be established. 4° The discourse of legal theory may be open to observation
of other disciplines, but it has at the same time its own specific
forms of closure-its own criteria of relevance and value that do
not necessarily coincide with those of the borrowed discipline. Insights from other disciplines thus must be "coupled" to legaltheoretical communication; they are not automatically relevant to
legal theory simply because they come from another (and academically more prestigious) discipline.
The second caveat concerns the aspiration-probably more
common in legal scholarship than in other forms of academic
work-to influence, through theory, those parts of the world that
are not themselves theory-producing systems. 41 Here autopoietic
theory might point to the conspicuous lack of couplings between
legal scholarship and the operations of political and economic systems-and, for that matter, the operations of legal communication
in courts, agencies, and legislatures. Indeed, autopoietic theory
might identify legal theorists' aspiration to influence "the world,"
through proposals for policy or doctrinal reform, as more an "internal" premise of legal-theoretical communication than an actual
coupling between legal scholarship and any other system of com539 Autopoietic theory would point out that a discipline's boundaries are established by
the operations of the discipline itself. To that extent, they are not fixed and immovable (as
legal scholarship in the past quarter-century has demonstrated). But neither are they entirely at the disposal of individual theorists.
540 Thus, my attempts to establish connections between autopoietic theory and American legal discourse.
541 Or, at any rate, not academic-theory-producing systems.
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munication. 542
If we take the idea of autopoietic closure seriously, the problem of how legal theory can influence the world becomes more
acute. But perhaps it becomes, at the same time, more clearly
posed.

542 See supra note 501 (discussing Pierre Schlag's similar comments about "normative
legal thought").

